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Information modeling is focused on representing, using, and exchanging information in 
large-scale applications that include law-enforcement, healthcare, e-commerce, and 
others. Information modeling, as achieved by varied data formats, creates new security 
challenges. First, there is a need to integrate the security requirements of existing 
information applications that use and exchange information in via tree-structured 
documents. Second, there exists a need to consolidate this security in support of a newly 
developed information system. Third, we ask if is it possible to develop an approach for 
security for information applications that is able to reconcile the security policies across 
potential constituent component systems in an information exchange scenario. In this 
dissertation we present a security framework aimed towards an approach to modeling the 
security of information at global and local levels. This framework leverages the three 
major access control models: RBAC, LBAC, and DAC to achieve security assurance 
throughout varied scenarios. First, we introduce a security model that creates the base for 
the rest of the framework. This security model considers the access control requirements 
as realized in tree-structured documents with schemas. Second, we extend UML model 
and metamodel layers with new diagrams that provide a graphical notation for the 
security model. Third, we present a mapping process between the UML diagrams and the 
XACML that yields security policies ready to be deployed. Last, towards the overall 
purpose of the dissertation, we advance the information security problem to a software 
engineering perspective, elevating information security to a first-class citizen of the  
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software design and development process, resulting in secure information engineering. 
By tackling the problem from a perspective of tree-structured documents, any data format 
that is represented by such a structure (e.g. XML, specialized JSON structures, RDF, 
OWL, etc.) can be secured. This effectively allows us to provide separation of concerns 
with respect to information security by defining security requirements in one software 
process phase and generating enforcement policies in another phase. These enforcement 
policies are not embedded in the system, on the contraire, they are agents evaluated and 
enforced in the overall security architecture of the application. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Information modeling is focused on representing, using, and exchanging information 
in large-scale applications that include: law-enforcement repositories that use the model 
minimum uniform crash criteria data model standard (Ogle, Alluri, & Sarasua, 2011); 
healthcare collaborative and non-collaborative scenarios that use the Health Level 7‘s 
clinical document architecture (Alschuler, Mair, Boyer, & Dolin, 2002; Dolin et al., 2006) 
or the continuity of care record (Ferranti, Musser, Kawamoto, & Hammond, 2006; Kibbe, 
2005; Kibbe, Phillips, & Green, 2004) to store all types of data associated with patients; 
and, cXML (Merkow, 1999) for e-commerce communication between procurement 
applications. These information systems may support a wide range of data formats such 
as: the eXtensible Markup Language (Bray, Paoli, Sperberg-McQueen, Maler, & Yergeau, 
1998) that models documents as schemas and instances; the resource definition 
framework (Klyne, Carroll, & McBride, 2004) that brings semantics to the web; the web 
ontology language (McGuinness & Van Harmelen, 2004) that is used for applications that 
need to process semantic information instead of just its presentation; and, the JavaScript 
Object Notation (Crockford, 2006; Lanthaler & Gütl, 2012), which uses a programming 
like notation to model data interchange; etc. These information applications data often 
have a tree structure of index and entity nodes that allows for information to be modeled 
via schemas (that define structure) which can be used as blueprints for the creation of 
new documents (instances) and their validation (enforcement). In such settings, where 
sensitive data is utilized by users for time-critical applications, security that is achieved 
via access control is a paramount concern. These applications all present unique 
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challenges to the objective of providing a high-degree of protection to information. This 
is illustrated in Figure 1.1, where a role-based access control (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, 
Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001; Liebrand, Ellis, Phillips, & Ting, 2002) approach is 
represented as a user attempting to access the instances of an application. This is 
accomplished by utilizing the role of the user to determine the required instances of the 
application that are authorized by role to the user (top half of Figure 1.1) which is 
balanced with the enforcement of the access of the relevant instances via security 
schemas for roles, users, and constraints, that are able to filter the application instances 
before they are delivered to the user (bottom half of Figure 1.1). In the scenario as given 
in Figure 1.1, the ability to provide granular access control in support of information 
modeling for structured documents is based on security policies defined in an local 
manner (e.g., institutions) and guidance defined and enforced at a more global scope 
(e.g., legal entities and active pieces of legislation), has proven to be difficult to achieve.  
From a system perspective, today‘s information applications are designed and 
developed with the purpose of leveraging multiple technologies. Offering multiple 
application programming interfaces (APIs), cloud computing capabilities, web services 
such as the representational state transfer (Masse, 2011) and simple object access 
protocol (Parastatidis, Webber, Woodman, Kuo, & Greenfield, 2005), data mining 
capabilities, etc., have in turn increased the number of data formats (XML, RDF, JSON, 
OWL, etc.) used to both represent (model) and exchange information. In turn, the usage 
and information exchange of data has increased across information applications such as 
library repositories, collaborative environments, healthcare, etc., accompanied by the 
development of standardized document structures that promote and simplify 
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interconnection between systems and applications. As a process, information exchange 
involves more than one system with one or more applications, with the purpose to either 
provide a consolidated view of data stored in different repositories, or the transmission of 
data from one repository to another so that consistency of information is preserved.  
Security Schemas
n Role Schema
n User Schema
n Constraint Schema
Application
Application 
Schemas
Application 
Instances
Appl_Role.xml
Appl _User.xml
Appl_Constraint.xml
Security Officer 
Generates Security 
Application Schemas
Application
Schemas
User’s Role Determines 
the Scope of Access 
to Each Document
Filtered 
Instances
 
Figure 1.1: Document-based Secure Information Access. 
 
Information modeling as achieved by varied data formats creates new security 
challenges. First, there is a need to integrate the security requirements of existing 
information applications that use and exchange information in via tree-structured 
documents. Second, there exists a need to consolidate this security in support of a newly 
developed information system. Third, we ask if is it possible to develop an approach for 
security for information applications that is able to reconcile the security policies across 
the constituent component systems in order to control the instances that are utilized and 
shared. These three challenges in turn drive us to the main research questions that involve 
the ability to bring together multiple systems in support of a larger overriding information 
application. How do we provide a solution at an information modeling level that operates 
across various contexts? Is there be an approach that is capable of integrating the local 
security of the individual interacting information systems into some higher-level global 
security mechanism? Is it possible to integrate different access control models (e.g., 
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lattice-based access control (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993), role-based access control (RBAC) 
(Ferraiolo et al., 2001), and discretionary access control (DAC) (Dittrich, Hartig, & 
Pfefferle, 1989; Downs, Rub, Kung, & Jordan, 1985; Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)) into a 
single framework that is capable to providing a diverse and flexible approach to 
information security? Finally, how can we enforce security across multiple interoperating 
systems? The constituent systems, services, and technologies might have a varied field of 
security requirements realized through different security approaches. The main challenge 
for a newly developed information application that employs tree-structured document 
formats is to utilize to all of the resources that are available in the constituent information 
systems allowing their secure access to be achieved.  
The work presented in this dissertation provides a framework that allows for tree-
structure documents for a new information application to be modeled, utilized, and 
exchanged in conjunction with the constituent information systems (and their documents 
and services). The proposed work supports the definition of security at a model level 
(schemas) that is then enforced on the executing information application to customize the 
information (instances) that is to be utilized and exchanged. Specifically, the proposed 
work seeks to control the information security of an application by providing the ability 
to define access control permissions across LBAC, RBAC, and DAC for the information 
schemas in an application and their respective instances. For LBAC, the ability to define 
sensitivity levels (clearance for users and classifications for data) for tree structured 
documents (at the schema level) that provide a robust access control mechanism to 
control what can be seen from each authorized instance. For RBAC, the ability to define 
on with specific permissions on the tree structured documents (at the schema level) that 
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are then filtered to show custom instances that is delivered to a user is a needed 
requirement. Lastly, for DAC, the capability of defining authorizations that can be 
delegated from one user to another allows the access control (LBAC and/or RBAC) at the 
schema level to be delegated. Why are the three major access control models important? 
The answer is that they are targeting across the spectrum of the possible domains, from e-
commerce to healthcare, banking, infrastructure and national defense 
The result of all of these supports fine-grained access control of instances for: non-
destructive (document-level) operations that utilize instances as a source of information 
(e.g., read and aggregate); destructive (document-level) operations that alter instance(s) 
to reflect a change (e.g., insert, update, delete); and, other types of operations (policy-
level) that act on the instance as a whole and not in the intrinsic data found within (e.g. 
authorizations). As a result, our work provides a security framework and an associated 
security model that supports all of the aforementioned access control capabilities for 
large-scale information applications in domains such as healthcare, e-commerce, national 
defense, etc. The intent of this dissertation is to define a security for framework for tree-
structured information modeling formats that use schemas to concretely specify structure 
that are enforceable via generated security policies at the instance level to deliver only the 
information required and nothing more to the end user of an information application 
across LBAC, RBAC, and DAC access control models. The end result will include a 
secure information engineering process and the generation of security policies to enforce 
the define security against an application‘s schemas (design time) and instances (run 
time).  
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1.1 Motivation for the Healthcare Domain 
The healthcare domain, where patient information is modeled and utilized by a wide 
range of stakeholders is a prime example of a large-scale information application that 
heavily relies on tree-structured information modeling for the operation and exchange of 
medical data. In the healthcare domain, XML has emerged as the de-facto standard of 
information exchange. XML provides an extensible tree-structure for information design 
via documents that is machine readable and easy to process, combined with the ability to 
design and develop schemas for document instance validation. The existence of XML 
standards (e.g. HL7 CDA, CCR, etc.) in healthcare for representations and their use by 
numerous health information technology (HIT) systems dictate the need for a new layer 
of functionality: the ability to secure and enforce access control of an information 
application that is designed and constructed to use data from constituent local systems in 
a more global manner. In the United States, federal laws like the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (Annas, 2003; Baumer, Earp, & Payton, 2006) of 1996 
provide guidance on not only who can access information, but on how it is to be 
transmitted, disclosed and distributed; and countries throughout the world have similar 
laws. Another example legislation of the United States healthcare system, the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH act enforcement 
interim final rule.2014) Act of 2009, which aims to promote the adoption and meaningful 
use of health information technology while addressing the privacy and security concerns 
of electronic transmission of private patient information and health information exchange 
(HIE); and again, there are international efforts and ongoing efforts on electronic usage of 
patient data/HIE. Providing a solution for security in scenarios like these needs to 
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consider all the elements in play (legal constructs, system‘s requirements, capabilities, 
technologies, etc.) and must be able to integrate the essential components in a sensible 
way. In support of this, as shown in the right hand side of Figure 1.2, the proposed 
security framework is comprised of multiple access control mechanisms, the algorithms 
and infrastructure for permission definition that are used for policy generation. The 
bottom of the figure shows the generated policies that are filtered for delivery to the end 
user.  
To illustrate, consider a healthcare information application – a system of systems - 
built as a combination of constituent HIT systems (right hand side of Figure 1.2), where 
each one can have their own local security policies. The example is focused on a 
healthcare information application composed of: two electronic health records (EHRs), 
OpenEMR (Sainz de Abajo & Ballestero, 2012) and Practice Fusion (Practice 
fusion.2014)), utilized by a hospital, clinic or medical provider; a personal health record 
(PHR) Microsoft HealthVault (Microsoft HealthVault.2014) for patients to manage their 
own health information; and, a patient portal (PP) that provides a means for 
appointments, referrals, and interactions with a medical provider. The bottom right shows 
two information applications: PHA and SMARTSYNC. Personal Health Assistant (PHA) 
which consists of two related mobile health applications for health information 
management, one that supports a patient/healthcare provider scenario where the patient 
can authorize a subset of the PHI (CCR instance) stored in MSHV to different providers 
at different time, and a second that allows providers to select and view the authorized PHI 
on a patient-by-patient basis. SMARTSync for medication reconciliation (Ziminski, De la 
Rosa Algarín, A., Saripalle, Demurjian, & Jackson, 2012), takes patient medications from 
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MSHV and the Harvard SMART Platform Electronic Medical Record (EMR) and from 
this information is able to generate a summary list of medications/supplements added by 
patients (in MSHV) with those prescribed by a patient’s medical provider to generate a 
color-coded list of potential overmedication, adverse interactions, and adverse reactions 
for the patient and provider. Both PHA and SMARTSYNC need to utilize local security 
policies of the constituent HIT systems (OpenEMR, MSHV, etc.) guided by the security 
requirements and capabilities (access control models, and/or permissions) of those 
constituent systems in order to construct a global security policy that integrates and their 
security capability/model/policy (left side of Figure 1.2). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the healthcare application as shown in the left 
hand side of Figure 1.2 will support multiple access control models (LBAC, RBAC, and 
DAC), which in healthcare would support the definition of security policies on an tree-
structured documents (patient data) at the schema level can then be used to specify (allow 
or deny) different permissions on certain portions of the schema‘s instances. This will 
allow the same instance to appear differently to specific users (patients and medical 
providers) acting in a chosen role at different times, with the ability to severely limit 
access to data (using LBAC classifications to protect mental health data that is more 
restrictive under HIPAA) while simultaneously allowing authority to be delegated (so that 
a provider in an emergent situation can get the authority to access a system s/he has not 
previously been asked to use). To accomplish this, we leverage a secure information 
engineering process that promotes the consideration of security at the early stage of the 
software development and continued throughout the process. In healthcare, the use of an 
XML schema for an information application requires a security framework for that tree-
9 
 
structured schema that allows the design, implementation, and deployment of an 
enforceable security policy to allow access to instances to be precisely controlled by role, 
security level, or delegation authority. The definition of security at the schema level 
separates the security from the instances, which avoids the overhead required when 
updating security policies that would otherwise be embedded in the instances themselves. 
Figure 1.2 demonstrated that data will be obtained from different systems that have their 
own local security policy, and in some cases, there may be the need to translate the data 
from a local source into an tree-structured format such as XML in order to define the 
local security policy and allow the information to be shared, as shown by the DOC-C 
yellow diamond in Figure 1.2. As a result, for the research in this dissertation, we 
generalize from a security framework with a tree-structure information model with varied 
access control (LBAC, RBAC, and DAC) that is able to generate security policies for 
enforcement to a detailed example of the specialization of our approach to where XML is 
the information format. 
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Figure 1.2: Interplay of Information in the Healthcare Domain between Computational 
Systems. 
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Security for healthcare goes well beyond the needs of compliance of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which provides a set of security 
guidelines in the usage, transmission, and sharing of protected health information (PHI); 
protecting personally identifiable information (PII), including names, addresses, 
accounts, credit card numbers, etc.; encryption of PHI and PII data and its secure 
transition (e.g. SSL); extensive usage of standards such as the Health Level Seven‘s 
(HL7) clinical document architecture (CDA) (Bilykh, Jahnke, McCallum, & Price, 2006) 
and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) for storage of administrative, patient 
demographics, and clinical data; and the leveraging of XML for a wide range of 
healthcare standards (CDA, CCR, LOINC, SNOMED, UMLS). Instead, to attain security 
for healthcare, we will need all of these underlying technologies and standards that must 
be coupled with a strong understanding of the way that healthcare data is utilized by a 
wide range of stakeholders, including patients, providers, researchers, etc. In HIT 
systems, CDA and CCR come together in various systems such as EHRs for 
organizations to manage patient data, PHRs like Microsoft HealthVault for patients to 
track their health history; and, PPs where a patient can make appointments, order refills, 
request referrals, etc., as shown in Figure 1.2.  
As CDA and CCR documents are circulated among various systems and made 
available to particular users with specific needs, we must expand security from each 
individual local system to a focus that is more expansive in controlling a CCR document 
and its content, particularly for HIE, and in the rapidly emerging mobile healthcare 
domain, where patients manage personal health information for chronic diseases and need 
to securely access information and authorize its exchange with medical providers via 
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mobile applications, EHRs, secure emails, or other means. This will require document-
level access control of XML schemas to allow XML instances to appear differently to 
authorized users at specific times based on criteria that include, but are not limited to, a 
user‘s role, time and value constraints on data usage, collaboration for sharing data, 
delegation of authority, etc.  
The emerging trends in healthcare are all strongly tied to information usage, sharing, 
and exchange, across a wide range of medical initiatives related to patient care. First, a 
Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH) (Reid et al., 2009; Zajac, Norris, & Keenum, 
2014) that is targeted toward coordinating chronic conditions and optimizing care plays 
by interacting with multiple stakeholders (e.g., specialists, therapists, visiting nurses); in 
this situation, there may be a need for the lead provider to access information in other 
EHRs, PHRs, PPs, etc., in a timely manner. Second, accountable care organizations 
(ACOs) (Accountable care organizations.2011) that bring together larger groups of 
providers, clinics, and hospitals in an effort to give coordinated care to Medicare patients, 
which is particularly for chronic conditions, attempts to eliminate duplicate test and 
procedures. Third, secondary use (SU) (Safran et al., 2007) of clinical data that allows 
both providers and researchers to analyze specific diseases and their treatments across a 
large patient base via a clinical research data warehouses (CRDW), seeking events such 
adverse drug reactions, infection monitoring, disease monitoring in a larger population. 
Fourth, personalized medicine (PM) (Hamburg & Collins, 2010) which is targeting to 
treat individual based on their unique medical profiles which might include specific types 
of diseases and focus on the use of a patient‘s genomic information. In support of all of 
these initiatives, secure information engineering is vital to insure that the correct data is 
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available at the specific time by the appropriate stakeholder. In support of all of these 
initiatives, secure information engineering for information applications as shown in 
Figure 1.2 is vital to insure that the correct data is available at the specific time by the 
appropriate stakeholder. Note that what is shared in an HIE implementation is determined 
by the institute (practice, clinic, hospital, etc.) that owns the data; it doesn‘t mean all data 
is shared and the data to be shared is often offloaded into another server particularly 
intended for that purpose PCMH, ACO, SU, and PM support this infrastructure from 
three viewpoints: the reconciliation of security (both local and global) within the 
environment to insure that the required clinical data reaches the medical providers 
involved in PCMH and PM; the availability of de-identified patient data for providers and 
clinical researchers, in support of ACO and SU, that can be used for data analysis, 
mining, and clinical decision support in order to learn about what works and what doesn‘t 
in terms of treatments of various illnesses and diseases; the facilitation of the first two 
perspectives via the use of the eXtensible Markup Language and all of the associated 
standard, and terminologies. To demonstrate document-level security aspects of the work 
in this proposal, we use a healthcare and CCR case study of the Personal Health Assistant 
(PHA) application, which consists of two related mobile health applications for health 
information management, one that supports a patient/healthcare provider scenario where 
the patient can authorize a subset of the PHI (CCR instance) stored in MSHV to different 
providers at different time, and a second that allows providers to select and view the 
authorized PHI on a patient-by-patient basis.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The security framework in this dissertation is aimed towards a comprehensive 
approach to modeling the security of an information application in support of efforts such 
as PCMU, etc., at global and local levels operating within an environment that is driven 
to use, share, and exchange, and having to deal with the distributed nature of repositories, 
the fragmentation of data across these constituent HIT systems, and differences on 
sharing and security policies across them. Towards this purpose, we advance the 
information security problem to a software engineering perspective, elevating 
information security to a first-class citizen of the software design and development 
process. This secure information engineering is accomplished by leveraging and 
extending the Unified Modeling Language (Fowler, 2004) and the Meta-Object Facility 
(Poernomo, 2006) M2 layer with new constructs. With these new constructs, the security 
framework for secure information engineering and enforcement can provide guidance and 
structure for secure information usage and exchange. By tackling the problem from a 
perspective of tree-structured documents, any data format that is represented by such a 
structure (e.g. XML, specialized JSON structures, RDF, OWL, etc.) can be secured. This 
effectively allows us to provide separation of concerns with respect to information 
security by defining security requirements in one software process phase and generating 
enforcement policies in another phase. These enforcement policies are not embedded in 
the system, on the contraire, they are agents evaluated and enforced in the overall security 
architecture of the application. 
In this dissertation, the initial high-level view of our information security framework 
(De la Rosa Algarín, A., Demurjian, Berhe, & Pavlich-Mariscal, 2012; De la Rosa 
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Algarín, A., Ziminski, Demurjian, Kuykendall, & Rivera Sánchez, 2013; De la Rosa 
Algarín, A., Ziminski, Demurjian, Rivera Sanchez, & Kuykendall, 2013; De la Rosa 
Algarín, A., Demurjian, Ziminski, Rivera Sanchez, & Kuykendall, 2013) for information 
usage, sharing, and exchange can be defined as given in Figure 1.3. Security (via access 
control models) is defined at the schema level and realized at the instance level through 
the creation and generation of eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (Godik, 
Anderson, Parducci, Humenn, & Vajjhala, 2002) policies (as shown by the Information 
Security Extensions to UML box). Figure 1.3 illustrate the overall proposed information 
security framework, which starts with the ability for a designer to pick and choose to 
create local XACML security policies of constituent information systems (e.g. 
SchemaCIS1, SchemaCIS1, SchemaCIS3, SchemaCIS4) and policies for meta-systems (e.g. 
SchemaLSIA1 and SchemaLSIA2) for applications (in HIT, these would be EHRs, PHRs, 
PPs, etc.). The resulting information security framework achieves granular security by 
taking the generated XACML policies and enforcing them on the targeted schemas and 
instances via a combination of schema modeling, policy definition and policy generation, 
as shown in the second horizontal box in Figure 1.3. These policies support the three 
major access control models (LBAC, RBAC and DAC), as shown in the third horizontal 
box in Figure 1.3, and provide a custom or filtered view based on role, user clearance 
against data classification, and delegated authority.  
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Figure 1.3: Information Security framework in a Healthcare Scenario. 
 
Our approach provides separation of security concerns to tackle the challenge of 
changing security policies that can apply to multiple instances. This framework is built by 
leveraging prior work on secure software engineering using UML (Pavlich-Mariscal, 
Demurjian, & Michel, 2008), which proposed the creation of new UML-like diagrams for 
the NIST RBAC, MAC and DAC models that were consistent with an object-oriented 
design paradigm. In our work, we adopt these ideas but apply them in order to create new 
UML diagrams that can capture tree-structured schemas, roles, sensitivity levels, 
delegation rules and authorization rules that allow privileges on an application‘s schemas 
(see the fourth horizontal box in Figure 1.3) to be allowed and/or denied to different users 
different times. All of these applications require that the document that is delivered to a 
user be restricted by role (a filtering of the content of the instance), by security level 
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(sensitivity of data vs. clearance of user), and by delegation of authority, in order to 
insure that only the authorized information is provided to the user; these are referred to as 
security enforced instances that have gone through potentially multiple levels of security 
until the instances has reached a state where it can be safely presented to a user. The end 
result, shown in the bottom horizontal box in Figure 1.3, are generated security policy 
models for the new systems. 
By achieving this security framework for tree-structured schemas and instances, 
leveraging three major components (UML, XACML and access control models: LBAC, 
RBAC and DAC), we present a model-driven approach to document-level security and 
policy generation. Our intent is to bring together the processes of software engineering 
and knowledge engineering overlaid with a security emphasis, resulting in a broader 
definition of secure information engineering, a term that we mean to denote a 
comprehensive process that leverages both software and knowledge engineering in order 
to emphasize on their information to be secured. In turn, designers can follow a secure 
information engineering process model to achieve both the modeling and security 
definition of an application. In the perspective of information exchange, the document-
level security framework for tree-structured documents produces local security policies 
that act on the system being engineered and developed. Utilizing the extensions to UML 
with respect to LBAC, RBAC and DAC, we can also integrate these local policies into an 
all-encompassing meta-policy that can be utilized by a newly developed meta-system 
(system of systems).  
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1.3 Research Objectives and Expected Contributions 
From the research perspective, the problem of secure information and sharing is 
achieved by realizing the following expected contributions. 
A. Security Model and Access Control Integration: The contribution of this aspect 
of our work is to provide a security model that leverages the RBAC, LBAC and 
DAC models with support for their capabilities and features, facilitating the 
extension of modeling components (such as UML diagrams) to realize granular 
information security across different access control concepts. Towards this 
objective, we have defined a proper security model that generalizes away from 
XML and moves towards the security of tree-structured documents. In this 
contribution, we assert that RBAC and LBAC features are orthogonal (non-
conflicting). 
B. UML Extensions for Tree-structured Document Security: The contribution of 
this aspect of our work is to represent a tree-structured schema as an UML-like 
diagram which is augmented with security features that capture the core aspects of 
the three main access control models: LBAC, RBAC, and DAC. To date, we have 
developed two new UML diagrams: the Document Schema Class Diagram 
(DSCD), which is a generalization of the XML Schema Class Diagram (XSCD), 
to represent a tree-structured schema as an UML-like diagram; and, the Document 
Role-Slice Diagram (DRSD), a generalization of the XML Role Slice Diagram 
(XRSD), to represent RBAC security. Representing the tree-structured schemas 
with these diagrams permits us to tackle document security from an information 
engineering perspective. This provides several benefits, including a more 
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consistent process towards secure information engineering, and facilitating the 
secure policy generation process by utilizing modeling artifacts that contain all 
the pertinent information for the security policy. 
C. Security Policy Generation: The intent of this objective is to leverage XML and 
UML for an automatic policy Creation. This is achieved via a mapping from the 
new UML security diagrams for LBAC, RBAC and DAC, and the Oasis XACML 
(Godik et al., 2002) Policy structure, which can be used as part of an enforcement 
mechanism to assure security. Towards this contribution, we have also introduced 
a mapping algorithm that considers LBAC, RBAC and DAC security components 
and integrates them into a single enforcement policy for a required application. 
D. Secure Information Engineering: This contribution provides a secure 
information engineering process to systems information by focusing on the 
perspective of the information to be secured. As shown in Figure 1.3, this secure 
information engineering process involves the security model by modeling the 
tree-structured schemas to be secured with the respective access control models 
(Contribution A), the use of UML diagram and metamodel extensions that realize 
the security model (Contribution B), and the generation of locally acting security 
policies (Contribution C) into enforcement policies for a newly developed or 
existing system. The end result of this contribution is a formal engineering 
process that a software designer or developer can follow in order to ensure 
security and information assurance in their respective application. 
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1.4 Research Progress to Date  
In support of the proposed information security framework, a number of articles have 
been published or in the process of publication (accepted or in the printing stage). In the 
first paper, a case for security in digital healthcare is made by considering the current 
state of affairs in the United States. 
 Demurjian, S., De la Rosa Algarín, A., Bi, J., Berhe, S., Agresta, T., Wang, W., 
Blechner, M. (2013). A Viewpoint of Security for Digital Health Care: What's 
There? What Works? What's Needed? (Accepted) To appear in International 
Journal of Privacy and Health Information Management. 
In the second paper, an approach for functional, collaborative and information 
security leveraging UML is presented. 
 Pavlich-Mariscal, J. A., Berhe, S., De la Rosa Algarín, A. and Demurjian, S. A. 
(2013). An Integrated Secure Software Engineering Approach for Functional, 
Collaborative, and Information Concerns. (Accepted) To appear in State-of-the-
Art Concepts and Future Directions in Software Engineering, IGI Global. 
In the third and fourth papers, a methodology to generate XACML enforcement 
policies from a UML diagram that models role-based access control is discussed. 
 De la Rosa Algarín, A., Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K. 
and Kuykendall, R. (2013). Generating XACML Enforcement Policies for Role-
Based Access Control of XML Documents. (WEBIST 2013 Selected Papers) 
(Accepted) To appear in Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing 
(LNBIP), Springer-Verlag. 
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 De la Rosa Algarín, A., Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Kuykendall, R. and 
Rivera Sánchez, Y. (2013). Defining and Enforcing XACML Role-Based Security 
Policies within an XML Security Framework. Proceedings of 9th International 
Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies (WEBIST 2013) (pp. 
16-25), doi:10.5220/0004366200160025 
In the fifth paper, UML extensions for integrated RBAC are presented. The work in 
this paper allows security engineers to integrate heterogeneous system‘s RBAC security 
into an all-encompassing policy that can be utilized by a newly developed meta-system. 
 De la Rosa Algarín, A. and Demurjian, S. A. (2013). An Approach to Facilitate 
Security Assurance for Information Sharing and Exchange in Big Data 
Applications. Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Technologies 
Security, pp. 65-83. Elsevier (Kaufman). Editors: Babak Akhgar and Hamid R. 
Arabnia. 
In the last two papers an overview of the general approach of this dissertation is 
given, specifically focusing on extending UML with RBAC security constructs. 
 De la Rosa Algarín, A., Demurjian, S. A., Ziminski, T. B., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K. 
and Kuykendall, R. (2013). Securing XML with Role-Based Access Control: Case 
Study in Health Care. Architectures and Protocols for Secure Information 
Technology (APSIT), pp. 334-365, IGI Global. Editors: Antonio Ruiz Martínez, 
Fernando Pereñíguez García, and Rafael Marín López. 
 De la Rosa Algarín, A., Demurjian, S. A., Berhe, S. and Pavlich-Mariscal, J. 
(2012). A Security Framework for XML Schemas and Documents for Healthcare. 
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Proceedings of 2012 International Workshop on Biomedical and Health 
Informatics (BHI 2012) (pp. 782-789), doi:10.1109/BIBMW.2012.6470239 
1.5 Organization of Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation has six chapters. Chapter 2 provides the motivation 
and examples from the healthcare domain will be utilized throughout the discussion, as 
well as background information on the major concepts of the work, including UML, 
RBAC, LBAC, DAC and XACML. Chapter 3 presents the underlying security model for 
RBAC, LBAC and DAC of tree-structured documents by discussing each access control 
model support independently, and then demonstrating an example that utilizes all three. 
Chapter 4 discusses the portion of the security framework that involves extensions to 
UML with seven new information diagrams to model RBAC, LBAC and DAC 
capabilities. More specifically, it presents the Document Schema Class Diagram, which 
serves to model the tree-structured schema as a UML diagram; the Secure Information 
Diagram, which presents a subset of the schema to be secured; the LBAC Secure 
Information Diagram, which supports LBAC; the Document Role Slice Diagram, which 
serves as a generalized version of the XML Role Slice Diagram; the User Diagram, 
which considers LBAC features from the user perspective; the Authorization Diagram, 
which supports schema and instance authorizations; and, the Delegation Diagram, which 
supports DAC. Chapter 5 details the security policy generation process by leveraging the 
UML extensions from Chapter 4 and XACML, demonstrating the different mapping 
processes with respect to the supported access control models. Chapter 6 demonstrates 
the secure information engineering process and the prototype of the security model and 
framework by utilizing a mobile application targeted for healthcare and XML as the tree-
22 
 
structured document format to be secured. Last, Chapter 7 offers concluding remarks and 
ongoing/future research areas created by the work of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
 
This section reviews background concepts for this dissertation in a wide range of 
areas to support the detailed material in the remaining chapters. First, Section 2.1 briefly 
reviews the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998) and its usage in the 
two dominant healthcare standards: Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture (HL7 
CDA) (Alschuler et al., 2002) and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) (Kibbe et al., 
2004). Next, Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present the various access control models that are 
utilized in support of the work in this dissertation, respectively: lattice-based access 
control (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993) that assigns sensitivity levels to subjects (clearances) and 
objects (classifications) to control access to information; role-based access control 
(RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) that focuses on the responsibilities of the users for an 
application per role; and discretionary access control (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) 
to allow both authority and privileges to be passed from one user to another. Then, 
Section 2.5 presents a set of assumptions for the healthcare domain, more specifically, 
detailing the way that health information technology (HIT) systems leverage private and 
protected information in interacting with patients for care and treatment. Next, Section 
2.6 presents a scenario of information usage in the healthcare domain using the two 
dominant standards (HL7 CDA and CCR) with an emphasis on the way to secure the 
information across differing degrees of granularity and requirements. Using this as a 
basis, Section 2.7 introduces the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Fowler, 2004) and 
its metamodeling capabilities that are going to be utilized throughout this dissertation to 
define the new UML diagrams to support the modeling of XML and LBAC/RBAC/DAC. 
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Lastly, Section 2.8 introduces the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) (Godik et al., 2002), a language utilized to create formal and enforceable 
security policies for XML documents.  
2.1 The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) 
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998) facilitates the modeling 
and exchange of information between disciplines, offering a flexible means to collect and 
transmit data between interacting information systems and platforms. XML provides a 
common, structured language that is independent of the system that utilizes it, and 
supports information to be hierarchically structured and tagged, with the tags offering the 
capabilities to represent the semantics of the information. XML supports the definition of 
an XML schema that defines data (elements) to be modeled accompanied by their 
interdependencies; this is akin to a class diagram or entity in a database design. By 
allowing the definition of XML schemas (see Figure 2.1) provides the mechanism to both 
define a standard for the information that can be used both as a blueprint for the content 
of an instance (which has to obey the schema) and as a means to validate instances that 
are being exchanged in or to insure that they seeking to comply with the required format. 
Towards this end, the main mechanism behind XML schemas is the XML Schema 
Definition (XSD), which follows the XML Schema language. 
Figure 2.1 shows an example of an XML schema that could be used in a healthcare 
scenario. This example, which represents a generic patient, shows the tree-structure of 
XML documents. In Figure 2.1, the node designated by <xsd:element name=‖patient‖> 
acts as the root node of the tree. The direct child of that node is an element designated 
with the <xsd:complexType> tag, which is in turn followed by a sequence of nodes that 
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can contain different attributes. For the purposes of this dissertation, we consider non-leaf 
nodes as those that provide context. In turn, leaf nodes provide value to their parental 
context. As one would expect in a healthcare example, information stored on patients 
include the name (first last), birthdate, vital statistics (height, weight, gender), along with 
diagnostic data (blood pressure, pulse). Once an XML schema such as patient has been 
defined, it is then possible to create instances of the schema, representing the actual 
documents that are being stored and exchanged by an application. Figure 2.2 shows two 
examples of an XML instance for the schema presented in Figure 2.1, providing both a 
male and a female patient. The instance on the left hand side of Figure 2.2 is for a female 
patient called Carol Smith (denoted by the <patient>) contains the name, height in 
meters, weight in kilograms, etc. Similarly, the instance on the right hand side of Figure 
2.2 is for Carol Smith‘s husband, Joseph Smith, likewise with data for name, height, etc. 
Note that schemas and instances in XML follow a tree structure; and while the work in 
this dissertation assumes such a tree structure will be applied to XML, it can also be 
generalized to other document formats such as JSON (Crockford, 2006), OWL 
(McGuinness & Van Harmelen, 2004), etc. 
 
Figure 2.1: Generic Schema Segment for a ―patient‖. 
<xsd:element name="patient"> 
 <xsd:complexType name="patientInfo"> 
 <xsd:element name=”firstName”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”lastName”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”birthdate”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”height”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”weight”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”gender”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”bloodType”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”systolic”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”diastolic”/> 
 <xsd:element name=”pulse”/> 
 </xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
26 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Instantiated ―patient‖ Segment. 
2.2 Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC) 
The lattice-based access control model (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993) and the mandatory 
access control model (Bell & La Padula, 1976) were simultaneously proposed in 1976. 
Both LBAC and MAC share the approach that there are security sensitivity levels that are 
assigned to subjects (clearance) and objects (classification) with the permissions for the 
subject to read and/or write an object dependent on the relationship between clearance 
and classifications. MAC typically is modeling using four sensitivity levels which are 
hierarchically ordered from most to least secure: top secret (TS) < secret (S) < classified 
(C) < unclassified (U)). LBAC generalizes this approach by ordering the sensitivity levels 
in a lattice that determines the relative ranking of each sensitivity level vs the others. 
Security policies in LBAC and MAC are using defined by a security administrator with 
the intent to control information flow in computer systems where users prohibited from 
changing their security attributes. In LBAC and MAC, access to objects (e.g., segments 
of an XML document, tables in a database, etc.) by subjects (e.g., users, processes in a 
system, etc.) is granted based on the security definitions on the targeted object (exhibited 
via tags) and the credentials granted to the user. There have been several implementations 
of both LBAC (IBM Informix (IBM-informix database software.2014) and DB2 LUW 
<patient>     
 <patientInfo> 
 <firstName>Carol</firstName> 
 <lastName>Smith</lastName> 
 <birthDate> 
1983-04-13T00:00:00Z 
</birthDate> 
 <height>1.70</height> 
 <weight>40</weight> 
 <gender>F</gender> 
 <bloodType>O</bloodType> 
 <systolic>110</systolic> 
 <diastolic>70</diastolic> 
 <pulse>85</pulse> 
 </patientInfo> 
</patient>     
<patient>     
 <patientInfo> 
 <firstName>Joseph</firstName> 
 <lastName>Smith</lastName> 
 <birthDate> 
1990-05-26T00:00:00Z 
</birthDate> 
 <height>2.1</height> 
 <weight>80</weight> 
 <gender>M</gender> 
 <bloodType>A</bloodType> 
 <systolic>95</systolic> 
 <diastolic>50</diastolic> 
 <pulse>75</pulse> 
 </patientInfo> 
</patient>     
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(Rjaibi, 2006)) and MAC (FreeBSD as part of the TrustedBSD, (Dinh-Trong & Bieman, 
2005), Windows with Windows Vista (Conover, 2006), Trusted Solaris (Faden, 2006), 
and the NSA SELinux research project (McCarty, 2004)).  
In both LBAC and MAC, security features can be selected to govern the read and 
write permissions of users with certain clearance levels and elements with certain 
classification levels to dictate the way that information at one level is allowed to be read 
or written at another level. In fact, as outlined in (DoD trusted computer system 
evaluation criteria.2014):   
―A subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's 
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's 
security level and the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level 
include all the non- hierarchical categories in the object's security level. A subject can 
write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level is 
less than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security level and all 
the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are included in the non-
hierarchical categories in the object's security level. ‖ 
Today, these rules have been realized as a set of security properties. Simple security 
(SS), or read-down, no read-up, is the permission to read at equal or lower levels. That is, 
a user is allowed to read elements with a sensitivity level lower than their clearance level, 
but not those elements with a higher sensitivity level. Simple integrity (SI), or write-
down, no write-up, is the permission to write to equal or lower levels. That is, a user can 
write elements with a lower sensitivity level when compared to their clearance level, but 
not to those elements with a higher sensitivity. Liberal star (LS), or write-up, no write-
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down, is the permission to write to equal or greater levels (the opposite of SI). Finally, 
Strict Star Write (SSW) and Strict Star Read (SSR), or write (read) equal, is the 
permission to write (read) only to equal levels. From a definition and management 
perspective, a security administrator would set the clearance level of users following the 
predefined sensitivity levels (e.g., TS, S, C, and U) to establish the levels for both 
subjects and objects. These levels are then augmented on a user-by-user basis by 
assigning the ability to read (via SS or SSR) and the ability to write (via SI, LS, or SSW). 
Once this has all been established for an application it then supports the definition of 
permissions and levels (e.g., the elements of a patient‘s health record) in order to 
maintain confidentiality by preventing an unauthorized provider to access sensitive 
information (e.g., not all providers are able to access mental health history) and to 
prohibit a patient from changing their own record.  
2.3 Role-based Access Control (RBAC)  
In the role-based access control model (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001), the intent is to 
allow the responsibilities of the role within the application to dictate the permissions for a 
given user. Roles are defined in an application in order to name entities that are often 
related to job categories and responsibilities that can be extrapolated from individual 
users and established as a reusable role. For example, in a healthcare application, a role 
for Nurse or Physician could be defined to capture all of the capabilities in terms of 
access and modification of information that are available for a user assigned a given role. 
Unlike LBAC, in RBAC, the users as subjects are assigned roles with the roles then 
assigned permissions as shown in Figure 2.3. In that way, the role(s) that a user are 
assigned to can vary based on what the user is doing in a given application at a specific 
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time. For example, a nurse Sara might have a NurseManager role to be able to manage 
the unit (all other nurses, staff, and patients) that they are supervising in a hospital and 
have a NurseCare role to be able to manage the information associated with her assigned 
patients. Sara can plan either NurseManager or the NurseCare role at any one point in 
time. 
The standardized version of RBAC, defined by the National Institute for Standards 
(NIST) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) contains four reference models, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
RBAC0 allows for policies to be denied at the role level instead of the individual level. 
This is akin to the Nurse or Physician role above. To handle role hierarchies, RBAC1, 
shown in the upper middle portion of Figure 2.3, allows for roles to be organized in a 
hierarchical fashion and as a result, parent roles to pass down common privileges to 
children roles so that permissions high in the hierarchy can be inherited by the roles 
below, and specific permissions are associated with roles that act as leafs in the hierarchy. 
In the example above, Nurse could be a parent role of both NurseManager and NurseCare 
and contain the privileges that would be shared by both roles. This allows the definition 
of roles to be more clearly organized into a hierarchy with privileges defined in one 
location passing down the tree to other roles and sub-roles.  
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Figure 2.3: NIST RBAC0, RBAC1, and RBAC2. 
 
The next level of RBAC, RBAC2, shown in the upper left of Figure 2.3, provides for 
the definition of constraints, such as separation of duty (SoD), mutual exclusion (ME), 
and cardinality. Separation of duty mandates that in order to complete a particular task, a 
number of individuals must participate, and, as a result, have a separation in their actual 
duties to accomplish a given task. For example, a patient arriving at an emergency room 
with heart symptoms is triaged and evaluated by a nurse, the ER physician, and a 
cardiologist; all have users have their separate roles and their specific duties to 
accomplish to treat the patient. Each will have the ability to write their own portion of the 
patient record (e.g., Nurse for history, ER physician for ordering tests, and cardiologist 
for evaluating an EKG) involving the need to all read the information in real-time, but 
may be prohibited from seeing the information (the nurse can‘t see the EKG results) until 
such time as allowed another use (cardiologist). SoD ensures that the authorization role 
that grants permissions exists as a different entity to the other roles. This ensures that 
roles are not allowed themselves to view sensitive data they would otherwise have no 
authorization to. Mutual exclusion ensures that two or more specific roles may not be 
assigned to any particular user, enforced by restrictions put in place by the cardinality 
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constraint (the number of users/permissions getting assigned to a particular role). RBAC3 
introduces the concept of sessions that represent the lifetime of a particular user, role, 
permission and their association for a dynamic runtime application. 
2.4 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
In the discretionary access control model (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994), access 
to objects is permitted or denied based on the subject‘s identity or the group they are part 
of with the ability to have privileges pass among users either under the control of a user 
or as dictated by a security administrator. DAC utilizes the concept of delegation to be 
able to pass privileges among users in certain situations and under specific constraints. A 
user has both the authority to delegate his/her permissions to another user as well as to 
authority to pass on the ability to delegate to another user who can then delegate to a third 
sure. There are two types of delegation authority in DAC. The first, administrative 
delegation, has a security office control who to delegate to whom and when to delegate. 
This would be useful in a university application where the head of an academic 
department may delegate his authority to another faculty member in his/her absence in 
order to run the department. The second, user-directed delegation puts the capability to 
both authorize and delegate to the user. In the above healthcare application, a physician 
John would delegate his authority to another physician Tom who is covering John‘s 
patients for the evening as the on-call physician. In both of these cases, the delegation 
would essentially transfer the permissions (either LBAC or RBAC) and the involved 
objects from one user to another. So John would specifically transfer his OnCallMD role 
to Tom along with access to his patients. 
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There are different ways to implement DAC under the assumptions of either LBAC 
or RBAC. In one approach, the permissions and the objects they apply to can be 
delegated. That is, every object would contain an owner that controls the permissions on 
that object, and would as a result control which users can access the object, and which 
permissions are allowed. This may not be manageable in many applications since it 
assumes that the user plays a significant role in both the definition and management of 
permissions, objects, and delegations. A second approach would permit users to delegate 
(transfer) their permissions (access) that target certain objects with other users. In this 
situation, it makes sense for a physician to pass on his/her OnCallMD role along with all 
of his/her patients to another physician; this leverages RBAC concepts and allows a user 
to pass on a role. In an LBAC setting, authorizations would be established to allow an 
individual with a clearance to have access to objects and their elements as constrained by 
classifications on the complete objects. This security capability can be utilized as an extra 
layer of security (only those authorized objects are the ones a user can perform any 
operations on), or as a fallback capability (delegating authorizations when a primary care 
provider is not available and someone with equal credentials is). 
2.5 Healthcare Domain Assumptions  
The work of this dissertation involves several assumptions with regards to security 
and the healthcare domain in HIT applications. The first assumption involves the idea 
that there are a set of HIT applications that are relevant in the healthcare domain. These 
include: electronic health records (EHRs), which are typically used in provider 
institutions such as hospitals, clinics and private practices, and serve the purpose of 
storing patient health information for continuous care; personal health records (PHRs), 
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which are provided by several institutions (e.g. Microsoft HealthVault (Microsoft 
HealthVault.2014), WebMD (WebMD.2014), etc.) for patients to use in order to maintain 
their own record of health information that can potentially contain information not found 
in EHRs; patient portals (PPs), which act as a door to an EHR from the perspective of the 
patient and have functionalities such as medical appointments managing, prescription 
repositories, etc.; and, a wide range of ancillary systems for pharmacy, diagnostic 
laboratories, therapy centers, and so on. These applications are candidates for the usage 
of our security framework presented in this dissertation to allow for the information that 
must be exchanged to be appropriately modeled. 
The second assumption considers the conditions under which information is modeled. 
Specifically, we assume that HIT applications model information utilizing a tree structure 
of index and entity nodes that allows for information to be modeled via schemas (that 
define structure) which can be used as blueprints for the creation of new documents 
(instances) and their validation (enforcement). In such settings, where sensitive data is 
utilized by users for time-critical applications, security that is achieved via access control 
is a paramount concern. Once such example of a tree-structured document is in XML, as 
was discussed in Section 2.1, including XML‘s usage in standards such as HL7 CDA and 
CCR. 
Our third assumption is that a myriad of users with potentially different roles (RBAC) 
and clearance levels (LBAC) are interested in accessing the information to be secured 
from the set of HIT systems. There is a need to bring together all of the information 
found in heterogeneous HIT applications (e.g. EHRs, PHRs, PP, etc., in the first 
assumption) in a way that appropriate and required access control across the integrated 
34 
 
set of HITs is achieved. This dissertation thrives under the assumption that different 
information systems exist, some of them possibly built as large-scale information systems 
(LSIS, or systems-of-systems) that are comprised of EHRs, PPs, etc. as given in the first 
assumption, and that information must be secured for a new health information 
application that will be used by multiple users under multiple roles and multiple 
clearance levels. Using this as a basis, we list a number of high-level assumptions 
regarding that information‘s structure, users, roles and general access control features: 
1. Security administrators will determine the security requirements of a new 
information system LSIS by considering a variety of access control models, 
namely: LBAC, RBAC and DAC. 
2. LBAC and RBAC are orthogonal. That is, features from either of the access 
control models does not affect the other. This allows for the definition of security 
for a new information system that supports LBAC and not RBAC, RBAC and not 
LBAC, or LBAC and RBAC. 
3. With the purpose of facilitating modeling, security administrators will be able to 
graphically design and model the major concepts of an information system. This 
includes the users, roles, lattice sensitivity levels, and authorizations. 
4. All instantiated patient information to be secured is found in a tree-structured 
format that contains a schema that easily validates its structure. 
5. Access to the patient information is allowed through the secured information 
system. 
6. Generated external policies are used to enforce the defined security requirements 
over the information system. 
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7. Mobile applications geared towards health information management are used to 
motivate and demonstrate the work presented herein. 
These assumptions set the context for the dissertation in terms of both the security 
framework to be presented as well as supporting the examples throughout. 
2.6 Healthcare Scenario 
This section presents a plausible scenario of health information modeling and the 
needed security using current and standardized technologies in healthcare. The scenario 
explained in this section will be utilized to illustrate both the modeling and the 
implementation of security for information systems in support of the proposed security 
framework. While the work presented in this dissertation is domain independent, most of 
its capabilities are driven by healthcare requirements, and the majority of HIT 
applications utilize XML in modeling or to be able export and import data sets (a patient 
or a set of patients) for information exchange. The scenario described herein covers two 
of the dominant standards in healthcare: Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture 
(CDA) (Alschuler et al., 2002) and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) (Kibbe et al., 
2004). Both utilize XML and follow the tree-structured assumptions in this dissertation. 
To begin, in Figure 2.4, a segment of the HL7 CDA schema is shown. CDA is capable 
of modeling different aspects of a health provider transaction, ranging from a patient‘s 
demographic data to medical diagnoses to medications to billing. In Figure 2.4 for the 
CDA schema, each xsd:element refers to other XML complex types, allowing for the 
inclusion into a patient‘s medical record: the encounter with the physician 
(patient_encounter element), the organization of the physician (provider element), and the 
patient him/herself (patient element). Likewise, in Figure 2.5, a CCR schema for a patient 
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record represents the structure for a patient record to be instantiated for each actual 
patient. In Figure 2.5, again, there are references to xsd:element that refer to other 
complex types such as the body element that contains the payer information (insurance 
type, company details, etc.), the problems element that serves as a list of individual 
problems, and the family history element that houses specific instances of family history 
problems specific for the patient. 
 
Figure 2.4: HL7 CDA ‗clinical_document_header‘ Schema Segment. 
 
To illustrate both CDA and CCR, Figure 2.6 contains an instance of the CDA schema, 
while Figure 2.7 contains an instance of the CCR schema. In Figure 2.6, a CDA instance 
for the patient Carol Smith is shown as a female (GenderCode is F) and seeing Dr. Brock 
Ketchum who is a general physician of the assignedEntity (the physician‘s office) and has 
<xsd:element name="clinical_document_header"> 
 <xsd:complexType> 
 <xsd:sequence> 
 <xsd:element ref="id"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="set_id" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="version_nbr" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="document_type_cd"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="service_tmr" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="origination_dttm"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="copy_dttm" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="confidentiality_cd"  
 minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="document_relationship"  
 minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="fulfills_order" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="patient_encounter" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="authenticator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="legal_authenticator" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="intended_recipient" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="originator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="originating_organization" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="transcriptionist" minOccurs="0"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="provider" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="service_actor" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="patient"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="originating_device" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="service_target" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 <xsd:element ref="local_header" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xsd:sequence> 
 <xsd:attributeGroup ref="common_atts"/> 
 <xsd:attribute name="HL7-NAME" type="xsd:string"  
fixed="doc_serv_as_clin_doc_header"/> 
 <xsd:attribute name="T" type="xsd:string" fixed="service"/> 
 <xsd:attribute name="RIM-VERSION" type="xsd:string" fixed="0.98"/> 
 </xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
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written a note on Carol as part of her medical history. As shown in the note of the CDA in 
Figure 2.6, Carol was hospitalized twice this year and last year, and has not been able to 
reduce dependency on steroids for the last month of treatment recorded. She was assigned 
to Dr. Elisa Fakington for the treatment received in each visit. Likewise, in Figure 2.7, a 
CCR instance for CAROL SMITH contains identified health problems (Asthma) as well 
as medications (Zithromax).  
Given this brief introduction and examples for CDA and CCR, the intent of the 
security framework in this dissertation is to secure a patient‘s data as it exists in the 
CDA/CCR documents that are instantiated and validated to exchange that data with 
different stakeholders (other medical providers) and the patient him/herself. To set the 
stage for this, we consider the creation of a new information system that utilizes both 
LBAC and RBAC in conjunction with DAC as presented in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. 
The scenario starts with a Dr. Ketchum‘s private medical practice, called GetBetter 
Clinic, where there is an interest to have a mobile patient application that allows a 
provider to access select portions of a patient‘s medical information in his EMR, allowing 
the prescription of medications and other activities such as secure email, making 
appointments, etc. For our purpose, suppose that GetBetter Clinic, commissions the new 
information system, a mobile patient application, to manage their patient‘s health data, 
which may be modeled by either CCR or HL7 CDA schemas with data exchanged back 
and forth between the patient and the system using XML instances. As her healthcare 
providers will utilize the provider version of the mobile app, Carol will make extensive 
use of the patient version in order to maintain continuous contact for her asthma 
condition. This dissertation will utilize Carol Smith‘s health record in CDA and CCR  
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Figure 2.5: CCR – Continuity of Care Record Schema Segment. 
 
<xs:element name="ContinuityOfCareRecord"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="CCRDocumentObjectID" type="xs:string"/> 
 <xs:element name="Language" type="CodedDescriptionType"/> 
 <xs:element name="Version" type="xs:string"/> 
 <xs:element name="DateTime" type="DateTimeType"/> 
 <xs:element name="Patient" maxOccurs="2"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="ActorID" type="xs:string"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 … 
 <xs:element name="Body"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Payers" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Payer" type="InsuranceType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name="AdvanceDirectives" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="AdvanceDirective" type="CCRCodedDataObjectType"  
 maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name="Support" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="SupportProvider" type="ActorReferenceType"  
 maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name="FunctionalStatus" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Function" type="FunctionType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name="Problems" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Problem" type="ProblemType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name="FamilyHistory" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="FamilyProblemHistory" type="FamilyHistoryType"  
 maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
… 
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structure, as well as the information system (mobile app) commissioned by GetBetter 
Clinic, to discuss the major contributions. 
To control access to the information supplied to/from the provider mobile application, 
there will be a need to utilize LBAC to define sensitivity levels (clearances for each user 
and classifications for the data elements) in the CCR/CDA instances to control access to 
Carol Smith‘s data. The security administrator of GetBetter Clinic uses the four levels 
from Section 2.2: top-secret, secret, classified and unclassified. Some of the patient data 
such as mental health records will require a top-secret classification to insure that the 
information is protected for use by anyone except for the treating physician (available to 
Dr. Ketchum but not available to Dr. Fakington); this information has to be shared under 
specific rules. Other patient data such as medications or allergies may be secret; it could 
be the ability for a physician such as Dr. Ketchum to write or alter a prescription, which 
would be prohibited from a nurse such as Jenkins. Nurses like Jenkins may have access to 
classified data that would include the ability to enter a medical history and record vital 
signs. Office staff could have unclassified access to demographic data in order to contact 
a patient for appointments or do insurance billing. These specific privileges are augment 
with extra layer of security which will further defined the actual instances that will be 
authorized, which in turn are filtered by the privileges. 
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Figure 2.6: Instantiated part of CDA for Carol‘s Health Record. 
 
Due to the initial design work that will go into the provider version of the app, 
GetBetter Clinic has also commissioned a patient version that will serve as a mobile 
patient portal. The information utilized in the patient version of the app like Carol Smith 
<ClinicalDocument> 
… 
 <patient> 
 <name> 
 <given>Carol</given> 
 <family>Smith</family> 
 <suffix></suffix> 
 </name> 
 <administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/> 
 <birthTime value="19830413"/> 
 </patient> 
 … 
 <assignedPerson> 
 <name> 
 <given>Brock</given> 
 <family>Ketchum</family> 
 <suffix>MD</suffix> 
 </name> 
 </assignedPerson> 
 … 
</author> 
<custodian> 
 … 
</custodian> 
<documentationOf> 
 … 
 <performer typeCode="PRF"> 
 … 
 <assignedEntity> 
 … 
 <code code="59058001" displayName="General Physician"/> 
 … 
 <assignedPerson> 
 <name> 
 <prefix>Dr.</prefix> 
 <given>Elisa</given> 
 <family>Fakington</family> 
 <suffix/> 
 </name> 
 </assignedPerson> 
 … 
<component> 
 … 
 <title>History of Present Illness</title> 
 <text> 
 <content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content> 
 is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management. 
 Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content> 
 <content revised="insert">teens</content>. 
 She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year. 
 She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several 
 months.  
 </text> 
 </section> 
 </component> 
 </structuredBody> 
</component> 
</ClinicalDocument> 
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will follow CDA and CCR schemas, but be limited to medications, allergies, and 
conditions; there will also be the ability to securely communicate with Dr. Ketchum, 
request medication refills, make appointments, etc. The security requirements of the 
patient version of the app will be similar to that of the provider version. One distinction 
in security requirements is that medical notes created by physicians, psychiatrists, and 
other health providers, will not be accessible to the patient; these may be classified so that 
Nurses like Leroy and all of the GetBetter Clinic physicians can access, but office staff 
and patients would be prohibited. A patient like Carol Smith that utilizes the app will be 
authorized to her health record instances only, and their clearance and permissions will be 
governed by those requirements set by the GetBetter Clinic security administrator. The 
patient version of the app will not allow for patients to add their own information, as 
GetBetter Clinic wants it to serve strictly as a window to the user‘s health information in 
their EMR. In addition to the main functionality of browsing the permitted segments of 
their health record, the patient app includes capabilities such as secure emailing for 
continuous contact with their healthcare providers, the ability to check/request 
appointments and a module to manage medication refills. 
The practice has a set of personnel including: Brock who is a psychiatrist, Elisa who 
is a family practice physician, Leroy and Jenkins who are nurses, and Gail who is an 
office staff member. Brock with a clearance level of top-secret which allows him to read 
and write mental health notes. GetBetter Clinic has several employees that are part of the 
daily workflow. Brock is a provider (psychiatrist) with a clearance level of top-secret that 
allows him to read and write mental health notes. Elisa has a clearance level of secret 
able to read and write all of the patient information (except mental health notes). Leroy 
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and Jenkins are nurses with clearance levels of classified who are able to see most 
portions of the patient record (except mental notes) and able to perform limited edits and 
additions. These privileges are defined by the security administrator in consultation with 
the personnel of GetBetter Clinic. Overall, most can Physicians can read the complete 
patient record, but may be limited in writing certain parts. Nurses can also read the 
complete patient record, and have limited write access. Parts of the patient‘s health record 
will be tagged with sensitivity levels so that it is easy to understand which sections are 
top-secret, secret, classified and unclassified. At the same time, users will be assigned 
specialized permissions for reading and writing. Users will be able to read-down their 
clearance levels, and will also be able to write-up their clearance levels. 
The information system (mobile app) commissioned by GetBetter Clinic needs to 
support the major access control models and needs to be developed with potentially 
changing security policies (i.e., new laws can affect existing guidelines). The mobile app 
will also needs to support two different viewpoints, one from the provider perspective in 
which health information is secured with respect to roles and clearance levels; and, one 
from the patient perspective in which health information is authorized on an instance 
basis and certain parts of the health record are completely disallowed regardless of 
ownership. 
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Figure 2.7: Part of Carol‘s Health Record Represented with the CCR Standard. 
<ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
 … 
 <Purpose> 
 <Description> 
 <Text>Summary of patient information</Text> 
 </Description> 
 </Purpose> 
 <Body> 
 <Problems> 
 <Problem> 
… 
 <Description> 
 <Text>Asthma</Text> 
 </Description> 
 <Status> 
 <Text>Active</Text> 
 </Status> 
… 
 </Problem> 
 </Problems> 
 <Alerts> 
 <Alert> 
   … 
 </Alert> 
 </Alerts> 
 <Medications> 
 <Medication> 
 … 
 <Product> 
 <ProductName> 
 <Text>Zithromax</Text> 
 <Code> 
 <Value></Value> 
 <CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem> 
 </Code> 
 </ProductName> 
 </Product> 
 </Medication> 
 </Medications> 
   … 
 <Actor> 
 <ActorObjectID>A1234</ActorObjectID> 
 <Person> 
 <Name> 
 <CurrentName> 
 <Given>CAROL</Given> 
 <Family>SMITH</Family> 
 <Suffix/> 
 </CurrentName> 
 </Name> 
 <DateOfBirth> 
 <ExactDateTime>1983-04-13T00:00:00Z</ExactDateTime> 
 </DateOfBirth> 
 <Gender> 
 <Text>Female</Text> 
 <Code> 
 <Value/> 
 </Code> 
 </Gender> 
 </Person> 
 … 
</ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
44 
 
2.7 Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a general-purpose modeling language for 
object-oriented systems (Fowler, 2004). Currently managed by the Object Management 
Group (OMG), UML can be used throughout the software development cycle by 
combining data, business and object modeling. UML diagrams can exhibit two views of a 
system‘s model: the structural view, which represents the objects, attributes, operations 
and relationships in the system; and, the behavioral view, which represents the 
collaboration among objects and changes to the internal states of objects. Towards this 
purpose, UML provides different kinds of diagrams. Structure diagrams, which include 
the class diagram, component diagram, composite structure diagram, deployment 
diagram, object diagram, package diagram, and profile diagram, focus on the 
representation of components of the system. Behavior diagrams, which include the 
activity diagram, UML state machine diagram, and the use case diagram, focus on the 
series of events that must happen in the system. Finally, interaction diagrams, which 
include the communication diagram, interaction overview diagram, sequence diagram, 
and timing diagram, focus on the data- and control-flow between the components of the 
system being modeled. 
The UML language can be extended via the use of the meta-model architecture 
developed by OMG. This meta-model architecture, called the Meta-Object Facility, 
consists of four layers. As shown in Figure 2.8, the M3 layer consists of the meta-meta 
model. M2-models are built using the M3 language. In turn, M2-models describe the 
elements of the M1-layer, while the M1-models describe the elements of the M0-layer 
(the runtime instance of the modeled system). Due to the inclusion of UML into ISO as a 
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standard (UML ISO standard.2014) for software systems, several tools (and development 
environments) exist to aid in UML modeling, including: ArgoUML (Ramirez et al., 
2003), StarUML (Lee, Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2005), Eclipse (Moore, Dean, Gerber, 
Wagenknecht, & Vanderheyden, 2004), Visual Studio (Randolph, Gardner, Anderson, & 
Minutillo, 2010), NetBeans (Boudreau, Glick, Greene, Spurlin, & Woehr, 2002), and 
others. The UML meta-model will be utilized in this dissertation to support the definition 
of new UML diagrams that are capable of modeling LBAC, RBAC, and DAC for tree 
structured documents and their instances, like as supported in XML. 
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Figure 2.8: UML‘s Meta-Object Facility Layers. 
2.8 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
In the same way that XML aims to provide a common, structured language for 
information exchange among heterogeneous systems, the OASIS eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) (Godik et al., 2002) defines a common language 
and processing model from the perspective of access control policies. This would then 
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permit a level of security interoperability among the heterogeneous systems. The 
XACML schema provides various elements and a general structure for the design and 
development of access control (security policies). These elements (as shown in Figure 
2.9) include the PolicySet, the Policy and the Rule. An XACML PolicySet is utilized to 
make the authorization decision via a set of rules in order to allow for access control 
decisions. A PolicySet can contain multiple Policy structures, and each Policy contains 
the access control Rules. As a result, the Policy structure acts as the smallest entity that 
can be presented to the security system for evaluation. The collection of Policy structures 
is contained in a PolicySet, combined via an algorithm specified by the PolicySet’s 
PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute that targets the particular XML schema. The XACML 
specification defines four standard combining algorithms: Deny-overrides, Permit-
overrides, First-applicable, and Only-one-applicable. 
The architecture of a typical security system that utilizes XACML for enforcement as 
given in Figure 2.10 also has a number of components that we can explain and relate to 
our ongoing example. First, the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) allows a request to be 
made on a resource such as Dr. Ketchum playing a Physician role to access a continuity 
of care record instance of Carol Smith. Next, the Policy Decision Point (PDP), evaluates 
the request and provides a response according to the policies in place, and in our 
example, a Physician role played by Dr. Ketchum can access (read and/or write) a portion 
of a continuity of care record schema. Then, the Policy Administration Point (PAP) is 
utilized to write and manage policies which in our example would be applied against the 
CCR schema and its associated instances to deliver the appropriate subset of information 
to a Nurse or Physician role and the individual who is playing that role. Last, the Policy 
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Information Point (PIP) can be utilized to arbitrate very fine grained security issues 
which in our continuing example would be to control access to mental health data of 
Carol Smith, allowing Ketchum, while denying Fakington In support of enforcement, an 
XACML PolicySet allows the ability to make the authorization decision via a set of rules 
in order to allow for access control decisions that may contain multiple Policies, and each 
Policy contains the access control rules. Note that multiple XACML Polices may be 
generated, resulting in a PolicySet for a specific set of XML schemas that comprise a 
given application.  
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Figure 2.9: Layered Representation of XACML‘s PolicySet, Policy and Rule Constructs. 
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Figure 2.10: Security Architecture that Utilizes XACML Policies for Enforcement. 
 
As an example to the way that a generated XACML policy would be for our scenario, 
consider Figure 2.11, which illustrates the structure of a basic RBAC policy. In this 
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policy, the target sets the subject to the user Elisa Fakington (<Subject> element and 
<user> child element), any set of resources at a policy level (<Resources> element and 
<AnyResources/> child element) and the possible actions (<Actions> element and 
<AnyResources/> child element). The first rule pertains to the role of Physician (denoted 
by the <roleName> tag inside the <role> sub-element of <Subjects> in the <Target> 
subtree) with an identifier 5 (denoted by the <roleID> tag) when considering any 
resources (<AnyResource/>) and any action (<AnyAction/>). The rule of this policy 
(<Rule> element) dictates that Elisa Fakington, acting as a Physician, is permitted 
(Effect=‖Permit‖) to insert (<operation> element under <Actions>) the element denoted 
by the name ―Past Medical History‖ (<element> element under <Resources>). This 
policy then allows any Elisa Fakington to insert new data in a patient‘s Past Medical 
History. 
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Figure 2.11: XACML Policy for User Elisa Fakington and Role Physician. 
  
<Policy PolicyId="ada-example-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">  
 <Description> 
This is a pseudocode example of an XACML policy with LBAC, RBAC and DAC  
 capabilities for user Elisa and role Physician. 
 </Description> 
 <Target> 
 <Subjects> 
  <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa Fakington</name></user> 
 </Subjects> 
 <Resources>  
 <AnyResource/> 
 </Resources>  
 <Actions> 
  <AnyAction/> 
 </Actions> 
 </Target> 
 
 <Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
 <Target> 
 <Subjects> 
 <role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>  
 </Subjects> 
 <Resources> 
  <element> 
   <elementID>el-3</elementID> 
   <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName> 
</element> 
 </Resources>  
 <Actions> 
  <operation> 
   <operationName>insert</operationName> 
 <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode> 
</operation> 
 </Actions> 
 </Target> 
 <Condition> 
 <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal"> 
 <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only"> 
 <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
 Secret 
 </AttributeValue> 
 </Apply> 
 <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
 Secret 
 </AttributeValue> 
 </Apply> 
 </Condition>  
</Rule> 
 
 <Rule RuleId="simple-DAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
 <Target> 
 <Subjects> 
  <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
 </Subjects> 
 <Resources> 
   <Schemas> 
   <schema><schemaID>4</schemaID><schemaName>Schema 
4</schemaName></schema> 
   </Schemas> 
   <Instances> 
   <instance> 
<instanceID>4,2</instaneID> 
   <instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName> 
 </Resources>  
 </Target>  
 </Rule> 
</Policy> 
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Chapter 3 
RBAC, LBAC and DAC Security Model for 
Tree-Structured Documents 
 
The objective of this chapter is to propose a security model for tree-structured 
documents that includes the ability to define role-based (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001), 
lattice-based (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993), and discretionary (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 
1994) access control for information systems. This model will define the underlying 
concepts and capabilities that will serve as a foundation for the definition of new UML 
diagrams to model RBAC, LBAC, and DAC for tree-structured documents, with the 
intent to achieve fine-grained information security via access control as part of the overall 
software engineering process for information systems. The inclusion of security as part of 
an information system‘s design facilitates the modeling of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC at a 
schema-level that is then realizable against its instances. The key intent of our approach is 
for a schema-level security solution that defines and enforces fine-grained control of an 
information system‘s instances for: non-destructive (document-level) operations that 
utilize instances as a source of information (e.g., read and aggregate); destructive 
(document-level) operations that modify instance(s) to reflect a change (e.g., insert, 
update, delete); and, other types of operations (policy-level) that act in the instance as a 
whole and not in the intrinsic data found within.  
In order to achieve this for an information system, there is the need to provide all 
relevant stakeholders with some degree of assurance on the different capabilities of the 
three access control models that are being supported. First, from a usability perspective, 
the security model should be able to support any document format that follows a tree-
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structure for representation which would allow the design of an information system 
without regard to the underlying data format. Candidate formats include, but are not 
restricted to, the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998), JavaScript 
Object Notation (JSON) (Crockford, 2006), the Resource Description Framework (RDF) 
(Klyne et al., 2004), the Web Ontology Language (OWL) (McGuinness & Van Harmelen, 
2004), etc. The security model in this dissertation casts these formats in their most 
generalized tree form, specifically, supporting a document model where each document 
has a schema and each schema has a single root node and potentially many children 
nodes. Second, the a majority of the RBAC capabilities in the NIST model (see Section 
2.3) are supported through the definition of roles, the assignment of operations as 
permissions, and the determination of constraints in support of role delegation with 
mutual exclusion (ME). Third, a wide range of LBAC capabilities will be supported by 
the security model, allowing a broad range of information systems and their security 
needs to be supported. This includes, as indicated in Section 2.2, the ability to assign 
classifications to all application schemas and their elements and define clearances for 
users. This assignment extends the schema via a decoration operation that acts over a 
determined criteria and results in an extension schema and its elements (e.g., the entire 
document tree) with classifications as tags that are then enforced at the instance level for 
actual users holding the appropriate clearance. When RBAC and LBAC are combined, a 
given role can access each element in a specific way via a particular operation, achieved 
by filtering schemas and instances utilizing the role as the criterion. Fourth, the ability to 
support DAC that includes the delegation of role from user to user and the ability to pass 
on the delegation. The model completes with a discussion from the user perspective that 
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includes authorizations over schemas and instances. Finally, for the purposes of this 
chapter, we note the distinction between document-level security and policy-level 
security. Document-level security includes those concepts that act on the tree-structure 
(e.g., classification levels for elements, access modes of operations that target the 
elements, operations and permissions for a role that are tied to an element, etc.), while 
policy-level security pertains to those capabilities that are defined at a higher level (e.g., 
authorizations over schemas and instances). The main assertion towards the research in 
this chapter is that RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal. That is, their capabilities do not 
conflict with one another. This is achieved by assigning clearance levels to users and not 
roles. Ultimately, when unifying RBAC, LBAC and DAC, LBAC requirements take a 
higher-level priority and dictate the final security effect; but from a construction 
perspective, the security can be added in any order with the end result the same in terms 
of the defined and enforced permissions. 
The remainder of this chapter has seven sections to define and explain the security 
model and compare our work to other efforts. Section 3.1 discusses the general 
information system structure that will make use of this security model, presenting the 
assumptions and the form of the major components in terms of schemas, an application, 
and the users. Next, Section 3.2 presents the general security architecture (as a basis) that 
the information system will utilize in order to leverage the security model presented in 
this dissertation. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the RBAC, LBAC and DAC 
capabilities respectively, taking special consideration to the structure of the User object 
that is constructed as more security capabilities are considered. Section 3.6 presents user 
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authorization capabilities that are utilized in an information system. Finally, Section 3.7, 
which provides a general overview of previous work security and access control. 
3.1 Model: Application, Schema, Instances, and Users  
In this section, we define the aspects and components of an information system in 
terms of the supported schema, the composition of an application, and the intended users. 
We assume that an information system that will need access control security across any 
combination of RBAC, LBAC, and/or DAC. Towards this purpose, we make an initial set 
of assertions, given in Table 3.1. The intent of these assertions is to represent the types of 
information system that whose security is to be modeled at a type level an enforced at an 
instance level.  
Information and data is represented in a tree structure with a root node, where non-leaf nodes 
provide context (metadata, element name, typing information, cardinality constraints, etc.), 
and leaf nodes offer a place to store data values. 
A schema is defined to organize the structure and content of a tree and act as a blueprint for 
instances. Schemas have the basic structures and context information (such as cardinality 
constraints, etc.). Akin to classes in an object-oriented programming languages or relations in 
a database, they contain the meta-data that describes the structure, elements, typing, etc. of a 
schema. 
A schema can be instantiated which means that the actual data is created and defined. The 
structure and data in an instance is validated against it respective schema. This is equivalent to 
classes in object-oriented programming languages (create an instance of the person class) and 
to databases (create a tuple in a relation). 
RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal. That is, each one can live independently from the other in 
case an application only needs RBAC or LBAC security. 
Table 3.1: Information System Assertions. 
 
The third assertion is important since the security model should provide support to 
information systems that may utilize either of those access control models. Note that we 
do not consider such an assumption for DAC. The reason for this is due to the fact that 
DAC capabilities live at a policy-level (authorizations) and not at the document level 
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(such as read/write operations controlled by RBAC, LBAC, or both); DAC involves the 
way that users utilize instances and pass on permissions among themselves.  
Building on these assertions, the first set of definitions involves a characterization of 
the information system application, its structure via a set of schemas and its instances 
(data) that are authorized to a set of users. To assist the discussion, Figure 3.1 shows a 
sample application, its instances, and its users, for the GetWellMobile application of 
Section 2.6 utilizing the same users, Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture 
(CDA) (Alschuler et al., 2002) and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) (Kibbe et al., 
2004) as schemas, and Carol Smith’s health record as instances. 
Defn. 1: An element  NAMEID eee ,  is defined as an ordered pair component in a 
hierarchical data structure that contains information against which operations are 
performed, where IDe  is a unique identifier for the element and NAMEe  is the tag 
of the element. 
Example: The elements in Figure 3.1 have unique identifiers IDe  such as eId1, 
eId2, etc., and names NAMEe  such as ClinicalDocument, patient, etc.  
Defn. 2: A schema  ESSS NAMEID ,,  is defined as a hierarchical organization 
of n elements represented as a set },...,,{ 21 neeeE   for a given purpose in the form 
of a tree, where every Sei   and there is a single root node in the tree of the 
schema S . In this case, IDS  is a unique identifier for the schema S , and NAMES  is 
the tag of the schema. 
Example: The schemas utilized in the healthcare scenario are from the CCR and 
HL7 CDA as given previously in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Figure 3.1 shows the way 
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that these schemas would be represented in the notation of the model, with 
identifiers sId1 for the CCR, and sId2 for the CDA. In addition, Figure 3.1 also 
contains the two element sets E1 and E2 for the instantiation of sets S1 and S2 , 
respectively. 
Defn. 3: An instance  NAMEID iii ,  of a schema S  is referred to as a document that 
contains values for each of the n  elements; instances must follow the structure of 
a schema, where IDi  is the unique identifier for the instance and NAMEi  is the tag 
that describes the instance  
Example: The instances utilized in the healthcare scenario are the CCR and HL7 
CDA instances of Carol Smith‘s medical record as given in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
Using the model, in Figure 3.1, the two instance sets for sId1 and sId2 are given. 
Defn. 4: Each schema jS  has an instance set jI  which is defined as 
},...,,{
21 msjjjj
iiiI   that contains ms instances where each instance follows the 
format of the n  elements that are defined by E  and is validated against jS . 
Example: Since the information system utilizes the CCR and HL7 CDA 
representation of Carol Smith‘s medical record, the schema set for the 
GetWellMobile application consists of the two instance sets sId1 and sId2. In 
this case, the instance set for CCR is Carol Smith‘s CCR instance, and for HL7 
CDA it is the respective instance. 
Defn. 5: An application A  is comprised of set of k  schemas and g  instance set 
pairs },,...,,,,,{ 122111  gk ISISISISA  where each pair represents 
one aspect of the information needs of an application. 
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Example: Figure 3.1 shows the information system application as the 
GetWellMobile, consisting of the set of paired schemas and their respective 
instances {<sId1, CarolSmithCCR>, <sId2, CarolSmithCDA>}. 
Defn. 6: A user u  is defined as a pair  NAMEID uu ,  that will have the ability to 
access portions of an application and uniquely identifies each user by IDu . 
Example: In Figure 3.1, the users of the GetWellMobile application are given for 
the scenario in Section 2.5. Each user has his/her own identifier, as exemplified 
by <uId1, Brock Ketchum> for Dr. Ketchum. 
Defn. 7: Let },...,,{ 21 juuuU   be defined as the set of j users for a given 
application A , where Uu j   and  jj NAMEIDj uuu , . 
Example: The list of users for an application is a set of pairs that contain each 
user‘s identifier and name. In our scenario of Section 2.5, and as given in Figure 
3.1, the set of users consists of Brock Ketchum, Elisa Fakington, Leroy, Jenkins 
and Gail represented as {<uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa 
Fakington>, <uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>}. 
In summary, as given in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 for the CDA and CCR schemas, 
respectively, please consider Figure 3.2 which contains an instance of the CDA schema 
and Figure 3.3 which contains an instance of CCR. CDA has <xsd:element 
name="clinical_document_header"> as a root, while CCR schema has 
<ContinuityOfCareRecord>. In turn, each of these structures have several children node 
(shown partially in Figures 3.2 and 3.3), which make the set of elements that are part of a 
schema S and instance i. 
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Elements e <eId1, ClinicalDocument>, <eId2, patient>,  
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>, …,  
<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, patient>, 
<eId10, name> 
Element Sets E 
1E  ={<eId1, ClinicalDocument>, <eId2, patient>, 
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>} 
2E  ={<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, 
patient>, <eId10, name>} 
 
Schemas S 1
S ={<sId1, Continuity of Care Record, E1>}  
2S = {<sId2, Clinical Document Architecture,E2>} 
Instances i <iId1, CarolSmithCCR>, <iId2, CarolSmithCDA> 
Instance Set I ccrRppt={<iId1, CarolSmithCCR>}  
cdaJeaderRppt= {<iId2, CarolSmithCDA>}<iId1<iId2 
Application A GetWellMobile = {<sId1, iId1>,  
<sId2, iId2>} 
Users u <uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington>, 
<uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail> 
User Set U {<uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington>, 
<uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>} 
Figure 3.1: Sample Elements, Schemas, Instances, Application, and Users. 
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Figure 3.2: Instantiated Portion of CDA for Carol‘s Medical Record. 
<ClinicalDocument> 
… 
 <patient> 
 <name> 
 <given>Carol</given> 
 <family>Smith</family> 
 <suffix></suffix> 
 </name> 
 <administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/> 
 <birthTime value="19830413"/> 
 </patient> 
 … 
 <assignedPerson> 
 <name> 
 <given>Brock</given> 
 <family>Ketchum</family> 
 <suffix>MD</suffix> 
 </name> 
 </assignedPerson> 
 … 
</author> 
<custodian> 
 … 
</custodian> 
<documentationOf> 
 … 
 <performer typeCode="PRF"> 
 … 
 <assignedEntity> 
 … 
 <code code="59058001" displayName="General Physician"/> 
 … 
 <assignedPerson> 
 <name> 
 <prefix>Dr.</prefix> 
 <given>Elisa</given> 
 <family>Fakington</family> 
 <suffix/> 
 </name> 
 </assignedPerson> 
 … 
<component> 
 … 
 <title>History of Present Illness</title> 
 <text> 
 <content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content> 
 is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management. 
 Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content> 
 <content revised="insert">teens</content>. 
 She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year. 
 She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several 
 months.  
 </text> 
 </section> 
 </component> 
 </structuredBody> 
</component> 
</ClinicalDocument> 
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Figure 3.3: Instantiated Portion of CCR for Carol‘s Medical Record. 
<ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
 … 
 <Purpose> 
 <Description> 
 <Text>Summary of patient information</Text> 
 </Description> 
 </Purpose> 
 <Body> 
 <Problems> 
 <Problem> 
… 
 <Description> 
 <Text>Asthma</Text> 
 </Description> 
 <Status> 
 <Text>Active</Text> 
 </Status> 
… 
 </Problem> 
 </Problems> 
 <Alerts> 
 <Alert> 
   … 
 </Alert> 
 </Alerts> 
 <Medications> 
 <Medication> 
 … 
 <Product> 
 <ProductName> 
 <Text>Zithromax</Text> 
 <Code> 
 <Value></Value> 
 <CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem> 
 </Code> 
 </ProductName> 
 </Product> 
 </Medication> 
 </Medications> 
   … 
 <Actor> 
 <ActorObjectID>A1234</ActorObjectID> 
 <Person> 
 <Name> 
 <CurrentName> 
 <Given>CAROL</Given> 
 <Family>SMITH</Family> 
 <Suffix/> 
 </CurrentName> 
 </Name> 
 <DateOfBirth> 
 <ExactDateTime>1983-04-13T00:00:00Z</ExactDateTime> 
 </DateOfBirth> 
 <Gender> 
 <Text>Female</Text> 
 <Code> 
 <Value/> 
 </Code> 
 </Gender> 
 </Person> 
 … 
</ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
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3.2 Model: Schema Operations for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC 
In this section, the work of Section 3.1 is extended to introduce concepts related to 
the ability to secure the schemas of a document-based application using RBAC, LBAC, 
and/or DAC in order to enforce the defined security at the instance level thereby 
customizing instances that are delivered to authorized users. Specifically, the schema 
operation ―|‖ is defined and used to transform a schema from one state to the next state 
under some set of assumptions and/or constraints as dictated by security that is defined 
for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. The schema projection operation (SPO) is used to 
transition an original schema (tree-structured) to a projected schema which identify those 
portions of the original schema that require access control constrained by various factors; 
the projected schema is a subset of the original one. The SPO is identifying those limited 
portions (up the entire schema) to have security definition and enforcement. Projection 
takes an original schema and removes those elements which do not need protection 
resulting in a schema that contains elements that require security. SPO prunes the original 
schema‘s tree-structure to produce a valid subtree as a projected schema which is 
contained in and may be equal to the original schema. For RBAC, one type of projection 
is based on role to order to identify that subset of a schema can be available to that role 
creating a separate projected version for each role of every schema that the role requires. 
For LBAC, SPO identifies the secure subset of the schema which needs control by 
assigning classifications (CLSs) to elements (see Section 2.2 again) that is then followed 
by decoration (see below). 
To complement SPO, the schema decoration operation (SDO) is used to augment an 
original schema with new data related to security that is associated with a schema‘s 
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elements, resulting in a decorated schema that exceeds in structure the original schema. 
For LBAC, decoration adds CLSs to the elements of schema, transitioning an element‘s 
definition from a two tuple  NAMEID eeel ,  (see Defn. 1) to the triple: 
 SLNAMEID eeeel ,,  where SLe  is the classification of the element (see Section 2.2 
again). As a result, decoration enlarges the schema with the addition of a CLS field for 
each element that needs a CLS, so the decorated schema actually gets larger and 
contains the undecorated schema (whether it is an original or a projected one). While 
SPO and SDO aimed to support RBAC and LBAC, the schema operator ―|‖ can be 
modified to define new criterion over which the transformation will occur per the 
discretion of the security administrator. This opens the possibilities to prune and/or 
decorate a tree-structured document with respect to other attributes (e.g. user tenure, time 
context, value constraints, etc.). Below we briefly summarize the assertions for this 
portion of the model. 
In the design process for an application, 
},,...,,,,,{ 122111  gk ISISISISA  serves as a starting point from which a 
security administrator will being to define privileges. Specifically, using SPO an SDO 
a designer can project/decorate to arrive a version of the application (which schemas 
projected/decorated) resulting in a projected (decorated) application where )||( ecrPA  (
)(cDA ) that contains km   schema/instance pairs from S , where )||( ecrPAm   ( )(cDAm 
), that have been projected/decorated in order to identify the portions of A that require a 
level of security control as realized in )||( ecrPA  ( )(cDA ). The remainder of this section 
reviews definitions involving schemas for SPO and SDO.  
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A schema is a hierarchically structured collection of elements which can be altered via a 
schema projection operation (SPO), denoted as P
ecr ||| , that can filter the tree into a proper 
subtree.  
)||( ecrP
iS  
is the result of a projection P
ecr |||  of iS  that effectively identifies the subset of iS  that 
has been filtered. Using this notation: PriS  means that a role has been utilized to create a 
subtree of the original schema that represents all of the elements allowed for role r; PciS means 
that a CLS c (e.g., TS, C, etc.) has been utilized to create a subtree the original schema that 
represents all of the elements allowed for that c; and, PeiS means that a subtree of the original 
schema) that represents all of the elements of the schema that need to be protected. 
Given a projection )||( ecrPiS  of schema iS , the instance set is also projected, creating 
)||( ecrP
iI
which are now filtered instances for the schema that must follow the structure of the filtered 
schema. This yields an instance that has been project by role r, CLS c, elements e of the 
schema.  
A schema which is a hierarchically structured collection of elements can be extended via a 
decoration operation, denoted as D
tc|| , over a criterion that alters the form of the elements by 
adding new information in the form of LBAC sensitivity levels or time constraints. 
)|( tcD
iS is the result of a decoration 
D
tc||  of iS  that effectively identifies the decorated version 
of iS  based on LBAC sensitivity levels. Using this notation: 
Dc
iS means that CLSs chosen 
from the set of all possible sensitivity levels (e.g., S, TC, C, U) have been added to all of the 
elements of the original schema; and, DtiS  means that time constraints have be included that 
represent the allowable timeframe for each element. 
Given a decoration 
)(cD
iS  of schema iS , the instance set is also decorated, creating 
)(cD
iI which 
are now decorated instances for the schema that must follow the new structure of the 
decorated schema. This yields an instance that has expanded by classification or time. 
Table 3.2: Schema Security Assertions. 
 
Defn. 8a. 
P
r|  is a schema projection operation (SPO) over an RBAC role r  and 
tree such that the end result of the action is the creation of a pruned tree by 
RBAC role that is a subset of the tree being projected, meaning that the 
projected subtree is a subset of the original schema to represent which portions 
of the original schema can be access by role. In our notation, for a schema iS , 
P
rii SS |
~Pr   means that 
Pr~
iS  is a projected version of iS  with respect to a role r , 
the results of a filtering action. 
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Defn. 8b. Pc|  is a schema projection operation (SPO) over an LBAC sensitivity c  
and tree such that the end result of the action is the creation of a pruned tree by 
LBAC that is a subset of the original schema to represent the portion of original 
tree that has a sensitivity level c. In our notation, for a schema iS , 
P
ci
Pc
i SS |
~
  
means that Pc
iS
~
 is a projected version of iS  with respect to an c , the results of a 
filtering action. 
Defn. 8c. Pe|  is a schema projection operation (SPO) over elements e  and tree 
such that the end result of the action is the creation of a pruned tree that is a 
subset of the tree being projected, meaning that the projected subtree is a subset 
of the original schema to represent the portion of original tree that has had 
elements deleted resulting in a subtree of the original tree that has the elements 
to be secured.. In our notation, for a schema iS , 
P
ei
Pe
i SS |
~
  means that 
Pe
iS
~
 is a 
projected version of iS  with respect to elements e , the results of a filtering 
action. 
Defn. 9: Dc|  is a schema decoration operation (SDO) over LBAC and tree such 
that the end result of the decoration is the creation of an expanded tree with 
sensitivity level or classifications on the elements of the tree. In our notation, 
for a schema iS , 
D
ci
d
i SS |
~
  means that 
Dc
iS
~
 is an expanded version of iS  with 
respect to LBAC, the results of a decoration action. 
Defn. 10: AA cDecrP )(|)||(
~
 is a subset of the information in an application‘s schemas 
that need to be protected through a process of SPO and/or SDO. Specifically,  
}
~
,
~
,...,
~
,
~
{
~ )(|)||()(|)||()(|)||(
1
)(|)||(
1
)(|)||(  cDecrPn
cDecrP
m
cDecrPcDecrPcDecrP ISISA  is the result of 
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an SPO and/or SDO on the original k schema/instance set pairs, that results in 
the creation of a set of m schemas where the information that needs to be 
secured and is available for access control has been identified.  
To illustrate the concepts related to projection and decoration, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 
have an organization of the resulting tree-structured schema from Figures 2.4 and 2.5, 
respectively, that after projection and decoration operations over RBAC and LBAC 
criteria. In Figure 3.4, the <xs:element name=”patient_encounter”> element (and 
others) in the original CDA schema has been removed yielding 
~
CDA ; in Figure 3.5, 
the <xs:element name = ”FamilyHistory”> element (and others) in the original 
CCR schema has been removed (explain further once final) yielding 
~
CCR .  
 
Figure 3.4: SPO and SDO to Generate 
~
CDA  Schema. 
 
To accompany these two figures, we provide their corresponding instances. 
Specifically, Figure 3.6 shows the result of a projection operation over a human -guided 
criteria, such as one from the security administrator of the practice from the scenario in 
Section 2.6, for Carol Smith‘s CDA, with <ClinicalDocument> as the root of the tree 
and two direct children: <patient> and <component> (each with their own set of 
context children nodes). Likewise, Figure 3.7 shows the result of a similar operation of 
<xs:element name=”ClinicalDocument”> 
 <xs:element name=”patient”> 
 <xs:complexType name=”name”> 
 <xs:element name=”given”/> 
 <xs:element name=”family”/> 
 <xs:element name=”suffix”/> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 <xs:element name=”administrativeGenderCode"/> 
 <xs:element name=”birthTime”/> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:complexType name=”component”> 
 <xs:element name=”title”/> 
 <xs:element name=”text”/> 
 </xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
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human-guided criteria from the security administrator of practice A) for the CCR, with 
a root node of <ContinuityOfCareRecord> and one direct child node: <Body> (with 
<Problems> and <Medications> children.  
 
Figure 3.5: SPO and SDO of the 
~
CCR  Schema. 
 
Figure 3.6: Applying Figure 3.4 to Generate Carol‘s CDA Instance. 
<xs:element name="ContinuityOfCareRecord"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:element name="Body"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Problems" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Problem" type="ProblemType"  
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name="Medication" minOccurs="0"> 
 <xs:complexType> 
 <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name="Medication" type="MedicationType"  
 maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:element> 
 </xs:sequence> 
 </xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
 </xs:complexType> 
 </xs:sequence> 
</xs:element> 
<ClinicalDocument> 
 <patient> 
 <name> 
 <given>Carol</given> 
 <family>Smith</family> 
 <suffix></suffix> 
 </name> 
 <administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/> 
 <birthTime value="19830413"/> 
 </patient> 
<component> 
 <title>History of Present Illness</title> 
 <text> 
 <content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content> 
 is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management. 
 Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content> 
 <content revised="insert">teens</content>. 
 She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year. 
 She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several 
 months.  
 </text> 
</component> 
</ClinicalDocument> 
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Figure 3.7: Applying Figure 3.5 to Generate Carol‘s CCR Instance. 
3.3 Model: RBAC Security  
In the section, we continue with the definition of RBAC in our security model for tree 
structured documents. This set of definitions involves designing a RBAC security policy 
that supports the ability to specify custom versions of the schemas that are projected on a 
role-by-role basis. The allows the permissions that are defined on the various elements of 
a schema to be of as authorized to a user by role, we call these role-based permissions 
(RBP); these definitions represent a formalization of a portion of the NIST RBAC model, 
which involves roles, objects, operations, permissions, and mutual exclusion. The set of 
assertions for RBAC is given below.  
 
 
 
 
<ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
 <Body> 
 <Problems> 
  <Problem> 
   <Description> 
    <Text>Asthma</Text> 
   </Description> 
   <Status> 
    <Text>Active</Text> 
   </Status> 
  </Problem> 
 </Problems> 
 <Medications> 
  <Medication> 
   <Product> 
    <ProductName> 
     <Text>Zithromax</Text> 
     <Code> 
      <Value></Value> 
      <CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem> 
     </Code> 
    </ProductName> 
   </Product> 
  </Medication> 
 </Medications> 
</Body> 
</ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
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A schema that contains a set of elements has defined, for each of the elements, a set of 
operations that are allowable, namely: read, aggregate, insert, update, and delete. These 
operations dictate the way that each element can be utilized. 
A role is a means to characterize privileges that are based on usage behaviors of the 
application coupled with needed functionality to arrive at a construct (role) that is able to 
quantify a common set of responsibilities that are shared by multiple users. Roles will be 
authorized to utilize different portions of the schema and instances for an information 
application. Each application has a set of roles. 
A permission is defined on each element in a schema by associating an element (by id) with an 
operation. The collection of all permissions for all roles across all schemas of an application is 
the role-based permission set, where each set member binds a permission to a role.  
The schema projection operation (SPO) (see Defn. 8a) can be applied by role in order to 
identify the elements of each schema and the associated permissions per role. 
Table 3.3: RBAC Assertions. 
 
Defn. 11: A role r is defined as a two-pair  NAMEID rrr ,  representation of the 
responsibilities for a user Uu  to access some portion (entire or further 
restricted) of a schema. 
Example: Consider Figure 3.8 with the sample roles for the scenario of Section 
2.6. The roles, with identifiers, for GetWellMobile would be 
{<rId1,Psychologist>, <rId2,Physician>, <rId3,Nurse>, 
<rId4,Staff>}. 
Defn. 12: Let },...,,{ 21 jrrrR   be defined as the set of j roles for a given application 
A , where Rrj   and  jj NAMEIDj rrr , . 
Defn. 6 (RBAC Version): A user that has been authorized to RBAC (but not 
LBAC) redefines the user u  as a tuple 
IDrNAMEID
uuu ,, , where 
IDr
u is the 
role as defined in Defn. 26. Note that a user can be authorized to more than 
one role, but is limited to playing one role in any application session. 
Example: Consider the users of GetWellMobile from Figure 3.8. When their 
roles are assigned, the user is augmented with a role identifier. In the case of the 
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users of GetWellMobile, their users are:  
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, rId1>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington, rId2>,  
<uId10, Leroy, rId3>, <uId11, Jenkins, rId3>, 
<uId20, Gail, rId4>}. 
Defn. 13: There exists a schema projection operation 
P
r|  by role that acts on a 
schema iS , and yields a filtered version
Pr~
iS  for any given role Rr . This results 
in what is referred to as a role-secured schema. 
Defn. 14: The set of role-secured schemas )
~
,...,
~
,
~
(
~ PrPr
2
Pr
1
Pr
iS SSSA   is the set of role 
projections of r
iS
~
 for role r , for any given schema i , where mi ,...,2,1 . 
Defn. 15: Let },,,,{ deleteupdateinsertaggregatereadO   be the set of operations 
that can be performed against an element in each schema from either an 
original or a projected and/or decorated tree. The operation is defined at the 
schema level to be applied at the instance level. For permissions, each Oop
will be assigned to individual roles. 
Defn. 16: A permission p is represented by the four tuple  opespp IDIDID ,,, , 
where IDp is the unique identifier of the permission (akin to IDu and IDr ), IDs is 
the identifier of a schema )(|)||()(|)||(
~~ cDecrP
S
cDecrP
i AS   and IDe  is the identifier of an 
element )(|)||(
~ cDecrP
iSel for some mi ,...,2,1 , meaning that operation op can be 
performed on the element (node) identified by IDe constrained to the schema
)(|)||(~ cDecrP
iS of the application.  
Defn. 17: Let },...,,{ 21 zpppP   be defined as the set of all granular permissions 
in a given application A, where a permission Pp . That is, P is the set of all 
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permissions defined by the security administrator in a given application A. 
Example: A set of permissions for the scenario of Section 2.6. is shown in Figure 
3.8. The set {<pId1, sId1, eId1, read>, <pId2, sId1, eId1, insert>, 
…, <pId6, sId2, eId9, update>, <pId7, sId2, eId10, update>} 
denotes a read permission over the CCR schema‘s eId1 element, an insert 
permission over the CCR schema‘s eId1 element, an update permission over the 
CDA schema‘s eId9 element, and an update permission over the CDA schema‘s 
eId10 element. 
Defn. 18: The set of all permissions, the role-permission assignments
},,...,,{
11

nk IDIDIDID
prprRPA , where IDr is the identifier of a role r as 
defined in Defn. 12, and IDp is the identifier of a permission p as defined in 
Defn. 16, contains all the role-permissions pairs meaning that role with 
identifier IDr can perform the permission with identifier IDp . 
Example: Consider Figure 3.8, which follows the healthcare scenario utilized so 
far. Sample role-permission assignments would be in the form of {<rId1, 
pId1>, <rId1, pId6>, <rId1, pId7>, …, <rId2, pId1>, <rId2, pId2>, 
<rId2, pId7>, …, <rId3, pId1>, <rId3, pId2>}. These pairs represent the 
following: the role Psychologist can perform the permissions with the identifiers 
pId1, pId6 and pId7. The role Physician can perform the permissions with the 
identifiers pId1, pId2 and pId7. Last, the role Nurse can perform the permissions 
with the identifiers pId1 and pId2. 
It is important to note that RPA can have multiple entries for a given role, where each 
entry represents one of the permissions that have been assigned to a role with a unique 
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IDr . Recall that a permission is defined as a tuple  opespp IDIDID ,,, , where IDp acts 
as the identifier for the whole permission p. Role secured schemas are in turn the result 
of a projection of a role‘s permissions and the elements they target. This )(|)||(
~ cDecrP
iS can be 
empty, meaning that a role Rr  has no nodes to act upon. 
Roles: {<rId1,Psychologist>, <rId2,Physician>, <rId3,Nurse>, 
<rId4,Staff>} 
Elements: {<eId1, ClinicalDocument>, <eId2, patient>, 
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>, …, 
<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, patient>, <eId10, 
name>} 
Operations: {read, aggregate, insert, update, delete} 
Permissions: {<pId1, sId1, eId1, read >, 
<pId2, sId1, eId1, insert >, …, 
<pId6, sId2, eId9, update >, 
<pId7, sId2, eId10, update >} 
Role-Permissions 
Assignments: 
{<rId1, pId1>, <rId1, pId6>, <rId1, pId7>, …, <rId2, pId1>, 
<rId2, pId2>, <rId2, pId7>, …, <rId3, pId1>, <rId3, pId2>} 
Users: {< uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington>, 
<uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>} 
Figure 3.8: Sample Roles, Operations, Permissions, Role-permission Assignments and 
Users. 
 
The next set of definitions involve the definition of separation of duty and mutual 
exclusion as defined between roles and their associated permissions. Separation of duty 
between two users playing different roles means that in the process of working on a 
specific task, their actual duties (privileges) must be separated. For instance, in a hospital 
setting, when administering significant intravenous medications (say, for cancer 
treatment), there are two separate individuals in the process, one in a verifier role that 
checks that the dosage and patient name is correct and another in a patient care role that 
administers the IV medication; these two roles have a separation (has to be two separate 
persons) in order to offer protection to the patient receiving the medication with the 
permission to verify the mediation separate from the permission to administer the 
medication. Mutual exclusion ensures that two or more specific roles may not be assigned 
to any particular user. Continuing with the example, the verifier and patient care roles can 
never be assigned to the same user. 
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Defn. 19: SoD  denotes separation of duty between roles which means that, given xr
SoD  yr , with Rrx   and Rry  , a user with role xr  cannot be assigned and perform 
any permissions of role yr , where the two tuple SoDrr yx  , represents the 
SoD between the two roles. The set SoD contains all the pairs of roles that have a 
separation of duty relation. 
Defn. 20: For a given role 
xr , the set },|,{ iSoDrrrrSoD ixix
rx   where i 
iterates over all of the roles in R. 
Example: As discussed above, consider that 
xr  is the verifier role and that yr is the 
patient care role. The duties of these two roles are different, and the security 
administrator at the hospital has decided that for security purposes, an explicit 
separation of duty must be defined. In this case, },{  ePatientCarVerifier
r
rrSoD Verifier  . 
Defn. 21: ME  denotes separation of duty between roles that is strictly defined as two 
roles not allowed to have any permissions in common which means that, given 
xr
ME  yr , with Rrx   and Rry  , the set of RPA does not have pairs with xr  and yr  
where the IDp  are the same. This defines a set ME that contains all the pair of 
roles that have a mutual exclusion relation. More specifically, MErr yx  , . 
Defn. 22: For a given role 
xr , the set },|,{ iMErrrrME Aixix
rx   where i 
iterates over all of the roles in R. 
Example: Consider the roles of Nurse and Staff from Figure 3.8. The security 
administrator has realized that a staff person (e.g. secretary) cannot be assigned the 
role of nurse because of the professional requirements. In this case, 
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},{  SecretaryNurse
r
rrME Nurse  
The previous definitions create a user object that redefines Defn. 6 as follows: 
Defn. 6 (RBAC with SoD and ME): A user that has been authorized to RBAC 
with SoD and ME constraints redefines the user u as a tuple 
 IDID rrIDNAMEID MESoDruu ,,,, , where 
IDrSoD is the resulting set of roles that 
have a separation of duty for role 
IDr  and 
IDrME is the resulting set of roles that 
have a mutual exclusion with IDr .  
Example: In the SoD example above, assume the user JaneSmithu  with role Verifierr  
would have the user tuple:  
 },,{,,,7 ePatientCarVerifierVerifierJaneSmithId rrruu .  
Likewise, for the ME example above, the user with role would have the user 
tuple:  
 },{,,,,9 SecretaryNurseNurseJaneJonesId rrruu  
Note that in order to correctly generate the security enforcement (see Chapter 5), it is 
necessary to be able to compute a transitive closure for 
xr  of both 
xrSoD  and xrME . For 
xrSoD , the transitive closure would be generated by starting with the tuple  yx rr ,  and 
using yr  to search for all of the separation of duties in SoD that are of the form  zx rr ,
for all z and continuing to recursively seek all of the other possible SoDs until the process 
terminates. The generation of the transitive closure for x
r
SoD  will yield a set that may 
have conflicts, and if it doesn’t, would then be utilized in the generation of the security 
enforcement. A similar process would apply for xrME . 
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3.4 Model: LBAC Security 
Given the general security definitions in Section 3.1, the relevant operations related to 
schemas in Section 3.2, and the RBAC capabilities in Section 3.3, this section focuses on 
LBAC. From the perspective of the research in this proposal, the security model and 
framework is realized as a combination of the three major access control models: RBAC, 
LBAC and DAC. In this section, we present the way that our security model supports 
LBAC features. The overriding premise of our security approach for LBAC, as reviewed 
in Section 2.2 is to provide the overall infrastructure and concepts that are needed to 
allow us to assign sensitivity levels, namely classifications to elements of schema and 
clearances to users. This will allow a user to only access those portions of instances for 
the schemas that they have been authorized to. As in the previous two sections, we start 
off with a set of assertions, given in Table 3.4.  
There exists a lattice of sensitivity labels that covers mandatory access control features in a 
generalized manner. These sensitivity levels correspond to classifications that are assigned to 
schema elements (see Defn. 1) and clearances that are assigned to users (see Defn. 6). 
The lattice L  of sensitivity levels is constructed from sensitivity levels that are bound by 
upper (most secure) and lower (least secure) values (see Defns. 19 to 23).  
 In support of our security model, we specialize from a lattice L  of sensitivity levels to an 
ordered set },...,,{ 21 qxxxSL   of sensitivity levels, where SL , qxx  ...x 21 . This means 
that qx represents the most secure sensitivity level and 1x  represents the least secure sensitivity 
level (see Defn. 24). 
An element of a schema can be assigned a sensitivity level (classification) with a user being 
assigned a clearance. Since schema elements can be either be context nodes (refer to other 
elements) or data nodes, and each can be assigned a classification. In a subtree of a schema, 
the classification of a node cannot be more secure than the classifications of its children, and 
the entire tree‘s schema when annotated with classifications must satisfy the lattice 
relationship of sensitivity levels (e.g., in MAC, TS > S > C > U) with the least secure level 
tending toward the top of the tree and the most secure level tending towards the bottom of the 
tree.  
Table 3.4: LBAC Assertions. 
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Given the assertions in Table 3.4, the following set of definitions for LBAC are 
provided. We assume there are q sensitivity levels; all represented in a chain (see 
Defn. 24). This set, denoted as SL, creates a linearly ordered set of levels that 
transitions the order operation   as defined in Defn. 19 to a set of positive integers 
ordered by <, which is now the symbol to do ordering between a clearance and a 
classification. Note that while we consider q sensitivity levels, the case where q = 4 
represents the typical MAC sensitivity levels in implementation: unclassified (U=1), 
classified (C=2), secret (S=3) and top-secret (TS=4). 
Defn. 23: A partial order relation   is a binary relation that is reflexive, 
antisymmetric, and transitive. 
Defn. 24: A lattice is a structure with a set SL , a partial order  , and two binary 
operations: infimum and supremum.  
Defn. 25: Let SLba , . infimum(a,b) is called the greatest lower bound of a  and b , 
or meet, and, supremum(a,b) is called the least upper bound, or join of a and b, 
such that: 
a. For any SLba , , infimum(a, b)   infimum(a, b)   b, and for any SLg , if 
g   a and g b then g   infimum(a, b). 
b. For any SLba , , a   supremum(a, b) and b   supremum(a, b), and for 
any SLg , if a   g and b   g, then supremum(a, b)   g. 
Defn. 26: If for any given SLba , , with   as the partial order relation, we have that 
ba   or ab  , then we call SL  a chain or totally ordered set. 
Defn. 27: We call a lattice ),( SLL   bounded if there exist elements top (┬) and 
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bottom (┴) such that for any a ∈LS, ┴   a   ┬. 
Defn. 28: Define },...,,{ 21 qslslslSL   to be the partially ordered set of q consecutive 
sensitivity levels for the application where 1sl  represents the least secure and qsl  
represents the most secure; an individual level is referred to as SLsl . 
Example: Consider the list of sensitivity levels in Figure 3.9. These sensitivity 
levels, {unclassified (U), classified (C), secret (S), top-secret 
(TS)} are a partially ordered set in which top-secret represents the most secure 
and unclassified represents the least secure level.  
Defn. 29: Given SLba , , the expression ba   denotes that b has a higher sensitivity 
(classification or clearance) than a, which means that b is more secure. Similarly, 
the expression ba   denotes that a and b have the same sensitivity. 
Example: Consider the list of sensitivity levels from Figure 3.9. In this example, 
the relation between levels would be U < C < S < TS. 
Defn. 30: We define a lattice ),(  SLL  as the lattice of sensitivity levels in an 
application A, ordered by the relation < which has replaced   as defined in Defn. 
19.  
Defn. 31: Let Dc
iS
~
be the subtree that results from the decoration iS
D
c|  as defined in 
Defn. 9. The nodes of Dc
iS
~
are LBAC decorated and in the form of 
el =< eID,eNAME,eSL >, where iSel  or 
)||( ecrP
iSel and eSL Î SL  for any i. As a 
result, the schema has been extended due to the addition of an element for eSL . 
Example: Recall the elements for the CCR and CDA schemas following the 
healthcare scenario and as shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. When a decoration 
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operation is performed over the schemas, instances with their elements would 
look as follows (as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11): {<eId1, 
ClinicalDocument, C>, <eId2, patient, C>, <eId3, name, C>, <eId4, 
given, C>, <eId5, family, C>, …, <eId8, clinical_document_header, 
U>, <eId9, patient, S>, <eId10, name, S>}. 
Defn. 32: If some node in a secure schema, )||(
~ ecrP
iSe  with classification eSL , has 
children nodes e1 and e2 , then the classification e1,SL  and e2,SL  must be equal to or 
higher than the classification SLe . That is, SLSL ee ,1  or SLSL ee ,1  and SLSL ee ,2  or 
SLSL ee ,2 . 
This definition means that the least secure levels migrate towards the top of the 
tree of the schema while the more secure level migrate towards the bottom leaf 
nodes. 
Example: Following the previous example, the patient element in the CDA 
schema (and resulting instances as in Figure 3.10) would need to have a 
classification higher or equal than that of unclassified. 
The result of a decoration operation with an LBAC criterion is exemplified in Figure 
3.10 for Carol‘s CDA instance, and in Figure 3.11 for her CCR instance (decorations 
shown in bold red text). In these examples, we consider a set of sensitivity labels as SL= 
{TS, S, C, U}, the typical sensitivity levels for MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976), a use-
case of LBAC. Note that for the CDA, the <patient> element could be given a 
classification of secret (S), but the <family> element could have a classification of top-
secret (TS). This is in order with Defn. 28, where a child node can be classified at the 
same or higher level of sensitivity than its parent. In Figure 3.11, the CCR has a base 
77 
 
classification of classified (C), as shown with the sl=”C” tag in the root node. 
Sensitivity 
Levels: 
{top-secret, secret, classified, unclassified} 
Elements: {<eId1, ClinicalDocument>,  
<eId2, patient>,  
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>, …,  
<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, patient>, <eId10, 
name>} 
Figure 3.9: Sample Sensitivity Levels and Elements to be Secured with LBAC. 
 
Figure 3.10: Result of an LBAC Decoration of Carol‘s CDA Instance. 
 
Figure 3.11: Result of an LBAC Decoration of Carol‘s CCR Instance. 
 
<ClinicalDocument sl=”u”> 
 <patient sl=”s”> 
 <name sl=”s”> 
 <given sl=”s”>Carol</given> 
 <family sl=”ts”>Smith</family> 
 <suffix sl=”s” /> 
 </name> 
 <administrativeGenderCode  
code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1" sl=”s” /> 
 <birthTime value="19830413" sl=”ts” /> 
 </patient> 
<component sl=”ts”> 
 <title sl=”ts”>History of Present Illness</title> 
 <text sl=”ts”> 
 <content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content> 
 is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management. 
 Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content> 
 <content revised="insert">teens</content>. 
 She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year. 
 She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several 
 months.  
 </text> 
 </component> 
</component> 
</ClinicalDocument> 
 
<ContinuityOfCareRecord sl=”c”> 
 <Body sl=”c”> 
 <Problems sl=”c”> 
 <Problem sl=”c”> 
 <Description sl=”c”> 
 <Text>Asthma</Text> 
 </Description> 
 <Status sl=”s”> 
 <Text>Active</Text> 
 </Status> 
 </Problem> 
 </Problems> 
 <Medications sl=”c”> 
 <Medication sl=”c”> 
 <Product sl=”c”> 
 <ProductName sl=”c”> 
 <Text>Zithromax</Text> 
 <Code> 
 <Value></Value> 
 <CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem> 
 </Code> 
 </ProductName> 
 </Product> 
 </Medication> 
 </Medications> 
</Body> 
</ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
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The next portion of the LBAC model is the need to define the conditions under which 
sensitivity levels are compared. Specifically, when a user with a clearance wants to 
access an element with a classification, LBAC and MAC both provide different ways to 
compare the allowable read and/or write from CLR to CLR. Specifically, as given in 
Section 2.2, there are a number of different read and write permissions that are defined 
and enforced for a user against an application that are called domination properties that 
define the way to evaluate a user‘s CLR. Simple security (SS), or read-down, no read-up, 
is the permission to read at equal or lower levels so that means CLR > CLS for read. That 
is, a user with CLR is allowed to read elements with a CLS lower than their clearance 
level, but not those elements with a higher CLS. Simple integrity (SI), or write-down, no 
write-up, is the permission to write to equal or lower levels, meaning CLR > CLS for 
write. That is, a user can write elements with a lower CLS when compared to their 
clearance level, but not to those elements with a CLS. Liberal star (LS), or write-up, no 
write-down, is the permission to write to equal or greater levels (the opposite of SI) 
meaning CLR < CLS for write. Finally, Strict Star Write (SSW) and Strict Star Read 
(SSR), or write (read) equal, is the permission to write (read) only to equal levels of CLR 
as compared to CLS, meaning CLR = CLS for either read or write. Overall, the 
domination properties SS, SI, LS, SSR and SSW allow a security administrator to 
carefully control the usage of information, and most importantly, by setting the 
appropriate the read and write permissions of users it can be insured that a user will never 
violate the requirements when reading and writing to CLSs.  
These features are comparisons performed over the nature of the operations that act in 
the schemas and instances. Building on this assertion, we define access modes and their 
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relationship to the operations as follows: 
Defn. 33: },{ WRITEAMREADAMAM   is the set of access modes that are 
used to categorize the multiple read oriented operations into the AM-READ category 
and multiple write operations in the AM-WRITE category that act against the 
secured tree nodes. 
Defn. 34: Each Oop  has an access mode assigned based on the operation. For 
non-destructive operations such as },{ aggregateread  have READAMam  , 
while destructive operations such as },,{ deleteupdateinsert  have 
WRITEAMam  .  
The operations from Section 3.3 have five values: read, aggregate, insert, update, and 
delete. When enforcing the read and write levels to check the domination properties SS, 
SI, LS, SSR and SSW, the comparison of a user‘s CLR against an element‘s CLS must 
first translate the operation into either AM-READ or AM-WRITE. When that has occurred, 
then the comparison of the CLR against the CLR can be performed based on the 
domination properties assigned to a user; that is, each user is assigned one read 
domination property and one write property. This translation is performed using the 
relation described in Defn. 30, which determines that non-destructive operations have an 
access mode of AM-READ, while destructive operations have an access mode of AM-
WRITE.  
This section is completed by utilizing all of the previous definitions, Defn. 6 can 
be redefined for a user to capture the definition of CLR of a user along with the R -W 
properties (SS, SI, LS, etc.) to access elements. The prior two-tuple becomes a five 
tuple as below: 
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Defn. 6 (LBAC Version): A user that has been authorized to LBAC (but not 
RBAC) redefines the user  u as a tuple   WLBACRLBACCLRNAMEID uuuuu ,,,, , 
where WRLBACu /  are either SS, SI, LS, SSR, or SSW. 
Example: Building on the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, the users of 
GetWellMobile would look as follows:  
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, TS, SS, SI>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington, S, SS, 
SSW>,  
 <uId10, Leroy, C, SS, LS>, <uId11, Jenkins, S, SS, SI>,  
 <uId20, Gail, U, SS, SI>}. 
This user definition is utilized in the situation where the security for the information 
application is limited to LBAC to define permissions on schemas that can be enforced on 
instances. For example, consider an insert operation which has an access mode of AM-
WRITE. If the user Brock Ketchum, as described in Defn. 6 (LBAC Version) has a 
WLBACu   of SI (simple integrity), this means that can only insert new data in those 
elements of the schema that have a lower classification than his clearance. 
3.5 Model: DAC Delegations 
The next set of definitions involves DAC and delegation of authority that allows a 
role and its permissions to be passed among users. These definitions tackle the delegation 
of roles for an administrator-directed delegation where the security administrator, rather 
than the user, decides the delegation of roles and their validity based on constraints set by 
the model. Note that the concepts used in this work is based on the DAC/delegation 
concepts in prior research (Liebrand et al., 2003). 
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There exists a set of original users that have assigned roles and the ability to delegate those 
roles. 
There is a set of delegable users that have the ability to receive roles from original users. 
 Pass-on delegation is an ability given to original users that allows an individual the authority 
to delegate the role even further. This means that an original user can delegate a role to a 
delegable user with pass-on delegation, resulting in the permission of that delegable user to 
pass the role on one step further to another user. 
Delegation of roles is only allowed to delegable users. This means that original users can 
delegate the role to a user in the delegable users set, and in the case that pass-on delegation is 
authorized, the receiving delegable user can delegate the role to another user in the delegable 
users set. 
Table 3.5: DAC Delegations Assertions. 
 
Given the assertions in Table 3.5, we now proceed to discuss DAC and delegation 
aspects of the security model, where the security administrator models the allowed 
delegations that can be defined (Defn. 32) and the allowed delegations that can be 
received (Defn. 33) by each user. 
Defn. 35: Let RDelRoles  , where },...,,{ 21 yrrrDelRoles   and Rry  , be defined 
as the subset of all roles that are eligible for delegation. 
Defn. 36: The set of Original Users, DelRolesUOU  , DelRolesUOU  , 
where },,...,,{ 11  ryuruDU x , is the set of original users with their assigned 
roles. That is, the members of OU have the form OUru yx  , , which means 
that the user with identifier IDu is allowed to delegate the role with identifier yr . 
Example: Consider Figure 3.8 where the original users of the application have 
been defined. The OU set would look as follows:  
{<uId1, rId1>, <uId5, rId2>, <uId10, rId3>,  
 <uId11, rId3>, <uId20, rId4>}.  
Defn. 37: The set of Delegable Users, DelRolesUDU  , where 
},,...,,{ 11  ryuruDU x , is the set of delegable users with the roles they are 
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allowed to receive as part of a delegation. The members of DU have the form of 
DUru yx  , , which means that the user xu  can receive the role with identifier 
yr when delegated by another user. 
Example: For example, let us extend the scenario of Section 2.6. User Samantha, 
a fourth year medical student with the role PhysicianIntern with an identifier 
uId30; and, user Emily, a first year medical student also with the role 
PhysicianIntern with identifier uId40. The acting Physician, Dr. Elisa 
Fakington, has decided that Samantha should be delegated the role of Physician 
whenever she is not available. Elisa wishes to do this with pass-on delegation (see 
Defn. 34) so that Samantha can delegate the role to Emily should she not be 
available. Therefore, the DU set would look as follows: 
{<uId30, rId2>, <uId40, rId2>}.  
Defn. 38: Pass-On Delegation, or PoD, is a Boolean {0,1} that indicates whether a 
user and role pair DUru xx  ,  can delegate the role xr , originally received by a 
user and role pair OUru xy  , , one further step to another user zu  that is set as 
DUru xz  , . In this case, a PoD value of 0 means that the delegation has no 
pass-on authority. A value of 1 means that the delegation has a pass-on authority. 
Example: Following the example from Defn. 33, the user Elisa might grant 
Samantha pass-on delegation so that in the case that Samantha is not available, 
Emily would take over the role of Physician. In this case, PoD would have a 
value of 1 (true). 
Defn. 39: Delegable, or Del, is a Boolean {0,1} that indicate whether a user and role 
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pair OUru yy  ,  or a user and role pair DUru xx  ,  can execute the 
permission of delegation to another user and role pair DUru zz  , , where 
yz rr   or xz rr  . 
Defn. 6 (RBAC with Delegation): A user that has been authorized to RBAC 
(but not LBAC) redefines the user u as a tuple  PoDDelruu IDNAMEID ,,,, , 
where Del true means that the role can be delegated and when PoD true means 
that the authority to delegate that role can be passed on when the role is 
delegated. If Del is false, PoD must be false; if Del is true, PoD can be either 
true or false. 
Example: Following the scenario in Section 2.6, users of Figure 3.11 are the 
members of the OU set. Their role delegation capabilities would look as follows:  
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, rId1, false, false>,  
 <uId5, Elisa Fakington, rId2, true, false>,  
 <uId10, Leroy, rId3, true, false>,  
 <uId11, Jenkins, rId3, true, false>,  
 <uId20, Gail, rId4, true, true>}.  
What this means is that the security administrator has several users defined (e.g. 
Brock Ketchu, Elisa Fakington, etc.) with their roles (e.g. rId1, rId2, etc.). The security 
administrator then takes the user-role assignment and defines the delegation capabilities 
by leveraging the set of original users (see Defn. 32) and the delegable users (see Defn. 
33). At the model level we then capture delegation as the user-role permission of 
delegation to a secondary user (e.g. Samantha or Emily from Defn. 33) with the pass-on 
delegation permission (see Defn. 34). All the information needed for the delegation is 
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available in the model in the form of the user object (see Defn. 6 (RBAC with 
Delegation)) and the user sets  
The example of Defn. 6 (RBAC with Delegation)) shows that Brock Ketchum 
cannot delegate his role of Psychiatrist. Elisa Fakington can delegate her role of 
Physician, but without Pass-on Delegation (i.e. Samantha or Emily, which would be in 
the set of Delegable Users, DU, from the example of Defn. 33 would not have PoD). The 
nurses Leroy and Jenkins follow the same role delegation rules as Elisa Fakington. Last, 
Gail can delegate her role with PoD (the user who is assigned the role can delegate it one 
step further). The users that act as recipients of these delegations, if triggered, must be 
members of the Delegable Users (DU) set. Those users of the application that are not part 
of the DU set cannot receive any role delegation. 
3.6 Model: User Authorizations  
In this section, we complete the model with a discussion of user authorizations and 
the authentication process. Recall that we define authority as a capability obtained by a 
user/role pair that allows him/her to perform operations over a schema‘s instances. In 
other words, if user U with role R has authorization for instance iSkI , then s/he can perform 
the permissions tied to R over the instantiated elements in iSkI . The following set of 
definitions describes the characterization of authorization with respect to instances and 
schemas. 
Defn. 40: The set of authorized schemas, 
},,,...,,,{
111

zyx IDIDIDIDIDID
srusruAS , is defined as the schemas from the 
application A that have been assigned to a user/role combination. That is, the tuple 
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ASsru IDIDID  ,,  represents an authorized schema to a user/role combination, 
where IDu is the unique identifier for a user Uu , IDr  is the unique identifier for 
a role Rr , and IDs  is the unique identifier for a schema AS , where S is a 
role-secured schema or an LBAC decorated schema.  
In Defn. 35, the end result is that,the set AS is a derived set from the users U set (see 
Defn. 6 RBAC Version) and the role-permission assignments RPA sets, in which the 
IDu and IDr  are obtained from the U set, and the IDs  is obtained from the RPA using 
the IDr  as a seed. 
Example: Recall the users from GetWellMobile in Figure 3.9. A sample schema 
authorization object for the user Brock Ketchum would look as follows: <uId1, 
rId1, sId1>. This means that Brock is authorized to the CCR schema under the 
role of Psychiatrist. 
Defn. 41: The set of authorized instances (AI) is defined as the instances from the 
application A that have been assigned to a user/role combination. That is, the tuple 
AIiru IDIDID  ,,  represents an authorized instance to a user/role combination, 
where IDu is the unique identifier for a user Uu , IDr  is the unique identifier for 
a role Rr , and IDi  is the unique identifier for an instance Ai . 
Example: Following the example above, the user Brock Ketchum‘s instance 
authorization object would be: <uId1, rId1, iId1>. This means that Brock is 
authorized to the CCR instance of Carol Smith‘s record under the role of 
Psychiatrist. 
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The previous two definitions represent the authorization granted over schemas and 
instances. Since in our model the security is defined at the schema level and enforced at 
the instance level, schemas authorized to a user/role combination include those that have 
permissions defined over their elements (Defn. 35 and Defn. 6 RBAC Version). 
Complete instances are authorized to the user/role combination, and the security is 
enforced with the permissions defined at their respective schemas. For example, if the 
instances of one schema S1 is a patient record for inpatient visit (hospital) and another 
schema S2 is a patient record for outpatient visit (MD office), we assign Carol Smith‘s 
instances of S1 to user Elisa. Carol Smith‘s instances, following S2, can be assigned to 
user Brock. The security over these instances is the result of a projection or decoration of 
the schemas with respect to the user/role (Elisa as a physician would use the security 
defined for her role in S1 and Brock as a psychiatrist would use the security defined for 
his role in S2, for example). 
To complete the work, we bring together the three access control models (RBAC, 
LBAC, and DAC) in order to define the ability of users who play optional roles to access 
elements of tree-structure documents which may have optional security levels. In our 
proposed security model, DAC is considered a policy-level security component, which 
means that authorizations over schemas and instances are automatic due to the defined 
permissions (with regards to the schemas) and driven by a security-administrator (with 
regards to the authorized instances). In terms of RBAC and LBAC, no preset order is 
necessary in terms of which one is defined first for information applications where 
components from both models are required; order is irrelevant with the final result 
staying the same. The combined definition is: 
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Defn. 6 (LBAC + RBAC): A user that has been authorized to both RBAC and 
LBAC redefines the user u as a tuple 
  PoDDelMESoDruuuuu
IDID rr
IDWLBACRLBACCLRNAMEID ,,,,,,,,, , where IDu is 
the unique identifier for the user, NAMEu  is the tag for the user u, CLRu  is the 
clearance level assigned to the user (per LBAC components), WRLBACu /  are either 
SS, SI, LS, SSR, or SSW, IDr  is the unique identifier for the assigned role Rr ,
IDrSoD is the resulting set of roles that have a separation of duty for role IDr , 
IDrME is the resulting set of roles that have a mutual exclusion with IDr , Del 
means that the role with the identifier 
IDr
u  can be delegated (Boolean value), and 
PoD means that pass-on delegation is allowed or not (Boolean value). 
Example: Building on all the definitions and examples utilized in this chapter, the 
finalized user object for the GetWellMobile application would look as follows:  
 {<uId1, Brock Ketchum, TS, SS, SI, rId1, Ø, Ø, false, false>,  
  <uId5, Elisa Fakington, S, SS, SSW, rId2, Ø, Ø, true, false>,  
   <uId10, Leroy, C, SS, LS, rId3, Ø, Ø, true, false>,  
   <uId11, Jenkins, S, SS, SI, rId3, Ø, Ø, true, false>,  
   <uId20, Gail, U, SS, SI, rId4, Ø, Ø, true, true>}. 
Figure 3.12 demonstrates the way that a tree-structured schema would look after 
RBAC project and projections are performed. In the figure notice that from the original 
schema to the LBAC decorated schema, there has been a prune and decoration. This is 
the execution of Defn. 8c and Defn. 9. When decorating the original S  schema, there 
was first a projection operation over those nodes that needed a classification. The 
resulting S
~
 was then further pruned via a projection operation over a role R, yielding the 
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schema S
~~
. The end result of this process is a role-secured schema with classification 
labels on the nodes that would provide RBAC and LBAC security. 
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Figure 3.12: LBAC Decoration and RBAC Projection of a Tree-structured Schema. 
3.7 Access Control Related Work 
Access control enforcement in tree-structured documents, most commonly with 
XML, has two typical approaches. First, the enforcement can be done as query rewrites, 
where these are generated depending on the access control policy. Second, the 
enforcement can be embedded into the schema and documents to provide different views 
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based on the policies in place. This embedded enforcement can include either security 
policy definitions or cryptographic properties.  
The work of (Damiani, De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Paraboschi, & Samarati, 2000) 
presents an access control system that embeds the definition and enforcement of the 
security policies in the structure of the XML documents in order to provide customizable 
security. The security details can also be embedded in the XML DTD (L. Sun & Li, 
2006), providing a level of generalization for documents that share the same DTD. This is 
similar to our work in that security policies act in both a descriptive level of the XML 
instances and target the XML instances, but differ in two ways. First, the work targets 
XML DTD‘s, which have been replaced by schemas in the newest specifications of the 
format. Second, the security policies are embedded into both the DTD and the instance. 
When policies are changed, the cost of updating the XML instances is huge. 
Another effort by (Damiani, Fansi, Gabillon, & Marrara, 2008) details a model that 
tries to combine the two discussed methodologies to provide security to XML datasets. 
The XML schema is extended with three security attributes: access, condition and dirty. 
Any changes done to the security policy must be updated in the XML schema, and 
therefore on any XML instance constructed from the schema. This is similar to our work 
in that it ultimately targets security in XML document instances via XACML policies, but 
our work differs by also taking into consideration XML document writing. For example, 
XPath (Clark & DeRose, 1999) design allows it only to perform reading queries to XML 
instances. 
The encryption of different sections of an XML document with different encryption 
keys is presented in (Bertino & Ferrari, 2002). These keys are then distributed to the 
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specific users based on the access control policies in place. Special focus is given 
content-based access control, and users are granted or denied access based on their 
credentials (not roles, as in our approach). This makes it difficult to handle policies such 
as role-delegation, time and value constraints, unless they are handled at the application 
level. Efforts by (Bertino, Castano, Ferrari, & Mesiti, 2002) present Author-X, a Java-
based system for DAC in XML documents, and provides customizable protection to the 
documents with positive and negative authorizations. Author-X employs a policy base 
DTD document that prunes an XML instance based on the security policies (similar to 
our approach), but focuses on discretionary access control (different to our approach of 
RBAC and its extensions and its lack of XML schemas). 
Another example of embedding access control policies into the XML DTD and 
instances is proposed by (Cao, Sun, & Wang, 2005; L. Sun & Li, 2006) via a usage 
control model allows for a more custom control than the more commonly used access 
control models. By embedding security into documents, changes to security have broad 
impact on instances. When security policies change, the cost of re-securing all created 
instances is directly proportional to the amount of instances. Work by (Rahaman, 
Roudier, & Schaad, 2008) presents a distributed access control model for collaborative 
environments where XML documents are used. The proposed framework utilizes a 
cryptographic methodology, employing a key management scheme to enforce security 
policies (much different to our secure software engineering approach). The framework 
also supports delegation of access control decisions via the use of a lazy rekeying 
protocol. Ultimately, this approach only handles the reading of XML instances, and does 
not handle the destructive permissions such as insert, delete and update. 
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The work of (Leonardi, Bhowmick, & Iwaihara, 2010) considers the scenario of a 
federated access control model, in which the data provider and policy enforcement are 
handled by different organizations. This approach relates to ours with regards to the 
separation of the security policies from the data to be handled, but differs in the specifics 
of where the policies‘ details are stored. (Kuper, Massacci, & Rassadko, 2005) has 
presented a model consisting of access control policies over DTD‘s (again, outmoded in 
XML) with XPath expressions in order to achieve XML security. The purpose of their 
model is similar to ours, as it aims to provide different authorized views of an XML 
document based on the user‘s credentials. However, the significant difference is that this 
approach combines query rewriting and authentication methods, whereas our approach 
can be applied to any non-normative XACML architecture (having a policy enforcement 
point) for both reading and updating, as well as XPath or XQuery queries. 
Last, the work of (Müldner, Leighton, & Miziołek, 2009) presents an approach of 
supporting RBAC to handle the special case of role proliferation, which is an 
administrative issue that happens in RBAC when roles are changed, added, and evolve 
over time, making security of an organization difficult to manage. This approach supports 
the encryption of segments of the XML document. Our approach doesn‘t address role 
proliferation; however, by separating our security into an XACML policy, we do insulate 
role proliferation from impacting an application‘s XML schemas and instances. 
  
92 
 
Chapter 4 
UML Security Extensions for  
Tree-Structured Documents 
 
In this chapter, the second major component of our security framework for tree-
structured documents involves the realization of the security model in Chapter 3 as a 
series of new unified modeling language (UML) diagrams (Fowler, 2004) that capture the 
characteristics of the security model and allow us to augment the software engineering 
process of UML with an information engineering process for tree-structure documents. 
Recall from Section 2.7 that UML provides a large variety of diagrams for the 
visualization of different software requirements: class, component, deployment, activity, 
use-case, state-machine, communication, sequence, etc. UML provide the benefit of 
reducing misinterpretation and promoting simple communication of domain requirements 
with its visual notation (Lange & Chaudron, 2005). However, while UML can be utilized 
to define security requirements, what is lacking in UML is actual diagrams that are 
dedicated to, in our interest, access control models (RBAC, LBAC, and DAC) that allow 
the definition of security requirements using new security UML diagrams that seamlessly 
integrate with the UML model and unified design process. This is particularly true for 
domains such as healthcare where the information to be utilized is private and often 
governed by legal constructs that assure its proper use and dissemination, as we have 
described in Section 2.6 and illustrated with a detailed example for our security model of 
Chapter 3.  
The work presented in this chapter leverages off of early work that has extended 
UML with new diagrams for RBAC, mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La 
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Padula, 1976), and DAC capabilities (Pavlich-Mariscal, 2008; Pavlich-Mariscal, 
Demurjian, & Michel, 2010) from an object-oriented perspective. This prior work defines 
role slices that contain the methods of an object-oriented application that are both 
assigned and prohibited on a role-by-role basis, along with the ability to tag roles with 
classifications in support of MAC and support delegation of author. The work also 
generates aspect-oriented AspectJ enforcement code for a UML design augmented with 
security. The work in this chapter also meshes with work on extending NIST with 
collaboration of duty and adaptive workflow capabilities (Berhe, Demurjian, & Agresta, 
2009; Berhe et al., 2010; Berhe, Demurjian, Gokhale, Pavlich-Mariscal, & Saripalle, 
2011) that also added new UML diagrams to represent users, roles, collaborations, and 
the required interaction of users towards a common goal. To support enforcement in an 
object-oriented RBAC context, the Java Meta Language is leveraged to define policies 
that can be directly embedded in code. The work in this chapter augments the overall 
UML design process by providing new UML diagrams for the information engineering of 
tree structure documents (see the security model of Chapter 3) that is integrated with an 
overall application process that includes object-oriented and collaborative capabilities. 
These three approaches have been integrated into a secure software engineering approach 
for functional, collaborative, and information concerns for complex applications like the 
one given in Section 2.6 (Pavlich-Mariscal, Berhe, De la Rosa Algarín, A., & Demurjian, 
2014). 
The formal definition of the UML metamodel by OMG with the Meta-Object Facility 
(MOF) allows the extension of the modeling language with several degrees of formality, 
as reviewed in Section 2.7. MOF facilitates Model Driven Architecture (MDA) (Kleppe, 
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Warmer, Bast, & Explained, 2003; Soley, 2000), another standard that aims to platform 
independent models (PIM) (Burmester, Giese, & Schäfer, 2005) to platform specific 
models (PSM) (Kelly & Tolvanen, 2008). UML can be extended via the use of the MOF, 
which consists of four layers: the M3 layer consists of the meta-meta model, M2-models 
are built using the M3 language. In turn, M2-models describe the elements of the M1-
layer, while the M1-models describe the elements of the M0-layer (the runtime instance 
of the modeled system). The other major benefit of UML that the security framework 
presented in this dissertation makes use of is the automatic generation of code from the 
diagrams (Montrieux et al., 2010), which has also been done in our prior work on RBAC, 
MAC, and DAC (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and NIST extensions for collaboration of 
duty and adaptive workflow (Berhe et al., 2010). The security framework presented 
herein further extends and supplements that capability by mapping the new UML 
extensions for the security model in Chapter 3 with XACML policy elements. This results 
in the automatic generation of proper enforcement ready for deployment in information 
systems. Towards this purpose, we advance the information security problem from a 
software engineering perspective, elevating information security to a first-class citizen of 
the software design and development process.  
In support of this work, this chapter presents a set of UML diagrams to realize the 
security model in Chapter 3 into a format that can be utilized to design an application that 
has functional (object-oriented), collaborative, and information security concerns. To 
accomplish this, we introduce new UML diagrams that correspond to the key security 
model characteristics as given in Chapter 3. First, there exists a necessity to represent a 
tree-structured schema (see Definitions 1 and 2 from Section 3.1) for which we propose 
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the creation of a new UML diagram to represent such a schema as a tree structured 
collection of elements, namely, the Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD). Second, 
to identify those portions of the tree-structure document schema as captured in DSCD 
(see Definitions 8a, 8b, 8c, 9, and 10 in Section 3.2) , we propose the creation of a new 
UML diagram that identifies the subset of DSCD that needs to be protected, namely, the 
new Secure Information Diagram (SID). Third, to represent RBAC security capabilities 
(see Definitions 11 and 12 from Section 3.3), we propose a new UML diagram to 
represent the roles and provide the ability to define. For elements of a schema, 
permissions for RBAC (read, write, etc.) and classifications for LBAC, we propose the 
new UML Document Role-Slice Diagram (DRSD). Note that DSCD, SID, and DSRC are 
generalizations of our prior work that specified these diagrams for XML (De la Rosa 
Algarín, A. et al., 2012; De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013); these new document based 
diagrams can apply to different document standards (e.g., XML, JSON, OWL, etc.). 
Fourth, to support LBAC features (see Definitions 26, 27, and 28 in Section 3.4), we 
propose the new UML LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) that builds off of the 
SID and serves as a means to define which elements in the tree-structured document need 
classifications. Fourth, to tie together RBAC, LBAC and DAC is the User Diagram 
(UD), created to consider the orthogonal nature between RBAC and LBAC, as well as the 
role-delegation and authorization assignments from DAC. Fifth, to support the ability to 
have privileges delegated from one user to another (see Definitions 31 to 35 in Section 
3.5), the new UML Delegation Diagram (DD) provides the ability to define which users 
and role pairs can delegate or be delegated. Lastly, to support the definition of users and 
their authorization (see Definition 6 in Section 3.1 and its augmented versions in Sections 
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3.3 and 3.4), we propose the new UML Authorization Diagram (AD) that provides the 
ability to determine which schemas and instances are tied to a user/role pair (see 
Definitions 35 and 36 in Section 3.6)  
The remainder of this chapter is organized into four subsections. Section 4.1 
introduces and motivates the usage of UML for secure information engineering for tree-
structured documents and places our work into a context with previous work (Berhe et 
al., 2011; Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) that includes functional, collaborative, and 
information security concerns. Using this as basis, Section 4.2 presents the new UML 
diagrams for our security model, namely, DSCD, DRSD, SID, LFD, DD, UD, and AD, 
and provides a detailed example of their usage using the healthcare scenario from Section 
2.6 and by reformulating the example in Chapter 3 from a model to a UML context. 
Section 4.3 complements the formalization of the new UML diagrams by starting their 
definition via a utilization of the UML metamodel to define these new security diagrams. 
Section 4.4 brings all of these diagrams together and presents a secure information 
engineering process, and shows the way that this process it be placed into an appropriate 
context with the work presented in Section 4.1 for designing an healthcare application for 
functional, collaborative, and information concerns. This chapter concludes with detailed 
discussion on the related work in Section 4.5 as related to security modeling via UML.  
4.1 Motivation and Usage of UML for Secure Information Engineering 
The software development process has evolved over 30+ years from the waterfall 
model (Royce, 1970) to the iterative model (Larman & Basili, 2003) to the spiral model 
(Boehm, 1988) to the unified process model (Jacobson, 1999) to agile development 
lifecycle (Cohen, Lindvall, & Costa, 2003). Despite this long history, these processes 
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have yet to address challenges of large-scale applications that have varied concerns 
(users‘ interfaces, server functionality, database support, tracking and logging, security, 
etc.) that are often tangled, e.g., an object-oriented application, code to read/write the 
database can be spread across multiple classes even if the database is abstracted via 
Hibernate (Bauer & King, 2005). All of these different concerns end up intertwined and 
spread out across the application‘s varied components. As a result, the traceability of 
security through different aspects, which in our case involves functional, collaborative, 
and information, capabilities, cannot be easily isolated. This chapter presents UML 
extensions and a secure information engineering process that elevates information 
security to a primary step of the software development process as depicted in Figure 4.1 
where the prior work on functional (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and collaborative 
(Berhe et al., 2010) security with extensions with UML yields a secure engineering 
approach that encompasses the different aspects of a system‘s security. In our focus on 
information security, representing the tree-structured schemas with new UML diagrams 
allows us to tackle document security from an information engineering perspective. This 
provides several benefits, including a more consistent process towards secure information 
engineering, and facilitating the secure policy generation process by utilizing modeling 
artifacts that contain all the pertinent information for the security policy. 
To provide a motivation for the usage of UML for security design, consider Figure 4.1 
more closely, where a secure software engineering approach for functional, collaborative, 
and information concerns (focused on tree-structured documents) is intended to visually 
model RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. From a functional perspective, the work of (Pavlich-
Mariscal et al., 2010), extended UML with new diagrams for RBAC, MAC, and DAC to 
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identify a subset of the object-oriented classes and their methods that need to be securely 
controlled in terms of permissions (methods) assigned to users by roles, and to allow 
these roles to be assigned permissions via a new role-oriented diagram. From a 
collaborative perspective, the work of (Berhe et al., 2010) extended NIST RBAC and 
UML with new diagrams to support the specification of collaboration among users that 
need to coordinate their activities to achieve a particular tasks in a series of steps over 
time. Our work in this chapter adds an information perspective, to allow tree-structured 
documents to be securely handled in support of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC by allowing 
different portions of the instances of a document to be delivered to different users based 
on roles, permissions, and classifications. Individually, all three approaches can generate 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms (AspectJ code for functional, Java Meta Language 
code for collaboration, and XACML policies for information). The combination of all 
three concerns promotes security as an integral part of a secure software engineering 
approach, while tracking software quality assurance in terms of the consistency of the 
security and non-security requirements.  
New UML Diagrams for 
Data-Sharing Based 
Collaboration and 
Adaptive Workflow Code/Policy 
Generation
Provide New Visual Security 
Policies in UML to Model 
Access Control Security 
Concerns
New UML Diagrams 
for Functional-Based
RBAC, MAC and DAC
Aspect Oriented Enforcement 
Code and XACML Enforcement 
Policies
Functional, 
Collaborative, 
Information
Security 
Framework for 
Information
XACML Policy Generation
 
Figure 4.1: An Abstraction Process for Concerns. 
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4.2 UML Security Extensions for Tree-Structured Documents 
The basis of the work presented herein leverages the work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 
2010) for functional security concerns (RBAC, MAC, and DAC) supported in an object-
oriented context within UML with new diagrams in order to support the definition of 
informational security concerns for tree-structure documents via new UML diagrams for 
RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. Our work transitions the security model of Chapter 3 to 
support security of tree-structured document schemas and instances in a granular 
approach that focuses on the elements, rather than the work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 
2010) that has focused on providing secure access to methods. However, our work on a 
security framework for tree structured documents has been influenced by some concepts 
from (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010), namely: the secure subsystem diagram (SSD), 
which denotes all of the classes and methods in the system that requires protection; the 
role-slice diagram (RSD), which provides a means to define permissions by role to the 
classes and methods that comprise the SSD; and, the user diagram (UD), which focuses 
in denoting the roles assigned to each user in the system, with the role retaining the actual 
permissions. The concept of identifying a secure portion via SSD corresponds to our 
identification of the portion of a document schema that needs to be protected, the ability 
to define a RSD for the methods allowed against SSD corresponds to our using the new 
document role-slice diagram to define permissions against a portion of the document 
schema, and, our user diagram corresponds to the actual document instances and portions 
thereof that are available to each user with a role from a permission perspective (e.g., 
read, write, etc.).  
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This section covers the new diagrams that extends UML with RBAC, LBAC, and 
DAC, with a specific target of tree-structured documents with elements that have defined 
schemas and instances (see Definitions 1 and 2 from Section 3.1). The UML extensions it 
this section generalize our prior work (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013) that defined a 
set of new UML diagrams that were specialized for XML. By generalizing, we are able to 
provide a design approach in UML that can work for applications that will be built with 
XML, JSON, OWL, etc., all which can be aligned into a document-tree structure format. 
Towards that end, the remainder of this section reviews six new UML diagrams: DSCD, 
DRSD, SID, LFD, DD, and AD. More specifically, Section 4.2.1 introduces the 
Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD) that can handle any tree-structured schema to 
model the document and realize the instance (see Definitions 8a, 8b, 8c, 9, and 10 in 
Section 3.2). Note that in showing examples for DSCD and other new UML diagrams, we 
utilize both the HL7 CDA and CCR schemas, which are specializations of a tree-structure 
document whose structure can be represented with the UML DSCD modeling construct 
called the UML Profile. The new UML Secure Information Diagram (SID) is presented in 
section 4.2.2, and is a UML extension that allows security administrators determine 
which subtree of the original document schema tree requires a level of security some sort 
of security (e.g. role filtering, LBAC sensitivity, etc.). Given DSCD and SID, the next 
new diagram in Section 4.2.3 is the Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD) to define the 
role and the associated permissions to access elements (see Definitions 11 and 12 from 
Section 3.3). Next, in Section 4.2.4, LBAC is supported via the definition of a new UML 
LBAC Secure Information (LSID) to capture the capabilities of security model (see 
Definitions 26, 27, and 28 in Section 3.4) that are used to define access modes and 
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classifications for schema elements; this decorates the originally created SID. Then, 
Section 4.2.5 contains the User Diagram (UD) for the definition of users (see Definition 
6 in Section 3.1 and its augmented versions in Sections 3.3 and 3.4). To handle delegation 
of roles between users, in Section 4.2.6, the new UML Delegation Diagram (DD) is 
proposed (see Definitions 31 to 35 in Section 3.5) to capture which users and roles are 
allowed to delegate authority in an application. Finally, Section 4.2.7 contains the 
Authorization Diagram (AD) that ties schemas and instances with the user/role 
combination to arrive at a culminating new diagram (see Definitions 35 and 36 in Section 
3.6 and Definition 6 in Section 3.6). 
4.2.1 The Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD) 
The new UML Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), shown in Figure 4.2 for 
HL7 CDA‘s clinical_document_header and section subtrees and in Figure 4.3 for the 
CCR segment of the healthcare example of Chapter 2, is an artifact that holds all of the 
characteristics of the schema, including structure, data type, and value constraints. The 
DSCD graphically represents the schemas utilized by an information system as described 
by Definitions 1 and 2 from Section 3.1. Recall that the assumption of the work presented 
in this dissertation is that schemas are characterized by a tree-structure, possibly 
complimented with data type constraints. To achieve this, we utilize a UML profile for 
tree-structured documents. There has been research in UML profiles for tree-structured 
documents, mainly utilizing XML (Bernauer, Kappel, & Kramler, 2003; Bernauer, 
Kappel, & Kramler, 2004), which range from information modeling (Carlson, 2008; 
Combi & Oliboni, 2006; Conrad, Scheffner, & Christoph Freytag, 2000; Routledge, Bird, 
& Goodchild, 2002) to systems modeling represented in XML (Bray et al., 1998). This 
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work also considers round-trip engineering, a concept that denotes the ability of 
producing a UML diagram from XML and vice-versa, without the loss of information. 
For the scope of the work in this dissertation, we generate a DSCD a UML diagram from 
a source tree-document schema, which for the purposes or demonstrating the concepts, is 
actually an XML schema. To facilitate this process, we utilize the UML Profile concept 
that allows new diagrams to be defined using the various UML concepts (stereotypes, 
tags, constraints applied to classes, attributes, operations, etc.) that allow a tree structured 
document to be transitioned into DSCD, and for the particular purposes of this section, to 
demonstrate the way that an XML schema (a tree structured format) can be transitioned 
to the new UML DSCD diagram; this is shown in Table 4.1. 
While it is possible to utilize the UML profile to represent an entire schema as a UML 
package, we instead have chosen to represent each schema as a tree of stereotyped 
classes. This approach was chosen in order to capture the hierarchical structure of a 
schema as a series of related classes. Table 4.1 has three columns: the first column 
represents the features of tree structured document, the second column defines the 
corresponding XML equivalents of these features, and the third column transitions the 
second column into the equivalent UML profile concept. In the first row of Table 4.1, a 
general element in the tree-structured document is equivalent to an XML element 
(xsd:element) and is realized as a UML class; the second row maps the element name to 
a UML class name. In the third row of Table 4.1, an element attribute in the tree-
structured document is equivalent to a generic attribute in XML which can be mapped to 
a «stereotyped» attribute in UML. The fourth row corresponds to a patient – child 
relationship at the schema level to identify a tree and its subtrees, which in XML is 
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observed as nested elements, and is represented as a UML dependency relationship in the 
DSCD. The fifth row of Table 4.1 describes complex elements (those that are built out of 
many sub-elements), which in XML are denoted as xsd:complexType and in the DSCD 
are denoted as a UML class with the «complexType» stereotype. The sixth row covers a 
similar case, considering sequences or lists of elements, which in XML are denoted as 
xsd:sequence and in the DSCD are denoted as a UML class with the «sequence» 
stereotype. Aggregation of attributes are handled with the seventh row of Table 4.1 and is 
represented as xsd:attributeGroup in XML and as a UML class with the 
«attributeGroup» stereotype in the DSCD. In the eighth row of Table 4.1, groups of 
elements in a tree-structured document are equivalent to an XML xsd:group node and is 
represented as a UML class with the «group» stereotype in DSCD. The ninth row of Table 
4.1 handles acceptable or allowable values for elements, which in XML are usually 
maxOccurs and minOccurs attributes to an XML element constraints, realized as a 
«constraint» stereotyped class member in DSCD. In the tenth row of Table 4.1, indirect 
references allow elements of a tree-structure document to be associated with one another, 
which in XML is a ref attribute on an element that are represented as a «ref» class 
member from UML profile in the DSCD. Lastly, in the eleventh row of Table 4.1, for 
tree-structured document, the parent-child relationship between non-named elements 
corresponds to non-named elements in XML (e.g., xsd:complexType, 
xsd:attributeGroup, etc.) and is represented with a UML directed association 
relationship between classes in the DSCD. Note that by using these mappings in Table 
4.1 it is possible to develop an algorithm that operate over an XML schema to generate a 
DSCD equivalent in UML. Note also that there would need to be other versions of Table 
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4.1 for other data formats (e.g., JSON, RDF, etc.) where the second column of the table 
would be replaced with the relevant model constructs from the other formats. 
Tree-Structured Document 
Component 
XML Analog DSCD Component 
General Element Element UML Class 
General Element Name Element Name UML Class Name 
General Element Attribute Generic Attribute Stereotyped Attribute 
Parent – child relationship of a 
schema (tree-subtree) 
Tree - Subtree 
UML Dependency 
Relationship 
Complex Type of Elements 
and/or Attributes 
XML xs:complexType 
Stereotyped «complexType» 
UML Class 
Sequential Element Order XML xs:sequence 
Stereotyped «sequence» UML 
Class 
Aggregation of Attributes  XML xs:attributeGroup 
Stereotyped «attributeGroup» 
UML Class 
Grouping of Elements to form 
a complex type 
XML xs:group 
Stereotyped «group» UML 
Class 
Acceptable Values for 
Elements 
XML constraints via 
minOccurs, maxOccurs 
Stereotyped «constraint» class 
member 
Indirect Reference of 
Elements 
XML ref 
Stereotyped «ref» name class 
member 
Parent – child relationship of 
non-named Elements 
XML Element – non-named 
child element 
UML Directed Association 
Relationship 
Table 4.1: Specialized UML Profile for Tree-Structured Document to DSCD with XML 
Cases. 
 
To illustrate the process of creating a DSCD that transitions from an XML diagram, 
consider the DSCD shown in Figure 4.3 has been created from the HL7 CDA schema 
segment from Figure 2.4, which we repeat in Figure 4.2. To create Figure 4.3, we utilize 
the equivalences from the tree-document structure and XML that then aligns the various 
XML concepts (column two of Figure 4.1) in order to map them to the appropriate UML 
profile concepts (column three of Figure 4.1). To begin, consider lines 1, 2, and 28 of the 
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XML in Figure 4.2 which correspond to a set of UML constructs (A/B, C, and D in 
Figure 4.3) that will be generated from the XML source. Specifically, these three lines of 
XML cause the creation of three UML classes corresponding to the three labeled boxes 
A/B, C and D in Figure 4.3 that are inside the dashed box at the top of the figure. First, 
from line 1 in Figure 4.2, we have <xsd:element 
name="clinical_document_header"> where the element being defined in the XML 
schema maps to a UML class with the same element name that acts as the root of the 
DSCD (see UML class next to A in Figure 4.3). This mapping uses rows 1 and 2 of Table 
4.1 to generate a class and its class name clinical_document_header. Second, notice 
that in the XML, the xsd:complexType in lines 2 to 33 (open/close) in Figure 4.2 is 
composed of a xsd:sequence (lines 3 to 27 in Figure 4.2), an xsd:attributeGroup 
(line 28 in Figure 4.2), and three xsd:attribute (lines 29-32 in Figure 4.2. The 
xsd:complexType of XML CDA in lines 2 to 33 (open/close) causes the generation of a 
UML «complexType» stereotyped generic class (see B in Figure 4.3), connected with a 
direct association to the root UML class (rows 4, 5, 7 and 11 of Table 4.1, shown in A/B 
of Figure 4.3). Once the «complexType» has been generated, it is then possible to create 
its components. The xsd:sequence for lines 3 to 27 causes the generation of the UML 
class next to C in Figure 4.3 that creates a sequence (list) that contains all of the refs 
given on lines 4 to 26 generated as UML «elements» as captured within the dotted box at 
the bottom of Figure 4.3 (see F). These UML «elements» are stereotyped with respect to 
the attributes where the XML ref is represented as a «ref» stereotype and constraints are 
represented as a «constraint» stereotype, as shown in row 10 of Table 4.1. Similarly, the 
xsd:attributeGroup in line 28 causes the generation of the UML construct next to D in 
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Figure 4.3 that has the name of ―common_atts‖ from line 28 of Figure 4.2. Finally, the 
last portion of the «complexType» is generated corresponding to the three attributes: 
HL7-Name, T, and RIM-Version (lines 29, 31, and 32, respectively) resulting in the 
generation of E in the top right portion of Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.2: HL7 CDA ‗clinical_document_header‘ Schema Segment. 
1. <xsd:element name="clinical_document_header"> 
2.  <xsd:complexType> 
3.  <xsd:sequence> 
4.  <xsd:element ref="id"/> 
5.  <xsd:element ref="set_id" minOccurs="0"/> 
6.  <xsd:element ref="version_nbr" minOccurs="0"/> 
7.  <xsd:element ref="document_type_cd"/> 
8.  <xsd:element ref="service_tmr" minOccurs="0"/> 
9.  <xsd:element ref="origination_dttm"/> 
10.  <xsd:element ref="copy_dttm" minOccurs="0"/> 
11.  <xsd:element ref="confidentiality_cd" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
12.  <xsd:element ref="document_relationship" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
13.  <xsd:element ref="fulfills_order" minOccurs="0"/> 
14.  <xsd:element ref="patient_encounter" minOccurs="0"/> 
15.  <xsd:element ref="authenticator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
16.  <xsd:element ref="legal_authenticator" minOccurs="0"/> 
17.  <xsd:element ref="intended_recipient" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
18.  <xsd:element ref="originator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
19.  <xsd:element ref="originating_organization" minOccurs="0"/> 
20.  <xsd:element ref="transcriptionist" minOccurs="0"/> 
21.  <xsd:element ref="provider" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
22.  <xsd:element ref="service_actor" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
23.  <xsd:element ref="patient"/> 
24.  <xsd:element ref="originating_device" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
25.  <xsd:element ref="service_target" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
26.  <xsd:element ref="local_header" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
27.  </xsd:sequence> 
28.  <xsd:attributeGroup ref="common_atts"/> 
29.  <xsd:attribute name="HL7-NAME" type="xsd:string"  
30.  fixed="doc_serv_as_clin_doc_header"/> 
31.  <xsd:attribute name="T" type="xsd:string" fixed="service"/> 
32.  <xsd:attribute name="RIM-VERSION" type="xsd:string" fixed="0.98"/> 
33.  </xsd:complexType> 
34. </xsd:element> 
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«element»
«ref» name=“transcriptionist”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element»
«ref» name=“provider”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”
«element»
«ref» name=“service_actor”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”
«element»
«ref» name=“patient”
«element»
«ref» name=“originating_device”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”
«element»
«ref» name=“service_target”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”
«element»
«ref» name=“local_header”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”
«element»
«ref» name=“common_atts”
«attributeGroup»
«type» name=“xsd:string”
«constraint» fixed=“document_service_as_clinical_document_header”
«attribute» HL7-NAME
«type» name=“xsd:string”
«constraint» fixed=“service”
«attribute» T
«type» name=“xsd:string”
«constraint» fixed=“0.98”
«attribute» RIM-VERSION
A
C
B
F
D
E
Figure 4.3: A DSCD for the CDA Segment. 
 
The conversion of the CCR schema from Figure 2.5 as repeated in Figure 4.4 follows 
a similar process in conversion to the CDA example, with Figure 4.5 showing the first 
portion of the CCR schema as a DSCD after applying the mapping process from Table 
4.1. As with the prior example, the ContinuityOfCareRecord root (see row 3 of Table 
4.1 and line 1 of Figure 4.4) contains a xsd:complexType that contains a sequence which 
in turn contains a set of elements CCRDocumentID (line 4), Language (line 5), Version 
(line 6), DataTime (line 7), Patient (lines 8 to 14), and Body (lines 16 to 64 and 
following – no shown). In converting these to UML as shown in Figure 4.5, the 
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ContinuityOfCareRecord as given in the dashed top portion of the figures is 
represented as a «complexType» that contains a «sequence» as given in A, which in turn 
contains four simple attributes that are represented as «element» stereotyped UML 
classes as given in B, a Patient that has in turn a «complexType», «sequence», and 
«element» with an ActorID as given in C, and finally an «element» Body that is a 
«complexType», and a «sequence» as given in D of multiple «element»s as given in E. 
The Body subtree of the XML document is composed of subtrees for: Payers (line 19 of 
Figure 4.4), AdvancedDirectives (line 26 of Figure 4.4), Support (line 34 of Figure 
4.4), FunctionalStatus (line 42 of Figure 4.4), Problems (line 49 of Figure 4.4), and 
FamilyHistory (line 56 of Figure 4.4); these are shown in the bottom dotted area of 
Figure 4.5). These XML subtrees are mapped to the corresponding UML diagrams in E of 
Figure 4.5 in the bottom dashed box, where each of the «element» classes are translated 
to UML diagrams that contain a «element» that is composed of a «complexType» with a 
«sequence», that has an «element». As an example, the XML element that has a 
AdvancedDirectives (line 26 of Figure 4.4) acts as the root of the subtree right after the 
«sequence» stereotyped UML class (shown in the F in the middle of Figure 4.5 following 
row 6 of Table 4.1). The constraint of AdvancedDirectives, which is an XML 
minOccurs constraint (line 26 of Figure 4.4), is represented as a stereotyped member 
«constraint» minOccurs=”0” of the UML class. The direct children, the complexType 
(line 27 of Figure 4.4) and sequence (line 28 of Figure 4.4) elements in the XML schema 
are represented as directed association UML classes. The leaf node, the 
AdvancedDirective element (line 29 of Figure 4.4), is represented as an «element»  
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Figure 4.4: CCR – Continuity of Care Record Schema Segment. 
 
1. <xs:element name="ContinuityOfCareRecord"> 
2.  <xs:complexType> 
3.  <xs:sequence> 
4.  <xs:element name="CCRDocumentObjectID" type="xs:string"/> 
5.  <xs:element name="Language" type="CodedDescriptionType"/> 
6.  <xs:element name="Version" type="xs:string"/> 
7.  <xs:element name="DateTime" type="DateTimeType"/> 
8.  <xs:element name="Patient" maxOccurs="2"> 
9.  <xs:complexType> 
10.  <xs:sequence> 
11.  <xs:element name="ActorID" type="xs:string"/> 
12.  </xs:sequence> 
13.  </xs:complexType> 
14.  </xs:element> 
15.  … 
16.  <xs:element name="Body"> 
17.  <xs:complexType> 
18.  <xs:sequence> 
19.  <xs:element name="Payers" minOccurs="0"> 
20.  <xs:complexType> 
21.  <xs:sequence> 
22.  <xs:element name="Payer" type="InsuranceType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
23.  </xs:sequence> 
24.  </xs:complexType> 
25.  </xs:element> 
26.  <xs:element name="AdvanceDirectives" minOccurs="0"> 
27.  <xs:complexType> 
28.  <xs:sequence> 
29.  <xs:element name="AdvanceDirective" type="CCRCodedDataObjectType"  
30.  maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
31.  </xs:sequence> 
32.  </xs:complexType> 
33.  </xs:element> 
34.  <xs:element name="Support" minOccurs="0"> 
35.  <xs:complexType> 
36.  <xs:sequence> 
37.  <xs:element name="SupportProvider" type="ActorReferenceType"  
38.  maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
39.  </xs:sequence> 
40.  </xs:complexType> 
41.  </xs:element> 
42.  <xs:element name="FunctionalStatus" minOccurs="0"> 
43.  <xs:complexType> 
44.  <xs:sequence> 
45.  <xs:element name="Function" type="FunctionType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
46.  </xs:sequence> 
47.  </xs:complexType> 
48.  </xs:element> 
49.  <xs:element name="Problems" minOccurs="0"> 
50.  <xs:complexType> 
51.  <xs:sequence> 
52.  <xs:element name="Problem" type="ProblemType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
53.  </xs:sequence> 
54.  </xs:complexType> 
55.  </xs:element> 
56.  <xs:element name="FamilyHistory" minOccurs="0"> 
57.  <xs:complexType> 
58.  <xs:sequence> 
59.  <xs:element name="FamilyProblemHistory" type="FamilyHistoryType"  
60.  maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
61.  </xs:sequence> 
62.  </xs:complexType> 
63.  </xs:element> 
64.  … 
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stereotyped UML class with the minOccurs constraint (line 30 of Figure 4.4) as a 
stereotyped «constraint» member (row 9 of Table 4.1). 
«element»
ContinuityOfCareRecord
«complexType»
«sequence»
«element» Version
«element» CCRDocumentObjectID
«element» Language
«element» DateTime
«element» Body«constraint» maxOccurs=“2”
«element» Patient
«complexType»
«sequence»
«element» ActorID
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» Payers
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”
«element» Payer
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» AdvanceDirectives
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”
«element» AdvanceDirective
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» Support
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”
«element» SupportProvider
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» FunctionalStatus
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”
«element» Function
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» Problems
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”
«element» Problem
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» FamilyHistory
«complexType»
«sequence»
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”
«element» FamilyProblemHistory
F
B
A
C
D
E
Figure 4.5: A DSCD for the CCR Segment. 
4.2.2 The Secure Information Diagram (SID) 
The DSCD is utilized to provide input for the definition and construction of the 
Secure Information Diagram (SID), which represents: the different portions of the DSCD 
that need to be secured based on the overall security requirements for an application. 
Essentially, the intent is to identify a subtree of the DSCD that must be secured for access 
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by users. In the case of our sample DSCDs in Figures 4.3 and 4.5, a subtree and/or a set 
of elements will be identified that must be securely controlled. The SID utilizes 
extensions to the UML metamodel (M2-layer) in order to represent those portions of the 
DSCD that need to be securely controlled. Graphically, at the model layer of the MOF 
(M1), the SID is an UML package with the stereotype «SecureInformation» that contains 
all of the respective classes of elements from the schema to be secured. The SID acts as 
the visual representation of the projection operation (see Definition 8c in Section 3.2) 
over the schema and elements (see Defs. 1 and 2 of Section 3.1). The effective subset of 
elements from the schema that result from the projection over the original schema‘s 
elements is visually represented with the SID. For example, consider the left side of 
Figure 4.6, which shows of a SID with CDA‘s elements (e.g., 
clinical_document_header and section in Figure 4.3) as classes while the right side 
of Figure 4.6 has an example of a SID with the CCR elements (e.g., Body, Patient, 
Problems, FamilyHistory in Figure 4.5) with some of the elements organized as a 
subtree of the original schema (Body, Problems, FamilyHistory). 
The security administrator that is in charge of designing the enforcement policies of 
the clinic in the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6 has the responsibility to identify the 
elements of a schema that need security control in terms of projecting their access (read, 
aggregate, insert, update, and delete). This can include from Figure 4.2 and the CDA 
elements such as patient, patient_encounter, and originating_organization, and 
from Figure 4.4 and the CCR elements such as the Patient, Body, Problems and 
FamilyHistory with the last three a subtree The security administrator will interact with 
all of the application‘s stakeholders in order to identify those portions of the application 
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A‘s schemas (see Definition 5 in Section 3.1) that need to be securely controlled. Once 
these have been identified, the security administrator can perform a projection operation 
(Definition 8c from Section 3.2) over the elements that need some level of security, to 
specifically select the set of elements from the DSCD that will comprise the SID 
package. As a result, the SID elements are taken from across all of the schemas of the 
application A. In fact, elements may be structured is packages that form a subtree as 
shown in the right side of Figure 4.6 for CCR. These elements might need RBAC 
permission defined over them in order to control destructive (insert, update, or delete) or 
non-destructive (read or aggregate) operations (Definitions 15 to 17 from Section 3.3), or, 
decorated with classification levels from LBAC (Definitions 9 and 24 to 28 from Section 
3.4) to provide a more complete security policy, which will be further discussed in 
Section 4.2.4 with the LBAC SID. Note that the process of creating SID is iterative in 
nature, and the security administrator needs to arrive a preliminary version and constantly 
revisit the content of an SID as work on defining roles, permissions, privileges, and users 
are being defined and modified over time. There is also a need to revisit SID whenever 
there are any substantial changes (additions, deletions, or modifications) to the schemas 
for an application.  
«SecureInformation»
ClinicalDocumentArchitectureSystem
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element»
«ref» name=“originating_organization”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element»
«ref» name=“patient”
«element»
«name» “Assessment”
«element»
«name» “Allergies”
«element»
«name» “Vital Signs”
«element»
«name» “Past Medical History”
«element»
«SecureInformation»
ContinuityOfCareRecordSystem
«element» Body
«constraint» maxOccurs=“2”
«element» Patient
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» Problems
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» FamilyHistory
 
Figure 4.6: SID with CDA Elements (left) and CCR Elements (right). 
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4.2.3 The Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD) 
To support RBAC of operations that target schemas and their instances and to enable 
granular LBAC labeling of elements, it is necessary to provide a construct that security 
administrators can utilize to describe policies and segments of policies. Towards this 
purpose, we present the Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD) that organizes the roles 
(see Definitions 11 and 12 from Section 3.3) into a hierarchy Graphically, the DRSD is an 
UML package with the stereotype «DRSD» with class diagrams as members that 
represent each of the elements of the schema (e.g., xs:complexType, xs:element, 
xs:sequence, etc. for XML) that need to be secured. These elements appear in the 
DSCD for the CDA schema as given in Figure 4.3. These diagram segments, which are 
organized hierarchically depending on their position with respect to the schema tree, 
contain stereotypes that represent the operations permitted by the role being described. 
For example, the middle-left of Figure 4.7 shows the role slice for a Nurse with respect to 
classes of the SID (see Figure 4.6) obtained by projecting the original XML schema of 
the CDA (see Figure 4.2). The diagram in the DRSD package contains the stereotype 
«read» to dictate that the Nurse role can read the elements legal_authenticator, 
patient and originating_organization from the clinical_document_header 
subtree. The Nurse role can also read captions with the name values Allergies, 
Assessment and Past Medical History, while the same role can insert new Vital 
Signs and update Vital Signs, and aggregate Vital Signs. 
Once the security administrator in charge of designing the security for the healthcare 
scenario of Section of 2.6 has identified the elements that require security in creating the 
SID (see Figure 4.6 in Section 2.2), the next step in the process is to define which roles in 
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the application can perform which actions (read, aggregate, insert, update, and delete), 
establishing the permissions (see Definitions 16, 17, 18 from Section 3.3). Towards this 
objective, the security administrator designs the DRSDs on a role-by-role basis, defining 
in a granular document level which operations can be performed on which elements and 
by which role against the DSCD for CDA in Figure 4.3. These roles can also be 
organized into a hierarchy with MedicalProvider as the parent role of Nurse, Physician, 
and Psychiatrist and Staff as a separate role; this will allow permissions shared by all 
roles to be defined at the parent MedicalProvider as is shown in Figure 4.7 so that they 
are not unnecessarily replicated which improves the maintainability of the security policy. 
For example, the permissions for the MedicalProvider role (top of Figure 4.7) includes 
read access to the patient, Allergies, Assessment, Past Medical History, Vital 
Signs, originating_organization, and legal_authenticator elements of the CDA. 
At the same time, the security administrator might define for the Nurse role, permissions 
to read the current prescriptions and laboratorytests (Definition 16 of Section 3.3), 
while both the Physician and Psychiatrist can write both of those items, with the 
Psychiatrist having the additional capability to write psychhistory. Repeating this 
process over all of the roles in the system will result in the creation of several DRSDs, 
one per role, for the application that defines the RBAC requirements for the application 
as a whole. Like the process of creating the SID as from Section 4.2.2, the process of 
creating the DRSD is iterative. Therefore, refinement over the permissions assigned to a 
role is possible by performing the design process as many times as desired. This allows 
the possible changes over policy that affects one role without incurring in a high cost of 
modification. This also allows for new roles to be defined as requirements change across 
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the stakeholders of an application. For example, after meeting to discuss the security 
permissions defined over the roles of the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, the decision 
of adding the permission for Nurses to delete Vital Signs in case of input error is 
agreed upon. This change could only require a refinement process over the Nurse DRSD 
(Figure 4.7) that would include the «delete» stereotype over the access() method of the 
Vital Signs element class. Note that while we have not shown a DRDS for the CCR 
schema, it is easy to imagine having a similar set of roles with the elements now referring 
to the DSCD in Figure 4.5. 
«DRSD»
Nurse
«DRSD»
Physician
«DRSD»
Psychiatrist
«DRSD»
Staff
«element»
ref:legal_authenticator
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:patient
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:originating_organization
«read» + access()
«DRSD»
MedicalProvider
«element»
caption : string = {“Allergies, Assessment,
Past Medical History”}
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:patient
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:legal_authenticator
«read» + access()
«element»
caption : string = {“Vital Signs”}
«read»«aggregate»«insert»«update» + access()
«element»
ref:originating_organization
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:prescription
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:prescription
«rwrite» + access()
«element»
ref:prescription
«rwrite» + access()
«element»
ref:laboratytest
«rwrite» + access()
«element»
ref:laboratytest
«rwrite» + access()
«element»
ref:laboratytest
«read» + access()
«element»
ref:pyschhistory
«rwrite» + access()
 
Figure 4.7: DRSD Role Hierarchy for CDA. 
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4.2.4 The LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) 
The LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) is a UML package with the 
stereotype «SecureInformation» that decorates the SID (see Section 4.2.2) and contains 
all of the respective classes of elements from the schema to be secured per access modes 
(ams) and classifications (cls). In the left of Figure 4.8 for the CDA segment‘s example, is 
an LSID where each element would have several attributes that indicate the access mode 
(denoted inside the element class with am) and the classification level (denoted with 
security level or cls); in this case, for each element, there is a cls associated with respect 
to the access mode. For example, the patient element has a cls of unclassified when 
considering operations that have an access mode of read, while the same element has a 
classification of classified when considering operations that have an access mode of 
write. The right of Figure 4.8 shows the example of an LSID for the CCR schema 
segment that is a subset of the DSCD in Figure 4.5. This LSID denotes a classified 
classification to the Patient, Problems and FamilyHistory elements of the DSCD. 
Note that in practice, the LSID works off an initial SID that has been established by the 
security administrator during the initial design process. While the SID is a project of the 
original schemas, the LSID decorates this projection thereby supporting decoration as 
detailed in Definitions 27 and 28 in Section 3.4. Like SID, LSID may have packages 
corresponding to subtrees of schemas. 
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«SecureInformation»
ClinicalDocumentArchitectureSystem
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“originating_organization”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“patient”
{ am=read, cls=u }
{ am=write, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Allergies”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Assessment”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Past Medical History”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=s }
«element»
«ref» name=“Vital Signs”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=c }
«element»
«SecureInformation»
ContinuityOfCareRecordSystem
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element» Body
«constraint» maxOccurs=“2”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element» Patient
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element» Problems
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element» FamilyHistory
Figure 4.8: LSID for CDA (left) and CCR (right). 
 
The LSID permissions via decoration can be established before or after RBAC has 
been, or in fact, can be in lieu of RBAC if the application only has LBAC. In either case, 
whether RBAC has been defined or not, the security administrator is in charge of 
designing the enforcement policies to utilize the capabilities of LBAC by assigning 
clearance levels to users (Definition 6 from Section 3.4) and classification levels to 
elements (Definition 27 from Section 3.4) of the CDA or CCR schemas. More 
importantly, the security administrator must decorate the defined SID to create an LSID 
with access modes and sensitivity levels. Following the example of Figure 4.8, this can 
include for CDA elements in the DSCD of Figure 4.3 that includes patient, Vital 
Signs, and originating_organization or for CCR elements in the DSCD of Figure 
4.5 that includes Patient and a subtree of Body, Problems and FamilyHistory; both 
access modes and sensitivity levels have been defined in Figure 4.8. In the same manner 
as with the SID, the security administrator will interact with the relevant stakeholders to 
determine which access modes and classification levels are assigned to which elements 
and which clearance levels will be assigned to which users (this will be later defined in 
Section 4.2.7) in arriving at the LSID. The security administrator may also further refine 
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the SID to an SID‘ if for some reason there is a wish to further restrict the information to 
control for LBAC. Once the classification levels for elements have been defined, the 
security administrator can then perform a decoration operation (Definition 9 from Section 
3.2) over the elements defined in order to extend them with classification (sensitivity) 
levels. As a result, the SID elements are classified with LBAC levels and thereby create 
the LSID. In the same manner as with the SID and the DRSD, the process of creating the 
LSID is iterative and open to refinements in case the security requirements constantly 
change. Like the earlier diagrams (SID and DRSD), the security administrator will likely 
pursue an iterative design process in order to arrive at a final LSID and this may involve 
making changes to the original SID. 
4.2.5 The User Diagram (UD) 
Another major component of information security to support RBAC, LBAC, and 
DAC is to quantify different users of the system, their requirements, and their constraints 
in order define the users of the system whose information is to be secured. The interplay 
of users, their roles and delegation permissions (for RBAC), their clearance levels (for 
LBAC), and their authorization permissions (DAC) require the proper definition of a user 
concept. The work in secure software engineering (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) 
proposed a UML extension for users via a User Diagram. In this dissertation, we build 
upon this first iteration of the User Diagram to extend to include both LBAC and RBAC 
user features directly to the metamodel. Graphically, the User Diagram (UD) is a UML 
package with the stereotype «User». User-role assignments, which are part of RBAC (see 
Definition 6 and its revisions throughout Chapter 3) are a directional arrow tagged with 
the «RoleAssignment» stereotype. Clearance levels, in support of LBAC, are represented 
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with a directional arrow tagged with the «CLRAssignment». Another capability of the 
UD is the representation of separation of duty constraints (SoD) with an n-ary association 
tagged with the «SOD» stereotype. These separations of duties connect all of the roles 
that have a separation of duty relation. Lastly, the UD can also represent the mutual 
exclusion relations between assigned roles via the use of the «ME» stereotype. Figure 4.9 
follows the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6 for UD with the user named Elisa assigned 
a role of Physician and the clearance level of secret (s). That role has a separation of duty 
with the roles Nurse that is assigned to the users Leroy and Jenkins, in which Leroy has a 
clearance level of classified and Jenkins has a clearance level of secret, and Psychiatrist, 
which is assigned to the user Brock with clearance level of top-secret. 
«User»
Elisa
«RoleAssignment» «DRSD»
Physician
«User»
Leroy
«RoleAssignment» «DRSD»
Nurse
«User»
Brock
«RoleAssignment»
«DRSD»
Psychiatrist
«User»
Jenkins
«RoleAssignment»
«SOD»
«LBAC»
C
«LBAC»
TS
«LBAC»
S
«LBAC»
S
«CLRAssignment»
«CLRAssignment»
«CLRAssignment»
«CLRAssignment»
«ME»
 
Figure 4.9: UD for the Healthcare Scenario. 
 
The security administrator can bring together all the previous security capabilities that 
cover RBAC, LBAC and DAC that include DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, and DD via the 
creation of the UD as shown in Figure 4.9. The security administrator has the 
responsibility of ensuring that clearance levels are assigned to users (Definition 6 of 
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Section 3.4), their roles (Definition 6 of Section 3.3), and the separation of duty and 
mutual exclusion between roles (Definition 6 of Section 3.3). As a result, the UD of an 
application would graphically denote the interplay of users, their roles, and their 
clearances (if needed) while also showing how separation of duty and mutual exclusion is 
organized. This diagram is also iterative in its creation, and after deployment will be 
managed by a security office who handles day-to-day updates and adjustments to this 
diagram. This allows the security office to add, update or delete users and their 
credentials as many times as needed. If there is a need to revisit the UD due to changes in 
which roles are assigned to who, or which clearance level is now the one assigned to the 
user, the security office can refine the end-requirements without obstacles particularly in 
a rapidly changing environment like healthcare. 
4.2.6 The Delegation Diagram (DD) 
The Delegation Diagram (DD) captures the information of the security model‘s 
delegation mechanisms as a new UML diagram extension and is meant to capture the 
concepts of original user, role assigned, delegated users, and role delegation per 
Definitions 31 to 35 in Section 3.5. This includes the delegable users that can receive a 
role delegation from the original user/role pair. Figure 4.10 illustrates a delegation 
diagram for our continuing example with the healthcare scenario from Section 2.6 where 
the user Elisa who has the role Physician assigned (left side of the figure) is interested in 
delegation that role to one or more other users. The role Delegation Diagram on the right 
side of Figure 4.10 is a UML package tagged with the «DelegationDiagram» stereotype. 
The User Diagram (left side of Figure 4.10 and within the Delegations class) contains 
information on the user and role and are part of both the delegating user and the delegable 
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user(s) who are capable of receiving the role as part of a delegation. The connection 
between a user and the delegations is done with a directional connection tagged with the 
«Delegation» stereotype. In Figure 4.10, the user Elisa with the role of Physician can 
delegate the Physician role to Samantha or Emily. 
«User»
Elisa
«Delegation»
«DelegationDiagram»
Delegations
«User»
Samantha
«User»
Emily
«DRSD»
Physician
«RoleAssignment»
 
Figure 4.10: DD for User Elisa in Physician Role in a Healthcare Scenario. 
 
The security administrator that is in charge of the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6 
also has the responsibility of defining permissions over user-role delegation to other users 
which includes the delegation from an original to a delegated user. What is not directly 
supported in the DD is the pass-on-delegation capability that allows Elisa to pass on the 
authority to delegate Physcian to a user (say Samantha) who in turn would be able to 
further delegate Physician to another user; this is supported in Definition 34 in Section 
3.5. In Figure 4.10 Elisa defines the possibility to delegate her Physician role to potential 
recipients Samantha and Emily. The security administrator would define the 
DelegationDiagram package that would have the delegable users (Definition 33 of 
Section 3.5) inside, while the original user (Definition 32 of Section 3.5) would have the 
respective role assigned with a Delegation tagged relationship with the package. While 
the security administrator will define the delegation, the user Elisa has the ability to 
initiate the delegation. For example, Elisa might delegate to Emily on a Friday night since 
Emily is the covering physician and will be answering calls from Elisa‘s patients. Like all 
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the constructs discussed in the previous sections, the process of creating the DD is 
iterative and can be refined as many times as needed by the security requirements of the 
application. Note also that if Elisa has multiple roles assigned, then there will be separate 
DDs for each user/role combination to establish the delegations that are allowed for all 
roles Elisa can delegate. 
4.2.7 Authorization Diagram (AD) 
The Authorization Diagram (AD) is a new UML diagram that illustrates a particular 
user/role combination and the way that it is connected to authorizations to particular 
schemas and/or their instances for a given application. Authorizations are used to 
augment security by providing another layer of verification. For example, if a user has 
permissions defined over a specific schema, but is not authorized to it, then that user 
cannot perform any of the permissions. Further, a user may have permission to access a 
particular schema but have no assigned instances as yet; e.g., a Elisa with the Physician 
role is a new doctor that doesn‘t have any patients. Figure 4.11 illustrates the structure of 
an AD which is a UML package tagged with the «AuthorizationDiagram» stereotype for 
user Elisa under the role of Physician (left hand side of the figure). Classes on the right 
hand side of Figure 4.11 represent those specific schemas and instances that have been 
authorized. In the case of the schemas, a simplified version of the DSCD is used. For 
instances of the schema, placeholder classes that serve as identifiers are utilized tagged 
with the «Instance» stereotype. In Figure 4.11, Elisa has access to the CCR schemas as a 
DSCD for CCR as given in Figure 4.5, as well as two CCR instances «has» for Carol 
Smith and John Jones. The connection between a user and the authorizations is done with 
123 
 
a directional connection tagged with the «Authorization» stereotype. Note that while not 
shown, in practice, there can be multiple DSCDs with associated instances in each AD.  
«User»
Elisa
«Authorization»
«AuthorizationDiagram»
Authorizations
«DSCD»
CCR
«Instance»
John Jones
«DRSD»
Physician
«RoleAssignment»
«has»
«Instance»
Carol Smith
 
Figure 4.11: AD for User Elisa in a Healthcare Scenario. 
 
Like the case with the DD, the security administrator also has the responsibility of 
defining and maintaining authorizations over user/role combinations and the schemas 
and/or instances which they have been authorized to use, e.g., the patients each physician 
is treating. This includes the capabilities of, as shown in Figure 4.11, a user such as Elisa 
being authorized to specific schemas (CCR) and/or instances (Carol Smith and John 
Jones) while performing a specific role, such as that of Physician. The security 
administrator would define the AuthorizationDiagram package that would have the 
users/role and the authorized schemas (Definition 35 of Section 3.6) and instances 
(Definition 36 of Section 3.6) inside the package. And like the DD, the AD creation 
process is iterative and capable of handling refinements over new security requirements 
and definitions. Moreover, as with UD, the day-to-day usage of the AD is taken over by a 
security officer that would be in charge of adjusting user/role schema/instance 
permissions on a continuous basis. This may actually be a person that is in charge of a 
unit in a medical establishment (e.g., a nurse manager) that would be in charge of 
authorizing which patients have been assigned to each user with the nurse role.  
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4.3 The UML Metamodel for Security Extensions 
The underlying model from Chapter 3 that is realized in UML extensions on Section 
4.2 sets requirements that are engineered at the MOF M2 metamodel layer (see Figure 2.8 
from Section 2.7). That is, all the new UML constructs presented in Section 4.2, which 
are defined at the MOF M1 layer, require a corresponding metamodel extension at the 
M2 layer. Towards this purpose, this section covers the UML metamodel extensions that 
support those extensions presented in Section 4.2. To preface the discussion, we provide 
in Figure 4.12 a high-level view of our MOF M2 metamodel for the new UML diagrams, 
demonstrating the way that all of the new constructs interact to allow the modeling and 
security definition for a set of schemas composed of tree-structure documents as we have 
illustrated with XML. As shown in Figure 4.12, the meta-classes SecureInformation, 
Element, AccessMode, Permission, SensitivityLevel, User, UserRole, RoleSlice, 
OriginalUser, DelegableUser, Authorization, Instance, Schema, ME, and SOD extend the 
MOF M2 layer to support RBAC, LBAC, and DAC capabilities as defined in Chapter 3 
and as realized with the new UML diagrams in Section 4.2. Extending the MOF M2 layer 
metamodel with these new constructs makes it possible to define the diagrams at a model 
layer, and then instantiate their definitions to generate security policies that will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5. The top-left of Figure 4.12 graphically represents the 
section of the metamodel that pertains to the SID diagram from Section 4.2.2. The top of 
Figure 4.12 contains the meta-classes the build the metamodel extensions for the SID 
with LBAC as discussed in Section 4.2.4. In turn, the middle-right of Figure 4.12 shows 
the meta-classes that make the Delegation Diagram from 4.2.6 possible. Moving to the 
bottom of Figure 4.12, Mutual Exclusion and Separation of Duty meta-classes are shared 
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by the Role Slice for the purposes of the User Diagram from Section 4.2.5. Lastly, the 
Authorization Diagram from Section 4.2.7 has its meta-classes shown in the bottom-left 
of Figure 4.12. The remainder of this section presents the MOF M2 metamodel for all of 
the new UML diagrams in Section 4.2 in greater detail. 
 
Figure 4.12: Tree-Structured Document Security UML Metamodel at MOF M2. 
 
The DSCDs (schemas) for an application must be constrained to identify those 
portions of the schema that require security control. This was accomplished in as 
discussed in Section 4.2.2 with the Secure Information Diagram (SID) in Figure 4.6 that 
identified those portions (elements and subtrees) of an application‘s schema on which 
both RBAC permissions and LBAC classifications will be defined. For SID, the M2 
metamodel is shown in Figure 4.13 where each class that is part of the SID is represented 
as meta-class (SecureInformation) associated with many possible instances of any given 
schema element as represented with the Element meta-class. 
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SecureInformation Element
*          *  
Figure 4.13: Secure Information Diagram M2 metamodel. 
 
Next, in Figure 4.14, the metamodel representation of the document role-slice 
diagram (DRSD) is shown as discussed in Section 4.2.3 and shown in Figure 4.7, where 
the RoleSlice meta-class represents the role slices that will be defined with permissions 
against the SID with respect to the schema(s) of the application to be secured. The 
Permission meta-class represents the permissions allowed over the instances validated 
against the secured schema (read, aggregate, insert, update, delete) that define what a role 
can and can‘t do for the elements in a schema. In order to create a relation between the 
RoleSlice meta-class (which contains all of the DRSD instances) and the Permission 
meta-class (which contains all of the schema targeting permissions), it is necessary to 
create a relation between the users and their roles. In Figure 4.14, the UserRole meta-
class is a parent-class of the RoleSlice meta-class and a sibling class of the Permission 
meta-class. The connections between the UserRole and Permission meta-classes are given 
by the permitted permission (PP) relation. The Element meta-class in turn represents all 
of the instances of elements (from the schema) that are targeted by the different 
permissions. This connection is tagged with the targeted element (TE) label in Figure 
4.14. 
RoleSlice
Permission
PP *
UserRole
Element
TE *
 
Figure 4.14: Document Role Slice Diagram M2 metamodel. 
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Next, the meta-model for the LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) as 
discussed in Section 4.2.4 and shown in Figure 4.8 is shown in Figure 4.15. The four 
meta-classes User, AccessMode, Element, and SensitivityLevel are interconnected to 
represent the relations between the user (User), its clearance level (Sensitivity), and 
access modes (read, aggregate, insert, update, delete; AccessMode) for each of the 
elements (xs:element, xs:complexTyp, etc.; Element) from the SID that need to be 
protected. To represent the relation between User and SensitivityLevel, an arrow with a 
UC (user clearance) tag is used. This relation indicates that the user could either have a 
clearance level or is without a clearance level, therefore the utilization of the 0..1 
cardinality constraint. Element and Sensitivity are similarly related, represented with the 
arrow tagged EC (element classification). The relationship between Element and 
AccessMode is represented with the 1..+ cardinality constraint to cover the case of an 
element with different possible access modes (e.g. patient element from Figure 4.8). 
SensitivityLevel Element
User
1 .. +
AccessMode
UC 0 .. 1
EC
 
Figure 4.15: LSID M2 metamodel. 
 
Next, at the meta-model layer (M2) of the MOF, the User Diagram as discussed in 
Section 4.2.5 and shown in Figure 4.9 is composed of six major meta-classes as given in 
Figure 4.16: User, SensitivityLevel, UserRole, RoleSlice, SOD, and ME. The User meta-
class represents all of the possible instances of users in a particular application. Both the 
User meta-class and the RoleSlice meta-class, is a subtype of the UserRole meta-class. 
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The UR tag represents user-role assignments (RBAC), the separation of duty (SOD) 
meta-class represents the separation of duty relations, and, the mutual exclusion (ME) 
meta-class represents the mutual exclusion relations between roles. The SensitivityLevel 
meta-class, which represents the sensitivity as related to LBAC is a clearance level for a 
user and is tied to the User meta-class. This distinction shows an important feature of the 
security framework presented in this dissertation, namely, that RBAC and LBAC 
capabilities are orthogonal. 
UR
RoleSlice SOD
UserRoleUser
0..1
*Sensitivity
Level
*
ME0..1
 
Figure 4.16: User Diagram M2 metamodel. 
 
The metamodel of the Delegation Diagram (DD) as presented in Section 4.2.6 and 
shown in Figure 4.10 is given in Figure 4.17. The metamodel consists of three meta-
classes: OriginalUser, DelegableUser, and RoleSlice. The OriginalUser meta-class, along 
with the RoleSlice meta-class represents the original users of the application and their 
assigned roles. The DelegableUser, connected to the RoleSlice meta-class, represents the 
user/role pairs of authorized delegations. In turn, the Delegation tag in the connection 
between OringalUsers and DelegableUsers represents the ability to perform the 
delegation operation. 
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DelegableUser
OriginalUser
RoleSlice
*
*
Delegation
 
Figure 4.17: Role Delegation Diagram M2 metamodel. 
 
The final metamodel of the Authorization Diagram (AD) as presented in Section 4.2.7 
and shown in Figure 4.11 is given in Figure 4.18 and consists of four meta-classes: 
UserRole, Authorization, Instance, and Schema. The UserRole meta-class represents the 
specific user/role pair in a similar fashion as the case of the UD in Figure 4.16 The 
Authorization meta-class is connected to the Instance and Schema meta-classes to 
represent whether an authorization to an instance or schema exists and is represented with 
the 0..+ tag on the directional connection. This metamodel definition allows scenarios in 
which a user might not be authorized to any schema/instance, or any combination of the 
two (e.g. all schemas and all instances). 
Authorization
Schema
UserRole
0..+
*
Instance
0..+
 
Figure 4.18: Authorization Diagram M2 metamodel. 
4.4 Related Work in Security Modeling with UML 
This section provides related work on secure software engineering and security for 
multiple concerns for a system to be secured: functional, collaborative and information. 
In the functional security area, there have been many research efforts that involve UML. 
SecureUML (Basin, Doser, & Lodderstedt, 2006) is a modeling language to design 
security in distributed systems. This language is based in UML, extending its semantics 
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and notation to support RBAC, and certain authorization constraints. The focus of this 
approach is to utilize UML to specify access control as part of the main design of the 
application and then automatically generate access control infrastructures based on the 
design models. The approach defines a meta-model for SecureUML and details a 
methodology to integrate it into several design modeling languages. UMLSec, described 
in (Jürjens & Juerjens, 2005) and improved by (Zisman, 2007) and ((Popp, Jurjens, 
Wimmel, & Breu, 2003), is an extension to UML that defines several new stereotypes 
towards formal security verification of elements such as: fair exchange to avoid cheating 
for any party in a 2-party transaction; secrecy and confidentiality of information 
(accessible only to the intended people); secure information flow to avoid partial leaking 
of sensitive information; and, secure communication links like encryption. AuthUML 
(Alghathbar, 2007) models RBAC policies using use cases and Horn clauses to represent 
the access control information and to check its consistency. The approach of (Pavlich-
Mariscal et al., 2010) includes the definition of several new UML diagrams to represent 
different access control concerns (RBAC, MAC, and DAC), and a set of features that 
represent small subsets of an access control model. These features can then be composed 
to create custom access control policies. 
In the collaborative security area, research has occurred in many areas. In terms of 
access control and collaboration, in (Tolone, Ahn, Pai, & Hong, 2005), a set of eight 
criteria (complexity, understandability, ease of use, applicability, groups of users, policy 
specification, policy enforcement, and granularity) critical for a collaborative 
environment are presented. The eight characteristics and their support are evaluated 
against seven access control models (Matrix, RBAC, TBAC, TMAC, C-TMAC, SAC, 
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and Context-AW). This work demonstrates that collaboration capabilities are not primary 
goals in access control models. As given, the seven access control models do not support 
an integrated model for coordinated, obligated, secure, and team-based collaboration. 
Another related area is a distributed secure interoperability framework for collaboration 
environments (Sachpazidis, Rizou, & Menary, 2008). This framework presents a multi-
system architecture in which different stakeholders with different privileges collaborate 
with one another towards optimizing monitoring prescription intake. With regard to 
collaboration, workflow, and security, the work of (Shehab, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005) 
addressed security services that support inter-organizational collaborative enterprises, 
which may span multiple organizations. This work presents a framework for mediator-
free collaboration. Similarly as in (Sachpazidis et al., 2008), this work focuses on inter-
system collaboration, while our work focuses on early integration of collaboration 
requirements into the software engineering process. The work of (Kang, Park, & 
Froscher, 2001) concentrates on workflows that are addressed from an access control 
perspective. This is an important aspect of our effort (Berhe et al., 2010), where 
workflow is also represented as collaboration steps with access control addressed at each 
step and for the overall workflow. The work in (Y. Sun & Pan, 2005) proposes a model 
that integrates RBAC into workflows. In their approach, permissions, roles, cardinality, 
ancestors (pre-obligations), and a status value are assigned to activities (collaboration 
steps). 
Finally, in the informational security area, a later effort (Mouelhi, Fleurey, Baudry, & 
Le Traon, 2008) presents a model-driven security approach for designers to set security 
requirements along with the system models to automatically generate an access control 
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infrastructure. The approach combines UML with a security modeling language defining 
a set of modeling transformations; the former produces infrastructures for JavaBeans, and 
the latter can generate secure infrastructures for web applications. (Basin et al., 2006) 
utilizes the model-driven architecture paradigm to achieve security for e-government 
scenarios with inter-collaboration/communication. This is achieved by describing 
security requirements at a high-level (models), with relevant ―security artifacts‖ being 
automatically generated for target architectures, removing the otherwise present learning 
curve in specifying security requirements by domain experts with no technical know-
how. In the approach presented in (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013), UML is leveraged 
to provide a secure information engineering approach for XML schemas and documents. 
By extending UML with new XML diagrams, an enforcement security policy in XACML 
can be generated and deployed for access control purposes (not unlike automatic code 
generation from UML class diagrams). By doing this, the approach scales to scenarios 
that involve a high volume of XML documents validated against a common schema. 
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Chapter 5 
Security Policy Generation Process 
 
To this point, this dissertation has defined a security framework that includes a model 
for access control for RBAC, LDAC, and MAC for the definition of permissions against 
tree-structured documents (see Chapter 3 again) coupled with the definition of new UML 
diagrams for the security modeling of schemas (see Chapter 4 again). This chapter 
presents the third component of our framework that supports the automatic generation of 
a security enforcement policy when given a security design for a set of schemas as 
captured in our new UML diagrams (see Chapter 4). UML has a long history for the 
automatic generation of code (Vogel-Heuser, Witsch, & Katzke, 2005) in varied 
languages; our usage of our new UML diagrams to generate a security policy is 
consistent with this usage. In this chapter, we present a process for the generation of 
enforcement policies that transitions a UML design containing a Document Schema Class 
Diagram (DSCD), a Secure Information Diagram (SID), a Document Role Slice Diagram 
(DRSD), lattice-based access control SID (LSID), a User Diagram (UD), a Delegation 
Diagram (DD), and an Authorization Diagram (AD); see respectively Sections 4.2.1 to 
4.2.7.  
To support the automatic generation of a security enforcement policy, we define a set 
of mapping statements (MSs) that are utilized to define the conditions under which the 
combination of the various diagrams (DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, UD, DD, and AD) can 
be utilized to support the creation of respective policies for RBAC, LBAC, DAC, and 
authorization. A mapping rule (MR) is defined to take the security model concepts and 
capabilities to Chapter 3 that both underlie correspond to different portions of the new the 
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UML diagrams of Chapter 4 and use this combination to yield a portion of the security 
policy. To illustrate, in support for RBAC: a role mapping statement (R-MS) takes a 
specific role such, as Physician from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, and maps it 
to the policy‘s subject construct, such as the <Subject> element of XACML‘s 
specification; an element mapping statement (E-MS) takes an attribute, such as a child 
node of ‗clinical_document_header‘ or ‗section‘ segments of the HL7 CDA from the 
healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, and maps it to the policy‘s resource construct, such as 
the <Resource> element of XACML‘s specification; and, a permission mapping 
statement (P-MS) establishes permissions for the element (read, aggregate, insert, update, 
delete) as actions against elements of the document to be secured. These three mapping 
statements support the transition of information from DSCD, SID, and DRSD into a 
security policy segment that supports RBAC, specifically restricted to one user role 
combination.  
In support of LBAC, mapping statements are need with respect to: the user‘s 
clearance level, the element‘s classification (sensitivity), and the access mode of the 
operation being performed. Specifically: a subject (user) mapping statement (SU-MS) 
that takes a specific user, such as Elisa from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, and 
maps it to the policy‘s subject construct; an action (operation) mapping statement (AO-
MS) that takes a specific operation (e.g. read, aggregate, insert, update, delete from 
Section 3.3) and its access mode and maps it to the action construct of the policy; and, a 
resource (element) mapping statement (RE-MS) that takes an element that needs 
classification levels to be added and maps it to the resource construct of the policy. In 
support of DAC: a delegation user (original user) mapping statement (DUOU-MS) takes 
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a user from the Original Users set as defined in the Delegation Diagram of Section 4.2.6 
and Section 3.5 to a user construct in the policy, such as the <Subject> element 
introduced for XACML; a delegation resources (roles) mapping statement (DRR-MS) 
takes the role to be delegated, such as Physician from Section 4.2.6, and maps it to the 
resource construct of the policy; and, a delegation targets (delegable users) mapping 
statement (DTDU-MS) corresponds to the users in the delegable set as set in the DD from 
Section 4.2.6 and Section 3.6 and maps it to the delegation target construct of the policy. 
The authorizations over schemas and instances are in turned assigned to users. We utilize 
a subject (user) mapping that takes the user from the User Diagram (UD) of Section 4.2.5 
and the Authorization Diagram (UD) of Section 4.2.7; and a resources (schemas and 
instances) mapping that takes the schemas and instance constructs (e.g. CDA and Carol 
Smith‘s record from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6). This characteristic allows the 
definition of authorizations in a policy similar to assigning a given user an LBAC 
clearance. Overall, the work in this chapter presents a high-level view of the policy 
generation process that is accompanied by a detailed examination of the policy generation 
using the eXtensible access control modeling language (XACML) (Godik et al., 2002).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized into six major sections. Section 5.1 
provides an overview of the mapping process from an architecture perspective to take the 
new UML diagrams through a process that results in the generation of a security policy. 
Section 5.2 introduces the key XACML concepts needed for the discussion in this 
chapter, including the normal components of a security architecture that enforces 
XACLM policies, and policy/rule combination algorithms. Section 5.3 presents the 
generation process for RBAC, LBAC, DAC delegations, and authorizations that provide 
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the capability to convert from the new UML security diagrams (see Section 4.2 again) to 
an XACML security policy via a series of mapping statements. Section 5.4 defines an 
algorithm that automates the policy generation process by organizing the mapping 
statements as presented in Section 5.3 into a structured process. Lastly, Section 5.5 
reviews related work on policy generation and integration. 
5.1 An Architecture for Security Policy Generation  
In this section, we provide a high-level view of the security policy generation process 
that combines the access control concepts and capabilities of our security model (see 
Chapter 3 again) with the new UML diagrams into an architecture. As shown in Figure 
5.1, the seven new UML diagrams in the first column (DSCD, SID, DRSD, LBAC, UD, 
DD, and AD) are used in various combinations (see four different arrow types) in order to 
start a process that can map them through access control models RBAC, LBAC, DAC 
delegations, and authorizations (see column two) in order to identify the key policy 
components (see column three) that are then utilized to automatically generate a security 
policy (fourth column). First, DSCD, SID, DRSD and UD are combined to produce an 
RBAC oriented policy for each user/role combination as shown with the solid arrows in 
Figure 5.1; as a result, multiple security policies are generated on a user/role basis. 
Second, DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD are combined to produce an LBAC oriented policy 
for each user as shown with the dashed arrows in Figure 5.1; again, specific security 
policies are generate for each user. Third, DRSD, UD, and DD are combined to produce a 
security policy that defines the delegable users and the role that can be delegated as 
shown with the long dash dot arrows in Figure 5.1; again, this results in a separate policy 
each user/role combination. Finally, DSCD, DRSD, UD, and AD are combined to 
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generate the policy that identifies the schemas and instances are authorized for a specific 
user as shown with the long dash dot-dot arrow in Figure 5.1. For each of these 
combinations, there is a transition to the policy components that form the basis of the 
generated policies (third column of Figure 5.1). The last step in the process (fourth 
column of Figure 5.1), illustrates the alternative policies that can be generated, including 
XACML (the focus of this dissertation), SQL DDL code for a relational database system, 
and aspect-oriented programing (AOP) for an object-oriented application (Pavlich-
Mariscal et al., 2010). 
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Figure 5.1: An Architecture for Generating Policies from UML Diagrams. 
 
To illustrate the usage of the architecture, we continue with the healthcare scenario of 
Section 2.6. Suppose that user Elisa‘s role of Physician has a no read permission over a 
psychiatric element of the CCR schema. In this case, the policy would involves Elisa, 
Physician, and psychiatric element would filter the CCR schema to hide this information 
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for the RBAC mapping as well as controlling and the ‗Carol Smith‘ instance for the 
Authorizations mapping. The generality of the policies created via the architecture 
presented in Figure 5.1 could be readily applied to an eXtensible Stylesheet Language 
(XSLT) (Clark, 1999), to other query tools such as XPath (Clark & DeRose, 1999) and 
XQuery (Boag et al., 2002) for XML documents, or to a relational database schema and 
tuples. The generated policies must also be able to target the software methods at the 
system‘s level in order to support destructive operations such as insert, update, and 
delete. In all of these cases, the validation of the consistency of the altered instance is left 
as a task of the system. In other words, this security model does not validate proper 
alterations to an instance against its schema; it just assures that the security requirements 
that control the destructive operations are properly enforced. For example, in the case of a 
relational database, a system such as Oracle (Harrison, 2000) would be responsible for 
enforcing operations against the database tuples. From the perspective of a security 
administrator, the ability to automatically generate enforcement policies from the UML 
diagrams as shown in Figure 5.1 would reduce the costs associated when security 
requirements are frequently changed and modified over time. UML has a long history of 
the automatic generation of object-oriented code (OOC) (Vogel-Heuser et al., 2005) from 
UML class diagrams, and, this automated process reduces the complexity to the click of 
one button with modeling tools that have that capability, e.g., CodeSmith Tools 
(CodeSmith tools.2014), Acceleo (Mtsweni, 2012), etc. The benefit of automatic policy 
generation, combined with the security framework‘s target of defining security definitions 
at the schema level, would further reduce the effort and cost of updating security 
requirements that can potentially affect thousands or millions of documents (instances). 
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This benefit is particularly useful in the case of large institutions in the healthcare domain 
such as hospitals and clinics. 
The architecture given in Figure 5.1 can be reformulated as given in Figure 5.2 to 
provide a view of this approach from the perspective of UML metamodel changes, UML 
diagrams, and the support for policy generation at the schema and instance level that 
results in the creation of a set of enforcement policies. Specifically, starting from the top 
of Figure 5.2 downward, the generalized mapping approach utilizes the meta-classes of 
the UML Meta-Object Facility (MOF) (Poernomo, 2006) M2 layer presented in Section 
4.3 (e.g., User, UserRole, Permission, RoleSlice, etc.) to create two new sets of 
authorizations (middle of Figure 5.2). These meta-classes are combined to form the seven 
new UML diagrams, which in turn supports both policy level authorizations and 
document level authorizations. Policy level authorizations include delegations and 
authorizations, or those operations that have an effect on a user and not on a document. 
Document level authorizations include permissions (operations over elements) on the 
tree-structured document, or those operations that have an effect on the documents being 
secured and not on the users. This includes support for delegation, where there is a set of 
original users that can delegate their roles, and a set of delegable users that can receive 
specific roles. This means that roles are resources that can be interchanged between users 
of an application and have properties (e.g., the permissions are defined as part of a 
policy) such as pass-on authority for second-level delegations. To support all of these 
capabilities, it will be necessary to have a policy language that has a non-normative 
construct that serves to identify the delegable users (delegation targets). This construct 
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would act as a holder for all of the delegable users that can receive the role being treated 
as a resource. 
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Figure 5.2: Mapping Process to Generate Enforcement Policies. 
5.2 XACML Concepts and Rule Combining Algorithms 
In the same way that XML (Bray et al., 1998) provides a common, structured 
language for information exchange among heterogeneous systems, the eXtensible access 
control modeling language (XACML) (Godik et al., 2002) defines a common language 
and processing model from the perspective of access control policies. This would then 
permit a level of security interoperability among the heterogeneous systems. The 
XACML schema provides various elements and a general structure for the design and 
development of access control security policies. These elements (as shown in Figure 5.3) 
include: the PolicySet, the Policy, and the Rule. In XACML, every policy has: a rule 
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combining algorithm to interconnect the result of rules in order to reach a proper 
authorization; a description to textually illustrate the purpose of the policy; and, an 
identifier for indexing. The body of a policy consists of a target <Target> element and 
one or more rules <Rule>. The <Target> element of the policy or the <Rule> element is 
utilized by the policy evaluation point to determine whether the policy is relevant to the 
request received by the application. If no policy or rule is relevant to the request, the 
request is dropped, likely indicating an invalid access. The XACML specification defines 
four standard combining algorithms: deny-overrides, in which a policy is denied if at 
least one of the rules is denied; permit-overrides, in which a policy is permitted if at least 
one of the rules is permitted; first-applicable, in which the result of the first rule‘s 
evaluation is treated as the result of all evaluations; and, only-one-applicable, in which 
the combined result is the corresponding result to the acting rule.  
PolicySet
Policy
Rule
Subject
Action       
Resource      
Rule Combination Algorithm
Policy Combination Algorithm
 
Figure 5.3: Layered Representation of XACML‘s PolicySet, Policy and Rule Constructs. 
 
The architecture of a typical security system that utilizes XACML for enforcement is 
revisited with an example using our healthcare scenario from Section 2.6 in Figure 5.4. 
The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) allows a request to be made on a resource such as 
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Dr. Ketchum playing a Physician role to access a CCR instance of Carol Smith. The 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) evaluates the request and provides a response according to 
the policies in place. That would define, in the case of a Physician role played by Dr. 
Ketchum, as to whether a portion of a CCR schema can be accessed (read/written). The 
Policy Administration Point (PAP) is utilized to write and manage policies, which for the 
CCR schema and its associated instances would be utilized to deliver the appropriate 
subset of information to a Nurse or Physician role and the individual who is playing that 
role. Last, the Policy Information Point (PIP) can be utilized to arbitrate very fine grained 
security issues, which could be employed to control access to mental health data of Carol 
Smith, allowing Ketchum, while denying Fakington. 
Physician Nurse
Information System Roles
XACML Policy 
Deifnition
XACML 
Policy –
Schema 1
XACML 
Policy –
Schema 2
Policy Retrieval Point (PRP)
PAP
PDP
PEP
PIP
XACML Architecture
 
Figure 5.4: Typical Security Architecture for XACML Policies. 
 
The layered representation (Figure 5.3) and architecture (Figure 5.4) provide the 
means to support a process that can utilize the seven new UML diagrams as a starting 
point for security policy generation. Specifically, to create a XACML policy, we can 
utilize the policies‘ language structure and processing model where a policy consist of a 
PolicySet, a Policy, and a Rule. Based on the capabilities of XACML, we are taking an 
approach that each of the application' role(s) as represented, in say, a DRSD, must be 
mapped into a XACML Policy structure with its own set of rules that represent the 
appropriate enforcement for roles against a schema, the DSCD. Note that multiple 
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XACML Policy structures may be generated, resulting in a PolicySet for a specific set of 
XML schemas that have an associated set of user/roles that comprise a given application. 
The collection of Policy structures, one for each DRSD, is contained in a PolicySet, 
combined via an algorithm specified by the PolicySet’s PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute 
that targets the particular tree-structured schema. In order to support instance-level 
security for tree structured documents (schemas), the DRSD is mapped into an XACML 
Policy with the combining algorithm deny-overrides chosen. With the deny-overrides 
algorithm, if a single Rule or Policy element is evaluated to Deny, the evaluation result of 
the rest of the Rule elements under the policy is also evaluated as Deny. We note that 
while this assumption works when focusing on access control for instances in the 
document-level, as in the work of this dissertation, other higher-level systems (e.g., 
software applications that utilize the instance, etc.) can very deploy security policies with 
different combining algorithms. The pseudo-code implementation of all of the policy-rule 
combining algorithms can be found in Appendix A. An XACML PolicySet is utilized to 
make the authorization decision via a set of rules in order to allow for access control 
decisions such as granting access to a resource, allowing an operation to continue, etc. A 
PolicySet can contain multiple Policy structures, and each Policy contains the access 
control Rules. As a result, the Policy structure acts as the smallest entity that can be 
presented to the security system for evaluation. The collection of Policy structures is 
contained in a PolicySet, combined via an algorithm specified by the PolicySet‘s 
PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute that targets the particular tree-structured schema. 
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5.3 Security Enforcement Policy Generation in XACML 
This section concentrates on the third component of our framework in this 
dissertation that supports the automatic generation of a security enforcement policy in 
XACML from the security design as captured by the new seven UML diagrams (DSCD, 
SID, DRSD, LBAC, UD, DD, and AD). To properly generate and XACML policy/rule 
pairs for the different UML diagrams and their components, there are a number of key 
correlations that can be established between the nomenclature of UML and the 
terminology of XACML. These correlations represent meta-mapping statements that 
defines the matching between a security design in UML to XACML in order to support a 
fully automated process. Specifically, for our purposes, we correlate XACML‘s Policy 
and Rules to our security model (see Chapter 3) as follows: 
 Policy‘s PolicyId attribute value is the string AccessControlPolicy{Model}, where 
{Model} serves as a placeholder for LBAC, RBAC or DAC, concatenated to a 
unique identifier such as an integer. PolicyId represents a unique identifier that is 
used to index and identify any given policy from a group of policies. 
 Rules‘ RuleId attribute value is the string ProductRule{Model} concatenated to a 
unique identifier such as an integer. RuleID, in the same fashion as the PolicyId, 
is utilized to index and identify any given rule inside a policy from the rest of the 
rules that can be part of said policy. 
 Rules‘ Description value is the string AccessControlPolicyRule{Model} 
concatenated to a unique identifier such as an integer. Description is used to 
textually describe the purpose of the rule inside a policy. 
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The intent of this section is to transition the seven new UML diagrams to its 
realization as an XACML policy through the definition of mapping statements that 
represent the actions needed to generate policies for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC 
delegations/authorizations, respectively, in Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3. We note that 
there is no predefined order to apply the mapping statements at a higher-level (between 
RBAC, LBAC and DAC) or at a lower level (each mapping statement). These mapping 
statements work in a similar fashion to the UML profile presented in Section 4.2.1, which 
means that each mapping statement create a relationship between a component of the 
UML diagram and metamodel to a component of the XACML schema. This notion is 
further discussed in Section 5.4 with the automatic algorithm for XACML policy 
generation. 
Each of the first three subsections (5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3) have a unified format of 
presentation, structured in three parts: a definition of the mapping statements that 
transition the UML diagrams and their components to XACML equivalents; a 
demonstration of this mapping process through the use of example UML diagrams; and, a 
detailed explanation that illustrates the mapping from UML to equivalent XACML code. 
To complete the discussion, Section 5.3.4 explores the case when an application has a 
combination of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC in terms of its security capabilities and its 
mapping to XACML. 
5.3.1 RBAC Capabilities 
The generation of RBAC policies with XACML is facilitated due to the fact that 
RBAC‘s combination of a role, element, and permission (see Defns. 11 to 29 in Section 
3.3) seamlessly aligns to XACML‘s paradigm of <Subjects>, <Resource>, and 
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<Actions>. In our previous work (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013; De la Rosa Algarín, 
A. et al., 2013), we presented an automated method of achieving this specific goal with 
an emphasis on XML. This dissertation extends that effort by generalizing away from 
XML and considering a more varied set of operations (e.g., read, aggregate, insert, 
update, delete) that can be performed on general-purpose tree-structured documents and 
their schemas and instances. Note that while this section and dissertation is based on 
XACML policy generation, the work presented herein can easily be reused to generate 
policy code in another format. The mapping statements as presented are generalizable to 
generate ―code‖ for other target domains; for example, in RBAC, the mapping of roles, 
elements, and permissions has to still occur regardless of whether the target is XACML 
or SQL DDL and a relational database system. 
The mapping statements for RBAC are shown in Table 5.1, and include: a role 
mapping statement (R-MS) that takes a role such as Physician and a user such as Elisa to 
a <Subject> in XACML; an element mapping statement (E-MS) that takes an attribute 
such as FamilyHistory in CCR to a <Resource> in XACML; and, a permission mapping 
statement (P-MS) that takes a permission such as update to an <Action> in XACML. As 
discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the solid arrows in Figure 5.1, the mappings for 
RBAC utilize the DSCD, SID, DRSD, and UD diagrams from Chapter 4. For the R-MS, 
the DRSD and UD are utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target> Subject element as 
the role and to set the role identifier (using R-MS1) along with the user and user identifier 
(using R-MS2). The SubjectMatch‘s MatchId attribute utilizes the function ‗string-equal‘ 
to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the DRSD (using R-MS3). The XACML policy 
for a specific role will have as many Rule constructs as permission combinations shown 
147 
 
in the DRSD (using R-MS6). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree 
is the role from the DRSD (using R-MS7). For the P-MS, the DRSD and SID are utilized 
to represent the permissions (operations) that are tied to the respective role. The policy‘s 
<Target> element‘s Action child is set to <AnyAction/> in order for the policy to apply to 
the role when any request is done (using P-MS1). The ActionMatch’s MatchId attribute 
utilizes the ‗string-equal‘ function in a similar fashion to the SubjectMatch’s MatchId 
(using P-MS2), while the ActionAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId is set to the 
permission‘s operation (e.g., read, aggregate, insert, update, or delete) (using P-MS3). In 
the case of the P-MR, the policy‘s rules <Action> children are <Operation> elements 
with the <operationName> subchild and <opAccessMode> values which are the DRSD‘s 
stereotypes for the element classes (using P-MS4). Last, for the E-MS, the DRSD, DSCD, 
and SID are utilized in conjunction to represent those elements that a role can operate 
over by virtue of the tied operations in XACML form. In a similar fashion to the policy‘s 
<Target> Subject element, the Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that 
the higher-level policies apply to the role (using E-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> children 
are <element> nodes with element data that corresponds to the element classes in the 
DRSD, DSCD, and SID diagrams (using E-MS3). 
To provide a realistic example of the usage and application of the mapping statements 
and associated process, consider the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, where the user 
Elisa has the role of Physician. Consider the DSCD in Figure 4.3 of Section 4.2.1 and the 
SID in Figure 4.6 of Section 4.2.2, which provide the basis for defining the DRSD of 
Figure 5.6. The UD that corresponds to user Elisa is shown in Figure 5.5, the DRSD that 
corresponds to the Physician role is shown in Figure 5.6, while the corresponding 
148 
 
generated XACML code is shown in Figure 5.7. Notice that the figures are all labeled 
with capital letters. In the UML diagram figures, we will refer to Section A, Section B, 
etc., while in the XACML code figures, we will refer to part A, part B, etc.; To begin, 
section A of Figure 5.5 denotes the user that will become part of the user/role 
combination for a given role‘s policy with the role shown in section B. Figure 5.6 shows 
the DRSD‘s role in section A, with section B referring to those elements (resources in 
XACML) that a role has some a permission over, and section C indicating those 
operations allowed to be performed by the role. At a conceptual level, section A of the 
DRSD in Figure 5.6 corresponds to the <Subject> subtree of the XACML policy in 
Figure 5.7 (oarts A and B, respectively), while at a higher-level policy <Target>, the user 
from Figure 5.5 (section A) and the role (section B) are used in conjunction with the 
DSCD in Figure 5.6‘s role (section A).  
The R-MS1 and R-MS2 of Table 5.1 are used for Figure 5.7‘s part A, while the R-
MS7 is used for Figure 5.7‘s part B. In this case, section B in Figure 5.6 denotes the 
components of the DRSD that corresponds to the P-MS of Table 5.1. These sections of 
the DRSD are used by P-MS4 to result in Figure 5.7‘s part D, which contains the possible 
actions the user Elisa under the role of Physician can perform. Lastly, section B of Figure 
5.6 denotes the components of the DRSD that corresponds to the E-Ms of Table 5.1, 
which map to the <Resource> subtree of the policy in Figure 5.7 (part C). The resulting 
policy for RBAC that is generated would permit the role Physician to write the past 
medical history element of the CDA (Alschuler et al., 2002) instance that is shown in 
Figure 5.7. At the policy level (Figure 5.7), the subject is the role and user (part A lines 7-
13 of Figure 5.7, corresponding to the A and B parts of Figure 5.5), and a match is done  
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 Mapping 
Statement 
Type 
Involved 
UML 
Diagram(s)  
Mapping Statements 
R-MS 
 
(Role 
Mapping 
Statements) 
DRSD, UD 
R-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the role and 
role identifier set as a <role> subtree with 
<roleName> and <roleID> children that corresponds 
to the DRSD package name. 
R-MS2. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the user name 
and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with 
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the 
UD. 
R-MS3. SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function ―string-
equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the 
DRSD. 
R-MS4. AttributeValue of the Subject is a string, and the 
value is the «DRSD» Role. 
R-MS5. SubjectAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId is the role 
attribute. 
R-MS6. As many Rule per role Policy as permission 
combinations. 
R-MS7. Subject in Rule is set as the Subject in the higher-
level <Target> (role). 
P-MS 
 
(Permission 
Mapping 
Statements) 
DRSD, SID 
P-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Action set to 
<AnyAction /> to ensure that the higher-level policy 
applies to the role. 
P-MS2. ActionMatch’s MatchId uses the function ―string-
equal‖. 
P-MS3. ActionAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId set to the 
operation‘s tag (e.g. read, aggregate, insert, update, 
delete). 
P-MS4. Rule’s <Actions> children are <Operation> with the 
operation name (<operationName>) and access mode 
(<opAccessMode>) that correspond to the stereotypes 
of the +access() method in the «element» classes in 
the DRSD package. 
E-MS 
 
(Element 
Mapping 
Statements) 
DRSD, 
DSCD, SID 
E-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to 
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level 
policies applies to the role. 
E-MS2. Each Resource‘s ResourceMatch has a MatchId that 
determines the usage of the function ―string-equal‖. 
E-MS3. Rule’s <Resources> children are <element> with the 
element identifier (<elementID>) and element name 
(<elementName>) that correspond to the «element» 
classes in the DRSD, DSCD and SID packages. 
Table 5.1: RBAC Mapping Statements. 
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based on the attributes of the role, where a unique ID could exist that would be denoted in 
part A by the <ruleID> element in line 9 and <id> element in line 12 of Figure 5.7. Once 
this is verified, the rule ‗simple-RBAC-rule‘ (lines 21-42 of Figure 5.7) would be 
evaluated to determine if the triple of role, element, and operation match. This is 
represented by the role in part B, lines 23-28 of Figure 5.7 corresponding to the section B 
of Figure 5.5 and section A of Figure 5.6, by the element in part C, lines 29-34 of Figure 
5.7, corresponding to the classes of Figure 5.6 with section B denoting their names, and 
by the operation in part D, lines 35-40 of Figure 5.7, corresponding to the C parts of 
Figure 5.6. As result, the user/role is allowed to perform the insert operation on the past 
medical history element as denoted by the Effect=‖Permit‖ of the XACML rule in line 21 
of Figure 5.7. 
«User»
Elisa
«RoleAssignment» «DRSD»
Physician
«LBAC»
S
«CLRAssignment»
A
C
B
 
Figure 5.5: A User Diagram of User Elisa under Role Physician with a Clearance of 
Secret (S). 
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«DRSD»
Physician
«element»
ref:legal_authenticator
«read» + access()
«element»
caption : string = {“Allergies, Assessment,
Past Medical History”}
«read»«aggregate»«insert»«update»
+ access()
«element»
caption : string = {“Vital Signs”}
«read»«aggregate»«insert»«update» + access()
«element»
ref:patient
«read»«write»
+ access()
«element»
ref:originating_organization
«read» + access()
B
C
A
 
Figure 5.6: A DRSD for the Role of Physician in the Healthcare Scenario of Section 
2.6. 
 
Figure 5.7: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with RBAC Capabilities. 
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-rbac-policy"  
2.  RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">  
3.   <Description>This is a pseudocode example of an  
4.    XACML policy with RBAC capabilities for role  
5.    Physician and user Elisa</Description> 
6.    <Target> 
7.      <Subjects> 
8.       <role> 
9.        <roleID>5</roleID> 
10.        <roleName>Physician</roleName> 
11.       </role> 
12.       <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
13.      </Subjects> 
14.      <Resources>  
15.        <AnyResource/> 
16.      </Resources>  
17.      <Actions> 
18.        <AnyAction/> 
19.      </Actions> 
20.     </Target> 
21.     <Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
22.     <Target> 
23.       <Subjects> 
24.         <role> 
25.           <roleID>5</roleID> 
26.           <roleName>Physician</roleName> 
27.         </role>  
28.       </Subjects> 
29.       <Resources> 
30.         <element> 
31.           <elementID>el-3</elementID> 
32.           <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName> 
33.         </element> 
34.       </Resources>  
35.       <Actions> 
36.         <operation> 
37.           <operationName>insert</operationName> 
38.           <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode> 
39.         </operation> 
40.       </Actions> 
41.     </Target>  
42.   </Rule> 
43. </Policy> 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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5.3.2 LBAC Features 
LBAC capabilities involve three major components: the user‘s clearance level, the 
element‘s classification (sensitivity), and the access modes of the operation being 
performed against the target element. In Section 4.2.4, we introduced the LSID to 
graphically represent the LBAC attributes of elements to be secured. To properly generate 
an XACML policy that supports LBAC, we leverage DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD in 
combination with constructs of the XACML specification. Recall that the UD contains 
the LBAC characteristics tied to a specific user, providing us the information necessary to 
complete the user‘s clearance level component of an LBAC policy. In turn, the LSID 
provides us with the element‘s classification (sensitivity) with respect to the access modes 
permitted (read and/or write) against the elements of the LSID. To represent this in an 
XACML policy, we designate the target of a policy, <Target>, with a <Subject> value 
equal to the name of the user. This produces a policy-level target that is specific for a 
user. The LBAC rule of the policy leverages the LBAC user object from Definition 6 in 
Section 3.4, including the clearance level, mapped to the rule‘s <Target> <Subject> 
subtree. Then, the resource‘s LBAC characteristics denoted in the LSID, mapped to the 
rule‘s <Target> <Resources> and <Actions> subtrees. 
The mapping statements for LBAC are shown in Table 5.2, and include: a subject-
user mapping statement (SU-MS) that takes a user such as Elisa to a <Subject> in 
XACML; an action-operation mapping statement (AO-MS) that takes a permission such 
as insert or delete to an <Action> in XACML; and, a resource-element mapping 
statement (RE-MS) that takes an element such as such as FamilyHistory in CCR to a 
<Resource> in XACML. As discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the dashed arrows 
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in Figure 5.1, the mappings for LBAC utilize the DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD from 
Chapter 4. For the SU-MS, the UD is utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target> 
Subject element as the user and user identifier (using SU-MS1). The SubjectMatch‘s 
MatchId attribute uses the function ‗string-equal‘ to evaluate the user‘s name as modeled 
in the UD (using SU-MS2). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree is 
the user from the UD (using SU-MS3) along with the user‘s clearance (using SU-MS4). 
For the AO-MS, the UD and LSID are utilized. The policy‘s <Target> element‘s Action 
child is set to <AnyAction/> in order for the policy to apply to the user when any request 
is performed (using AO-MS1). The ActionMatch’s MatchId attribute utilizes the ‗string-
equal‘ function in a similar fashion to the SubjectMatch’s MatchId (using AO-MS2), 
while the ActionAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId is set to the permission‘s operation 
(e.g., read, aggregate, insert, update, or delete) (using AO-MS3). In the last case for the 
AO-MR, the policy‘s rules <Action> children are <Operation> elements with the 
<operationName> subchild and <opAccessMode> values equal to the LSID‘s member 
definitions (using AO-MS4). Lastly, for the RE-MS, the DSCD, SID and LSID are 
utilized in conjunction. In a similar fashion to the policy‘s <Target> Subject element, the 
Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that the higher-level policies apply 
to the user (using RE-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> children are <element> nodes with 
element data that correspond to the element classes in the DSCD, SID and LSID 
diagrams (using RE-MS3). 
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 Mapping 
Statement 
Type 
Involved 
UML 
Diagram(s)  
Mapping Statements 
SU-MS 
 
(Subject User 
Mapping 
Statements) 
UD 
SU-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the 
user and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with 
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the 
«User» package of the UD. 
SU-MS2. SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function 
―string-equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s name and id as 
modeled in the UD and the security model. 
SU-MS3. Subject in Rule is set as the Subject in the 
higher-level <Target> (user). 
SU-MS4. Subject in Rule is extended with a 
<clearance> element that corresponds to the LBAC 
clearance from the UD. 
AO-MS 
 
(Action 
Operation 
Mapping 
Statements) 
UD, SID, 
LSID 
AO-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Action set to 
<AnyAction /> to ensure that the higher-level policy 
applies to the user. 
AO-MS2. ActionMatch‘s MatchId uses the function 
―string-equal‖. 
AO-MS3. ActionAttributeDesignator‘s AttributeId set 
to the operation‘s tag (e.g. read, aggregate, insert, update, 
delete). 
AO-MS4. Rule‘s <Actions> children are <Operation> 
with the operation name (<operationName>) and access 
mode (<opAccessMode>) that corresponds to the 
members of the stereotyped «element» classes of the 
LSID. 
RE-MS 
 
(Resource 
Element 
Mapping 
Statements) 
DSCD, SID, 
LSID 
RE-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to 
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level policies 
applies to the user. 
RE-MS2. Each Resource‘s ResourceMatch has a 
MatchId that determines the usage of the function 
―string-equal‖. 
RE-MS3. Rule‘s <Resources> children are <element> 
with the element identifier (<elementID>), element name 
(<elementName>), LBAC classification 
(<classification>), and access mode (<accessMode>) that 
corresponds to the stereotyped «element» class of the 
LSID. 
Table 5.2: LBAC Mapping Statements. 
 
To continue the realistic example of the usage and application of the mapping 
statements and associated process from the prior section, we reuse the UD in Figure 5.5, 
introduce an LSID in Figure 5.8 that corresponds to the SID of the prior section, with the 
155 
 
corresponding generated XACML code from DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD is shown in 
Figure 5.9. The UD and section A in Figure 5.5 allows for the generation of the policy‘s 
target, specifically the user Elisa part A, line 8 in Figure 5.9. When a request by user Elisa 
is made on the system that involves one of the elements in the LSID (Figure 5.8), this 
policy is matched against the name in lines 6-16 of Figure 5.9, and then the rule in lines 
17-41 of Figure 5.9 is checked for validity. Elisa is assigned a clearance level of secret 
(S), denoted by <clearance> element inside the rule in line 23 in part B of Figure 5.9, 
corresponding to the section C of Figure 5.5. When Elisa tries to perform an insert with 
an access mode of write, denoted by <opAccessMode> in line 37 in part C of Figure 5.9, 
the effect of the policy is Permit in line 17 of Figure 5.9, and she will be allowed to 
continue. The element that is targeted in lines 29-33 in part C of Figure 5.9) corresponds 
to the ‗Past Medical History‘ element class in the LSID of Figure 5.8. Note that the 
members of the «element» class in the LSID package in Figure 5.8 for the ‗Past Medical 
History‘ element class is classified (c) for when the access mode is read, and, secret (s) 
for when the access mode is write. This property is matched in lines 30 and 31 in part C 
of Figure 5.9. 
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«SecureInformation»
ClinicalDocumentArchitectureSystem
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“originating_organization”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“patient”
{ am=read, cls=u }
{ am=write, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Allergies”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Assessment”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Past Medical History”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=s }
«element»
«ref» name=“Vital Signs”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=c }
«element»
 
Figure 5.8: An LSID for HL7 CDA Elements from the Scenario of Section 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with LBAC Capabilities. 
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-lbac-policy"  
2.  RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides"> 
3.  <Description>This is a pseudocode example of an  
4.   XACML policy with LBAC capabilities for user  
5.   Elisa</Description> 
6.   <Target> 
7.     <Subjects> 
8.       <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
9.     </Subjects> 
10.     <Resources>  
11.       <AnyResource/> 
12.     </Resources>  
13.     <Actions> 
14.       <AnyAction/> 
15.     </Actions> 
16.   </Target> 
17.   <Rule RuleId="simple-LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
18.     <Target> 
19.       <Subjects> 
20.         <user> 
21.           <id>6</id> 
22.           <name>Elisa</name> 
23.           <clearance>S</clearance> 
24.         </user> 
25.       </Subjects> 
26.       <Resources> 
27.         <element> 
28.           <elementID>el-3</elementID> 
29.           <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName> 
30.           <classification>S</classification> 
31.           <accessMode>write</accessMode> 
32.         </element> 
33.       </Resources>  
34.       <Actions> 
35.         <operation> 
36.           <operationName>insert</operationName> 
37.           <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode> 
38.         </operation> 
39.       </Actions> 
40.     </Target>  
41.   </Rule> 
42. </Policy> 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
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5.3.3 DAC Delegations and Authorizations 
This section focuses on both delegation (DD) and authorization (AD) from our model 
as presented in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.2.7, respectively. For delegation, XACML has built-
in support that allows the delegator to delegate partial or complete authority to another 
user in the system. This mechanism avoids the need to modify the original security policy 
since it effectively decouples the delegation rights and the access rights, thereby 
simplifying the policy generation process. However, the XACML‘s delegation component 
does not have a way to enforce which user can receive what roles, which is crucial to our 
approach. This effectively turns delegation into a discretionary non-checked operation. In 
order to support the delegation of roles to predetermined users, namely, delegable users 
as defined in Section 3.5 with Definition 33, we extend the XACML schema with non-
normative constructs that support the creation of specific rules regarding role delegation 
with the purpose of integrating the delegation permissions on a user basis. Recall from 
Section 3.5, that in order to have proper role delegation, there is a set of original users 
(Definition 32 of Section 3.5) that can delegate their roles and a set of delegable users 
(Definition 33 of Section 3.5) that can receive specific roles. This means that roles can be 
treated as resources that can be interchanged between users of an application, albeit 
limited in only one direction and only when an original user delegates it to a delegable 
user. The roles also have properties, namely, the permissions that are defined as part of a 
policy, such as pass-on authority for second-level delegations. To support all of these 
capabilities, we extend the XACML schema with a <DelegationTargets>. The 
<DelegationTargets> element that acts as a holder of all of the delegable users that can 
receive the role being treated as a resource. The delegation targets are users from the 
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delegable users set (see Definition 33 of Section 3.5) that can receive the role that is 
matched from the policy. To generate the delegation portion of the XACML policy, we 
define mapping rules between the Delegation Diagram (DD) of Section 4.2.6 and the 
extended concepts of XACML. 
The mapping statements for DAC delegations are shown in Table 5.3, and include: a 
delegation subject-original user mapping statement (DSOU-MS) that takes a user such as 
Elisa to a <Subject> in XACML; a delegation resources-role mapping statement (DRR-
MS) that takes a role such as Physician to a <Resource> in XACML; and, a delegation 
targets-delegable user mapping statement (DTDU-MS) that takes a delegable user such 
as Samantha or Emliy to a <DelegationTargets> extended element in XACML. As 
discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the long dash dot arrows in Figure 5.1, the 
mappings for DAC delegations utilize the UD, DD and DRSD from Chapter 4. For the 
DSOU-MS, the UD and DD are utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target> Subject 
element as the user and user identifier (using DSOU-MS1). The SubjectMatch‘s MatchId 
attribute uses the function ‗string-equal‘ to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the 
DRSD (using DSOU-MS2). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree is 
the user from the UD (using DSOU-MS3). For the DRR-MS, the DRSD and DD are 
utilized in conjunction. In a similar fashion to the policy‘s <Target> Subject element, the 
Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that the higher-level policies apply 
to the user (using DRR-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> children are <role> nodes with role 
data that correspond to the role packages in the DRSD and DD (using DRR-MS2). Last, 
for the DTDU-MS, the UD, DRSD and DD are utilized to represent those users that are 
allowed to receive the role from a delegation operation in XACML form. The policy 
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rule‘s newly introduced <DelegationTargets> element is set to the user of those classes 
insider the DelegationDiagram package of the DD (using DTDU-MS1). 
 Mapping 
Statement 
Type 
Involved 
UML 
Diagram(s)  
Mapping Statements 
DSOU-MS 
 
(Delegation 
Subject 
Original 
User 
Mapping 
Statements) 
UD, DD 
DSOU-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the 
user and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with 
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the 
«User» package of the DD. 
DSOU-MS2. SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function 
―string-equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s name and id as 
modeled in the DD and the security model. 
DSOU-MS3. Subject in the Delegation Rule is set as the 
Subject in the higher-level <Target> (user), the «User» 
package from the DD. 
DRR-MS 
 
(Delegation 
Resources 
Role 
Mapping 
Statements) 
DRSD, DD 
DRR-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to 
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level policies 
applies to the user. 
DRR-MS2. Rule‘s <Resources> children are <role> 
elements with the role identifier (<roleID>) and role 
name (<roleName>) that corresponds to the «DRSD» of 
the DD. 
DTDU-MS 
 
(Delegation 
Targets 
Delegable 
User Element 
Mapping 
Statements) 
UD, DRSD, 
DD 
DTDU-MS1. Rule‘s <DelegationTargets> children are 
<User> with the user identifier (<id>) and user name 
(<name>) that corresponds to the «User» classes of the 
«DelegationDiagram» package in the DD. 
Table 5.3: DAC Delegation Mapping Statements. 
 
Continuing the example, the DD from Section 4.2.6 is reintroduced in Figure 5.10 to 
explain the mapping relations between the DD and XACML, with the corresponding 
generated XACML code from DRCD, UD, and DD is shown in Figure 5.11. Figure 5.10 
shows a sample of the role delegation from the user Elisa in section A which corresponds 
in Figure 5.11 to parts A and B, lines 7-9 and 19-24, respectively. In addition, in Figure 
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5.10, the role of Physician in section B corresponds to part C, lines 26-31 of Figure 5.11, 
which is part of the ‗simple-DAC-delegation-rule‘. Note that the high-level target of the 
policy in lines 6-16 of Figure 5.11 that has the user Elisa with identifier 6 in line 8 of 
Figure 5.11, establishes the linkage to all for a delegation rule that states she can delegate 
the role Physician from section B of Figure 5.10 in lines 26-31 of Figure 5.11 to either 
Samantha or Emily (section C of Figure 5.10), with the user Samantha chosen with 
identifier 30 in part D, line 34 of Figure 5.11, denoting that she is a user part of the 
<DelegationTargets> element. Note that, as mentioned in the introduction of Section 
5.3.3, the <DelegationTargets> element is a non-normative component of XACML. We 
chose to extend the schema with this element to make the logic of delegating roles more 
streamlined. 
«User»
Elisa
«Delegation»
«DelegationDiagram»
Delegations
«User»
Samantha
«User»
Emily
«DRSD»
Physician
«RoleAssignment»
A
B C
 
Figure 5.10: A Delegation Diagram for User Elisa and Role Physician. 
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Figure 5.11: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with Delegation Capabilities. 
 
Authorization follows the delegation process, discussed in Section 3.6 with 
Definitions 35 and 36, to be defined over schemas and instances assigned to users. This 
requires the definition of authorizations in an XACML policy similar to assigning a user 
a clearance. To generate authorization related code for an XACML policy, we leverage 
AD from Section 4.2.7 and the <Resources> subtree of the <Rule> structure of XACML. 
In this case, the <Subject> subtree in the higher-level Policy <Target> is the user with 
his/her identifier and name. The resources under the rule would include the schema and 
instance identifiers as discussed in Section 3.1 with Definition 3, and represented as the 
new UML DD in Section 4.2.7. 
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-dac-policy"  
2.  RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">  
3.  <Description>This is a pseudocode example of an  
4.   XACML policy with DAC capabilities for user  
5.   Elisa</Description> 
6.   <Target> 
7.     <Subjects> 
8.       <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
9.     </Subjects> 
10.     <Resources>  
11.       <AnyResource/> 
12.     </Resources>  
13.     <Actions> 
14.       <AnyAction/> 
15.     </Actions> 
16.   </Target> 
17.   <Rule RuleId="simple-DAC-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
18.     <Target> 
19.        <Subjects> 
20.         <user> 
21.           <id>6</id> 
22.           <name>Elisa</name> 
23.         </user> 
24.        </Subjects> 
25.        <Resources> 
26.          <Roles> 
27.            <role> 
28.              <roleID>2</roleID> 
29.              <roleName>Physician</roleName> 
30.            </role> 
31.          </Roles> 
32.        </Resources>  
33.        <DelegationTargets> 
34.          <user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user> 
35.        </DelegationTargets> 
36.     </Target>  
37.   </Rule> 
38. </Policy> 
 
 
 
 A 
B 
C 
D 
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The mapping statements for authorizations are shown in Table 5.4, and include: a 
subject-user authorization mapping statement (SUA-MS) that takes a user such as Elisa 
and a role such as Physician to a <Subject> in XACML; and, a resources schemas-
instances mapping statement (RSI-MS) that takes a schema and/or instance such as CDA, 
CCR, or Carol Smith‘s record from Section 2.6 to a <Resource> in XACML. As 
discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the long dash dot-dot arrows in Figure 5.1, the 
mappings for authorizations utilize the DSCD, DRSD, UD, and AD from Chapter 4. For 
the SUA-MS, the UD, DRSD, and AD are utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target> 
Subject element as the user and user identifier (using SUA-MS1) and the respective role 
and role identifier (using SUA-MS2). The SubjectMatch‘s MatchId attribute uses the 
function ‗string-equal‘ to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the DRSD (using SUA-
MS3). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree is the user from the UD 
and AD (using SUA-MS4. For the RSI-MS, the AD and DSCD are utilized to set the 
schemas and instances that are to be authorized for the user/role combination in XACML 
form. The policy‘s <Target> Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that 
the higher-level policies apply to the user (using RSI-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> 
children are <Schemas> or <Instance> nodes with element data that correspond to the 
element classes in the DSCD and AD diagrams (using RSI-MS2). 
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 Mapping 
Statement 
Type 
Involved 
UML 
Diagram(s)  
Mapping Statements 
SUA-MS 
 
Subject 
(User) 
Mapping 
Statements 
 
UD, DRSD, 
AD 
SUA-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the 
user and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with 
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the «User» 
package of the AD. 
SUA-MS2. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the 
role and role identifier set as a <role> subtree with 
<roleName> and <roleID> children that corresponds to 
the DRSD package name. 
SUA-MS3. SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function 
―string-equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s name and id as 
modeled in the AD and the security model. 
SUA-MS4. Subject in the Authorization Rule is set as 
the Subject in the higher-level <Target> (user), the 
«User» package from the AD. 
RSI-MS 
 
Resources 
(Schemas 
and 
Instances) 
Mapping 
Statements 
 
AD, DSCD 
RSI-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to 
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level policies 
applies to the user. 
RSI-MS2. Rule‘s <Resources> children are <Schemas> 
and <Instances> elements that correspond to the with the 
«DSCD» and «Instance» components of the 
«AuthorizationDiagram» package. 
Table 5.4: Authorization Mapping Statements. 
 
In the final step for the example of XACML generation, we reintroduce the AD from 
Section 4.2.7 in Figure 5.12 for user Elisa under the role of Physician who is being 
authorized to Carol Smith‘s instance (and relevant schemas), with the corresponding 
generated XACML code from DSCD, DRSD, UD, and AD is shown in Figure 5.13. In 
this policy, the user Elisa from Figure 5.10 in section A corresponds to section A in Figure 
5.12, has the identifier 6 that leads to the subject definition in part A, lines 7-10 of Figure 
5.13 that correspond to parts A and B of Figure 5.12. In the example, Elisa is authorized 
by the rule with identifier ―simple-DAC-rule‖ to the CCR schema in part C, lines 24-29 
of Figure 5.13, that corresponds to the section C of Figure 5.12, as well as to Carol Smith 
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instance in part D, lines 30-35 of Figure 5.13, that corresponds to section D of Figure 
5.12. 
«User»
Elisa
«Authorization»
«AuthorizationDiagram»
Authorizations
«DSCD»
CCR
«Instance»
John Jones
«DRSD»
Physician
«RoleAssignment»
«has»
«Instance»
Carol Smith
A
B
C
D
 
Figure 5.12: Authorization Diagram for User Elisa. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with Authorization Capabilities. 
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-dac-policy"  
2.  RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">  
3.  <Description>This is a pseudocode example of an  
4.   XACML policy with DAC capabilities for user  
5.   Elisa</Description> 
6.   <Target> 
7.     <Subjects> 
8.       <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
9.       <role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role> 
10.     </Subjects> 
11.     <Resources>  
12.       <AnyResource/> 
13.     </Resources>  
14.     <Actions> 
15.       <AnyAction/> 
16.     </Actions> 
17.   </Target> 
18.   <Rule RuleId="simple-DAC-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
19.    <Target> 
20.       <Subjects> 
21.        <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
22.       </Subjects> 
23.       <Resources> 
24.        <Schemas> 
25.          <schema> 
26.            <schemaID>sId1</schemaID> 
27.            <schemaName>CCR</schemaName> 
28.          </schema> 
29.        </Schemas> 
30.        <Instances> 
31.          <instance> 
32.            <instanceID>iId1</instaneID> 
33.            <instanceName>Carol Smith</instanceName> 
34.          </instance> 
35.        </Instances> 
36.       </Resources>  
37.     </Target>  
38.   </Rule> 
39. </Policy> 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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5.3.4 Interplay of RBAC, LBAC and DAC 
Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 detailed the mapping statements to support RBAC, 
LBAC, or DAC individually in XACML. When an application is to be comprised with 
capabilities from all three of these access control models, a comparison must be 
performed between users, clearances, roles, permissions, elements targeted by the 
permissions, the element‘s sensitivity levels, and authorizations in order to determine if 
the combination has any potential conflicts or inconsistencies. This interplay supports the 
authorization of a user as given in Definition 6 in Section 3.6 that involves a user with a 
role, clearance, and delegation. To allow the definition of policies that support multiple 
access control models, the security definitions for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC, must be 
compared with one another. From the perspective of XACML, one approach to 
accomplish this comparison would be to list all of the permitted rules for the user/role 
pair (including rules for RBAC and LBAC), and endeavor to determine if there are 
conflicts in terms of access among the permitted rules. The result of this would produce a 
set of security policies, one for each permission in the security definitions for the user. 
The problem with this approach occurs when there is a large amount of users which 
results in a large set of security policy instances that would be difficult to manage 
properly. While easies to implement, it is difficult to manage due to numerous rules 
across numerous policies which could result in poor performance when fetching the 
relevant policies affecting one user in one scenario. A second approach to support the 
integration of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC leverages the <Condition> element of the 
XACML 3.0 schema, which is used to further augment the form of the <Rule> element‘s 
<Target> by presenting the capability of comparing two or more attributes with a set of 
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normative functions (e.g. integer-greater-than-or-equal, etc.).. The intent is to pair a 
<Condition> element with each rule as needed in order to perform necessary consistency 
checks. Utilizing the <Condition> element for each rule could allow the LBAC 
requirements that govern operations over elements to be realized as an extra component 
of an already existing RBAC rule. Another potential benefit of leveraging the 
<Condition> element is to more easily support LBAC read and write features such as 
simple-integrity, simple-security, liberal-*, etc. as discussed in Section 3.4. 
To illustrate this second approach, Figure 5.14 has an example of an XACML 
condition that would be part of a rule for the example of user Elisa and role Physician. 
The <Condition> XACML code segment results from the transformation of the mapping 
statements of Section 5.3.2 to support the enforcement of LBAC clearance vs. 
classification dominance. The first step of this transformation searches those permissions 
in RBAC that match the <Action> and <Resources> elements, and then generates the 
<Condition> logic to substitute for the LBAC logic of Section 5.3.2. This condition 
follows the logic of simple-integrity, or write-down and no write-up (see Section 3.4). 
This means that a user can write elements with a lower sensitivity level when compared 
to their clearance level, but would not be allowed to write those elements with a higher 
sensitivity. The first <Apply> in line 2 of Figure 5.14 utilizes the comparator integer-
greater-than-or-equal, which takes two elements as parameters. The first is the attribute 
that denotes the user‘s clearance as shown in lines 4-6. The second attribute denotes the 
element‘s sensitivity in lines 8-10. If this condition were evaluated to be true, which 
means that the clearance is greater than or equal to the sensitivity by the function from 
line 2, then the condition would return true and the rule would be permitted. 
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The end result of utilizing the <Condition> element is the creation of only one policy-
per-user as contrasted with the first approach discussed above. This is shown in Figure 
5.16 where for the user Elisa, there are groups of each of the RBAC permissions under 
one rule each, and injects the necessary XACML logic in the form of <Condition> when 
there is a need to support LBAC as shown in line 18. The DAC delegations and 
authorizations in lines 23-34 in Figure 5.16, live at the policy-level and are separate rules 
of the policy. This procedure allows a security architecture to only fetch one policy when 
handling the security of one user. As a result, this one policy with respect to a user 
realizes Defn. 6 of Section 3.6 by including all of the necessary security requirements to 
only one object, resulting in all of the security requirements are included in the user 
object, which is translated in XACML to only one policy per user. Following the scenario 
of Section 2.6, for users Brock Ketchum, Elisa Fakington, Leroy, Jenkins, and Gail (5 
users in total), the result of the policy mapping process would produce 5 XACML policy 
instances, one for Brock, one for Elisa, etc. 
 
Figure 5.14: XACML Condition Pseudo-code for the LBAC Component of an RBAC + 
LBAC Rule. 
 
5.4 Algorithm for Automatic Generation of XACML 
The process of generating an XACML policy from the seven new UML diagrams 
(DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, UD, DD, and AD) of Chapter 4 can be automated with an 
1. <Condition> 
2.  <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal"> 
3.  <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only"> 
4.  <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
5.  {userClearance} 
6.  </AttributeValue> 
7.  </Apply> 
8.  <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
9.  {elementSensitivity} 
10.  </AttributeValue> 
11.  </Apply> 
12. </Condition> 
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algorithm, as shown by Figure 5.15. The new UML diagrams along with the document 
schemas serve as the parameters, while the XACML schema is utilized as template for 
the resulting instances. While the mapping statements across the access control models 
(RBAC, LBAC, DAC) do not require any predetermined order to be applied (for 
example, DAC delegation and authorization mapping statements could be applied before 
RBAC mapping statements), for the purpose of automation, we prioritize some aspects of 
the process. From a high-level perspective, as shown in Figure 5.15, the first step is to 
iterate over every user of the information system that requires security. Once a user is 
selected (e.g., Elisa from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6), the next step is to find 
that user‘s role and the respective DRSD that describes all of the permissions over every 
element. Then, by iterating over every permission in the relevant DRSD, the algorithm 
creates an XACML <Rule> object that would map the role to the <Subject>, the elements 
to the <Resources>, and the permissions (operations) to the <Actions>. Then, after that 
initial mapping is done, a check for LBAC features is done. If any LBAC features exist, 
such as simple-security, simple-integrity, etc., a <Condition> element is added to that 
rule. This process is repeated over every permission, resulting in one <Rule > with a 
<Condition> element if LBAC is needed (see Figure 5.14 again) for each permission in 
the DRSD. This iteration is repeated for every role the user might hold. After the 
mappings over RBAC and LBAC capabilities are complete, then delegations and 
authorizations are tackled. For each delegation and authorization, a <Rule> element is 
created that would map the schemas and instances to <Resources> inside the rule for 
authorization, or roles and delegable users to <Resources> and <DelegationTargets> 
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respectively, for delegation. The end result of this high-level process is the creation of 
one XACML policy instance per user, which could be readily deployed.  
For each user (UD)
For each role (UD, DRSD)
Complete XACML Policy
Create <Rule>
For each permission (DRSD)
Match role to <Subject> 
(UD, DRSD)
Match elements to <Resources> 
(DSCD, SID, DRSD) 
Match permissions to <Actions>
(DRSD, SID)
If LBAC features exist/needed
Add <Condition> to <Rule>
(UD, DSCD, SID, LSID)
For delegations & authorizations
Create DAC <Rule> elements
for delegations & authorizations
Match schemas, instances and roles to 
<Resources>, Users to <DelegationTargets>
(UD, DRSD, DD, AD, DSCD)
 
Figure 5.15: High-level Algorithm for XACML Generation from UML Extensions. 
 
The high-level algorithm of Figure 5.15 can be transitioned to a more detailed pseudo 
code version as given in for the automatic generation of XACML that leverages the UML 
extensions of Chapter 4 and the mapping statements of Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 
5.3.4. The first step, as shown in line 3 of Figure 5.16 is to generate the XACML 
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description header as discussed in the introduction of Section 5.3. This process involves 
generating the PolicyID attribute of the <Policy> and the <Description> content of the 
<Policy>. The second step in line 4 of Figure 5.16 corresponding to the first step in 
Figure 5.15, involves a loop over each User in the system. For each user (line 4 of Figure 
5.16), the roles that are tied to that user are identified (line 6 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the 
UD and DRSD. After this list of roles has been found, an iteration over the roles (line 7 of 
Figure 5.16) is performed. Following a similar procedure as before, the list of 
permissions tied to that role is fetched using the DRSD (line 9 of Figure 5.16). Following 
this, a loop over each of the permissions tied to the role denoted by DRSD (line 10 of 
Figure 5.16) is performed. The first step inside this loop is creating a <Rule> element 
(line 12 of Figure 5.16), followed by the three mappings. First, a map of the <Subject> is 
performed (line 13 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the R-MS from Section Table 5.1. Then, a 
map of the <Resources> is performed (line 14 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the E-MS from 
Table 5.1. The last step inside this loop maps the <Actions> (line 15 of Figure 5.16) 
utilizing the P-MS from Table 5.1. After the RBAC permission mapping segment of the 
algorithm is complete (lines 12-15 of Figure 5.16), a check is performed if LBAC support 
is desired (line 16 of Figure 5.16). If true, the <Condition> element is created (line 18 of 
Figure 5.16) by utilizing the UD, DSCD, SID, and LSID and following the SU-MS, AO-
MS, and RE-MS of Table 5.2, followed by the transformation to the <Condition> element 
discussed in Section 5.3.4. 
After the loops over permissions and roles are complete, a check for delegations in 
line 23 of Figure 5.16 is performed. For each of the delegation rules (line 23 of Figure 
5.16), a <Rule> is created (line 25 of Figure 5.16), followed by a <Resource> map using 
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the DRSD and DD as discussed with the DRR-MS of Table 5.3. Then, the delegation 
targets are mapped (line 27 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the UD, DRSD, and DD with the 
DTDU-MS of Table 5.3. Once the loop over delegations is completed, a loop over 
authorizations starts (line 29 of Figure 5.16). The first step inside this loop creates a 
<Rule> (line 31 of Figure 5.16) followed by a <Subject> map utilizing the SUA-MS of 
Table 5.4 with the UD and AD, and ends with the <Resources> map utilizing the RSI-MS 
of Table 5.4 with the AD and DSCD. 
The result of executing the algorithm in Figure 5.16 is an instance of an XACML 
<Policy> as shown in Figure 5.17 for user Elisa (line 5, 37 and 52 of Figure 5.17) and 
role Physician (line 13 and 41 of Figure 5.17) with the security requirements defined in 
the UML extensions of Chapter 4 that are built upon the model of Chapter 3 and created 
from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6. In this policy, RBAC and LBAC features are 
found under the same rule in lines 10 to 32 of Figure 5.17. Note that this policy applies 
the function greater than or equal to figure out whether the condition under the 
insert/write rule is allowed as given in line 21 of Figure 5.17. Since the clearance of user 
Elisa (line 27 of Figure 5.17) and the classification of Past Medical History (line 29 of 
Figure 5.17) are equal, the condition is valid. The resulting enforcement would then 
depend on whether the schema and/or instance in which the operation is being tried on is 
authorized. Delegations and authorizations, from lines 34 to 63 in Figure 5.16, are 
translated as is from the mapping statements since they have no effect on the document-
level operations. That is, all of the authorizations for the user Elisa (lines 49 to 63 of 
Figure 5.17) and her delegation of roles to users such as Samantha (lines 34 to 48 of 
Figure 5.16) have no impact on the decision of whether the insert operation (line 20 of 
172 
 
Figure 5.17) is permitted or not. While RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal, the policy 
follows the nature of DAC delegations and authorizations being in a different layer of the 
access control model. Note that not all of the permissions of the Physician DRSD are 
represented in this policy due to space reasons. As discussed earlier in this section, each 
permission would be represented as a <Rule> element in the XACML Policy instance. 
The complete policy for the user Elisa and role of Physician can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 5.16: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy Instance Generation Algorithm. 
 
1. RBAC_LBAC_DAC_XACML_generation(DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, UD, DD, AD) 
2. { 
3.   Generate_XACML_Description_Header() // lines 1-2 of Fig. 5.17 
4.   foreach(User as currentUser) 
5.   { 
6.     role_list = Find_Role(UD, DRSD); 
7.     foreach(role_list as currentRole) 
8.     { 
9.       permission_list = Find_permissions(DRSD); 
10.       foreach(permission_list as currentPermission) 
11.       { 
12.         XACML.createRule(); // lines 10-36 of Fig. 5.17 
13.         XACML.mapSubject(UD,DRSD); // lines 12-14 of Fig. 5.17 
14.         XACML.mapResources(DSCD,SID,DRSD); // lines 15-18 of Fig. 5.17 
15.         XACML.mapActions(DRSD,SID); // lines 19-22 of Fig. 5.17 
16.         if(LBAC) 
17.         { 
18.           XACML.createCondition(UD,DSCD,SID,LSID); // lines 24-35 of Fig. 5.17 
19.         } 
20.       } 
21.     } 
22.   } 
23.   foreach(Delegation) 
24.   { 
25.     XACML.createRule(); // lines 37-51 of Fig. 5.17 
26.     XACML.mapResources(DRSD,DD); // lines 42-46 of Fig. 5.17 
27.     XACML.mapTargets(UD,DRSD,DD); // lines 47-49 of Fig. 5.17 
28.   } 
29.   foreach(Authorization) 
30.   { 
31.     XACML.createRule(); // lines 52-66 of Fig. 5.17 
32.     XACML.mapSubject(UD,AD); // lines 54-56 of Fig. 5.17 
33.     XACML.mapResources(AD,DSCD); // lines 57-64 of Fig. 5.17 
34.   } 
35. } 
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Figure 5.17: Resulting XACML Policy for User Elisa and Role Physician. 
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">  
2. <Description>Omitted due to length.</Description> 
3. <Target> 
4.  <Subjects> 
5.  <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
6.  </Subjects> 
7.  <Resources><AnyResource/></Resources>  
8.  <Actions><AnyAction/></Actions> 
9. </Target> 
10. <Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
11.  <Target> 
12.  <Subjects> 
13.  <role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>  
14.  </Subjects> 
15.  <Resources><element> 
16.  <elementID>el-3</elementID> 
17.  <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName> 
18.  </element></Resources>  
19.  <Actions><operation> 
20.  <operationName>insert</operationName> 
21.  <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode> 
22.  </operation></Actions> 
23.  </Target> 
24.  <Condition> 
25.  <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal"> 
26.  <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only"> 
27.  <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">Secret</AttributeValue> 
28.  </Apply> 
29.  <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">Secret</AttributeValue> 
30.  </Apply> 
31.  </Condition>  
32. </Rule> 
33. … // Remainder of permissions omitted due to space 
34. <Rule RuleId="simple-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
35.  <Target> 
36.  <Subjects> 
37.  <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
38.  </Subjects> 
39.  <Resources> 
40.  <Roles><role> 
41.  <roleID>2</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName> 
42.  </role></Roles> 
43.  </Resources>  
44.  <DelegationTargets> 
45.  <user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user> 
46.  </DelegationTargets> 
47.  </Target>  
48. </Rule> 
49. <Rule RuleId="simple-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
50.  <Target> 
51.  <Subjects> 
52.  <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
53.  </Subjects> 
54.  <Resources><Schemas><schema> 
55.  <schemaID>4</schemaID> 
56.  <schemaName>Schema 4</schemaName> 
57.  </schema></Schemas> 
58.  <Instances><instance> 
59.  <instanceID>4,2</instaneID> 
60.  <instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName> 
61.  </instance></Instances></Resources>  
62.  </Target>  
63. </Rule> 
64. </Policy> 
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5.5 Related Research in Policy Generation and Integration 
In this chapter we presented a way of generating XACML that effectively integrated 
capabilities from LBAC, RBAC and DAC. Related work on this area of research usually 
focuses in integrating existing policies into one. The work of (Damiani et al., 2000) 
presents an access control system that embeds the definition and enforcement of the 
security policies in the structure of the XML documents in DTDs in order to provide 
customizable security. This provides a level of generalization for documents that share 
the same DTD, similar to our work where security policies act against XML schemas to 
control XML instances. Two differences are: their work targets outdated XML DTD‘s 
while ours utilizes schemas, and their polices are embedded into both DTD and instance, 
requiring changes to instances when policies change; our work allows changes with no 
impact on instances. 
Another effort (Damiani et al., 2008) details a model that combines the embedding of 
policies and rewriting of access queries to provide security to XML datasets. The XML 
schema is extended with three security attributes: access, condition, and dirty. While this 
work is similar to our work by targeting security in XML instances via policies, it differs 
by requiring changes to instance when the policy is modified and does not consider XML 
document writing (see Section 5.3). Efforts by (Bertino & Ferrari, 2002; Bertino, 
Carminati, & Ferrari, 2004) present Author-X, a Java-based system for DAC in XML 
documents that provides customizable protection to the documents with positive and 
negative authorizations. Author-X employs a policy-based DTD document that prunes an 
XML instance based on the security policies, which is similar to our approach, but 
focuses on discretionary access control where we focus on RBAC. The work of (Leonardi 
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et al., 2010) considers the scenario of a federated access control model, in which the data 
provider and policy enforcement are handled by different organizations. This approach 
relates to ours with regards to the separation of the security policies from the data to be 
handled, but differs in the specifics of where the policies‘ details are stored. 
The work of (Kuper et al., 2005) has presented a model consisting of access control 
policies over outmoded DTD‘s with XPath expressions to achieve XML security. Their 
model is similar to ours, as it aims to provide different authorized views of an XML 
document based on the user‘s credentials. However, the significant difference is that this 
approach combines query rewriting and authentication methods, whereas our approach 
can be applied to any non-normative XACML architecture (having a policy enforcement 
point) for both reading and updating, as well as XPath or XQuery queries. The work of 
(Müldner et al., 2009) presents an approach of supporting RBAC to handle the special 
case of role proliferation, which is an administrative issue that happens in RBAC when 
roles are changed, added, and evolve over time, making security of an organization 
difficult to manage. Our approach doesn‘t address role proliferation; however, by 
separating our security into an XACML policy, we do insulate role proliferation from 
impacting an application‘s XML schemas and instances. 
Policy integration approaches vary from similarity finding to specialized algebraic 
approaches. For example, (Mazzoleni, Bertino, Crispo, & Sivasubramanian, 2006; 
Mazzoleni, Crispo, Sivasubramanian, & Bertino, 2008) presents a policy integration 
methodology to find similarity of policies on distinct levels (rule effects, targets, roles), 
and integrating over a set of defined rules, also considering policy decision conflicts. 
Another approach (Rao, Lin, Bertino, Li, & Lobo, 2009) proposes an algebraic solution 
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to the problem to integrate complex security policies at a granular detail with an algebra 
that consists of five unary operations (three binary and two unary). This algebra is 
utilized as part of a framework (to achieve the generation of an instance policy 
automatically. Like (Mazzoleni et al., 2008), this approach also focuses on the instance 
level, creating a dependency on the OASIS XACML specification and policy structure to 
achieve proper results. The use of these methods would be impossible on security 
requirements defined in any other method (e.g., a database table with security rules, 
policies modeled with a different language, etc.). 
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Chapter 6 
Secure Information Engineering Process and 
Enforcement with Mobile Apps 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the secure information engineering process (SIEP) that 
leverages the security model presented in Chapter 3, the seven new UML diagram and 
respective metamodel extensions presented in Chapter 4, and the policy mapping process 
presented in Chapter 5. Over the past five years, one major focus of our research group 
has been on extending UML with new diagrams to realize a secure software engineering 
process for RBAC, MAC, and DAC, shown in Figure 6.1 (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2014) 
using separate concerns for functional, collaboration, and information application 
characteristics. First, from a functional perspective focused on object-oriented design, a 
framework of composable security features was defined (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) 
that preserves separation of security concerns from models to code through the extension 
of UML with new diagrams for RBAC, DAC, and MAC coupled with the automatic 
generation of enforcement code in AspectJ (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010). Second, from 
a collaboration perspective, a framework for secure, obligated, coordinated, and dynamic 
collaboration was developed (Berhe et al., 2010) that extended NIST RBAC to allow for 
the definition and enforcement of security with new UML diagrams for collaborative 
RBAC applicable to situations when individuals need to interact with one another in 
certain ways to achieve a common goal.  Third, from an information perspective, the 
work presented in this dissertation has focused on the definition of a modeling and design 
framework with enforcement process for information-based applications. 
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The objective of this chapter is to present a secure information engineering process 
for security and/or software engineers concerned with information security can follow to 
provide security assurance for the information that must be both modeled and protected. 
In order to achieve SIEP the underlying security model from Chapter 3 creates the logical 
base in which the seven new UML diagrams of Chapter 4 are defined from, with the 
policy generation process of Chapter 5 utilized to produce enforcement policies for the 
new UML diagrams that target information schemas that can be readily deployed and 
used for enforcement.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized into three major sections. Section 6.1 
covers the secure software engineering work that we published that considered 
functional, collaborative and information security concerns in combination (Pavlich-
Mariscal et al., 2014) and serves as the basis of the SIEP in this chapter. Then, in Section 
6.2, the SEIP is presented which utilizes the security model from Chapter 3, the UML 
extensions of Chapter 4, and the policy generation process from Chapter 5 for a design 
and development cycle for information security. Finally, in Section 6.3, we complete the 
discussion using the prototype mobile application tailored for the healthcare domain, 
from Section 2.6, which includes a high-level enforcement architecture in and its 
realization in our mobile personal health assistant (PHA) application. 
6.1 Secure Software Engineering 
Figure 6.1 details a secure software engineering process for functional, collaborative, 
and information modeling and design. From a functional perspective, (Pavlich-Mariscal 
et al., 2010) extended UML to represent RBAC, DAC, and MAC (see upper portion of 
Figure 6.1) via the introduction of the Role Slice Diagram, the User Diagram, the 
179 
 
Delegation Diagram, and MAC extensions coupled with a Secure Subsystem Diagram 
(middle right hand side of Figure 6.1). The Secure Subsystem Diagram denotes the subset 
of an application‘s overall classes and methods that are restricted and require permissions 
to be in place for authorized users, as we previously discussed in Section 4.2.2. The Role 
Slice Diagram denotes RBAC policies, providing the role slice, a stereotyped package 
that represents the permissions assigned to a role. A role slice uses method-based 
permissions to allow or deny users to access specific operations, regardless of the object 
to which it is applied. The Delegation Diagram can be utilized to represent all of the rules 
of delegation between roles. This diagram provides the delegation slice, a stereotyped 
package that contains all of the roles that a user can delegate authority to another user, 
who may also be allowed to further delegate the role. The User Diagram has stereotyped 
packages to denote users and stereotyped dependency relations to represent user-role 
assignments. MAC extensions enhance the previous three diagrams with sensitivity levels 
(e.g., confidential, secret, top secret) and their ordering relations to indicate 
classifications of methods, clearances of role slices, and, implicitly, to declare access 
constraints based in the relation between classifications and clearances. From an 
enforcement perspective, once defined, the diagrams are utilized to generate aspect-
oriented enforcement code in AspectJ (bottom portion of Figure 6.1) that is able to verify, 
at runtime, whether the active user has a role with permissions over the protected method 
and grants or denies access accordingly. The end result is that aspects can effectively 
modularize access control concerns and enhance traceability from design to code. 
From a collaborative perspective, (Berhe et al., 2010) (lower middle left of Figure 
6.1) has focused on the extension of RBAC to define collaboration and sharing 
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capabilities across a workflow. Collaborative computing has emerged in many domains, 
with users interacting with one another towards some common goal. For example, in a 
health care setting, a patient‘s many providers (e.g., internist, cardiologist, physical 
therapist, etc.) need to interact with one another against a common set of data (patient‘s 
medical record). Unlike traditional security that defines separation of duty and mutual 
exclusion to prohibit what users can do, in a collaborative setting, the key is on defining 
when and how users collaborate. Thus, the work extended RBAC with a set of UML 
diagrams for collaboration on duty and adaptive workflow (Berhe et al., 2010) that 
interacts with our functional extensions in the top of Figure 6.1 (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 
2010): the Extended Role Slice Diagram, the Team Slice Diagram, the Workflow Slice 
Diagram, and the Obligation Slice Diagram. The Extended Role Slice Diagram defines 
the roles and privileges for each user within each collaboration step. The Team Slice 
Diagram defines the team members and their participation in the various collaboration 
steps. The Workflow Slice Diagram defines the steps and connections among them for a 
given team and specific collaboration. Lastly, the Obligation Slice Diagram defines the 
required permissions and participations for a particular collaboration. In addition, we 
provide the mapping of these new UML based collaboration design-time diagrams to 
actual machine-readable code-based policies for runtime enforcement. 
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Figure 6.1: Secure Software Engineering. 
 
Finally, from an information perspective, (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013) 
(middle-right of Figure 6.1) has emphasized the control of information created by one 
application to be shared and/or exchanged with other applications. One dominant 
approach for information exchange is the use of tree-structured documents, such as the 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998). In the case of XML, defining 
XML schemas has become an integral part of the application development process to 
handle exchange form database to server, from server to end user, among different 
182 
 
databases, etc. In support of information-based security, we have extended UML with 
seven new diagrams: the Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), the Secure 
Information Diagram (SID), the Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD), the LBAC 
Secure Information Diagram (LSID), the User Diagram (UD), the Delegation Diagram 
(DD), and the Authorization Diagram (AD). The DSCD models the original tree-
structured schema as a UML diagram. The SID identifies the subset of elements from the 
original schema that require some sort of security definition. The DRSD introduces 
RBAC capabilities that target elements of the original schema. The LSID extends the SID 
with LBAC features such as classifications in elements. The UD models the users and 
their properties of the information system. The DD represents the role-delegation 
capabilities between original users and delegable users. Lastly, the AD models the 
authorized schemas and instances for a respective user/role pair. These seven new 
diagrams allow us to automatically generate enforcement policies with the eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) via a mapping process as presented in 
Chapter 5. In turn, these enforcement policies can be readily deployed into any security 
architecture that utilizes the XACML specification‘s processing model. With these seven 
new UML diagrams augmented with the policy mapping process, a software engineer can 
consider and produce security enforcement code that targets information content by 
modeling the original schema (producing the DSCD), augmenting it with security 
features with respect to the different roles and permissions (producing the SID, DRSD, 
LSID, and AD), and then automatically creating an enforcement policy with the mapping 
process (XACML). 
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6.2 The Secure Information Engineering Process (SIEP) 
The secure information engineering process (SIEP) is intended to provide both 
security and/or software engineers with the ability to support RBAC, LBAC and DAC of 
tree structured documents integrated with the overall design, development, deployment, 
and maintenance of an information application, as shown in Figure 6.3, and consists of 
five main ordered tasks that are further divided into smaller sub-tasks. To help drive the 
discussion of Figure 6.3, we reintroduce all of the diagrams presented in Section 4.2 
using Figure 6.2 where: diagram A is the DSCD from Figure 4.5 in Section 4.2.1; 
diagram B is the UD from Figure 4.9 in Section 4.2.5; diagram C is the SID from Figure 
4.6 in Section 4.2.2; diagram D is the DRSD from Figure 4.7 in Section 4.2.3; diagram E 
is LSID from Figure 4.8 in Section 4.2.4; diagram F is the DD from Figure 4.10 in 
Section 4.2.6; and, diagram G denotes AD from Figure 4.11 in Section 4.2.7. In the 
remainder of this section, we explore SIEP in Figure 6.3 utilizing the diagrams (A to G) 
and explaining the steps and actions of a security and/or software engineer1. 
To begin, the first major step in SIEP labeled (1) in the top portion of Figure 6.3 is the 
design of the main security component of the application. This can include functional and 
collaborative application characteristics. such as those presented by (Pavlich-Mariscal et 
al., 2010) and (Berhe et al., 2011), and is primarily focused in the controlling access to 
the application programming interfaces (APIs) and their methods (functional) coupled 
with the definition of the detailed workflows of users and their interactions towards a 
particular task (collaboration) . The second major step in SIEP labeled (2) in Figure 6.3 is 
the initial information security design. For this step, an engineer defines a DSCD (see 
                                                          
1 Note that from this point forward, the use of the term engineer refers to either a security engineer or 
software engineer that is involved with designing the information security of an application. 
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diagram A of Figure 6.2) for the tree-structured schema that the information application 
will be utilizing labeled (2.1) in Figure 6.3, and then defines the general information 
security requirements labeled (2) in Figure 6.3). These general information security 
requirements can include, but are not limited to, roles of users that will be utilizing the 
information presented by the system, their permissions, the user‘s clearance levels and 
the information‘s sensitivity, as well as delegation and authorization aspects of the 
security definitions. Step (2.2) acts as the catalyst for the refinement of initial version of 
the UD (see diagram B of Figure 6.2), for the users of the information system. 
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Figure 6.2: Diagrams Used through the Secure Information Engineering Process. 
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The third major step labeled (3) in Figure 6.3 provides and ability to define the 
different aspects of the information security design initially presented by the security 
model in Chapter 3 and the UML diagram extensions in Chapter 4. This initial step can 
define one or more SIDs (see diagram C of Figure 6.2) in Figure 6.3 labeled (3.1) that 
will identify the respective subsets of the DSCDs that require requires some level of 
security via the projection operation in Chapter 3, Definition 8. Step (3) in Figure 6.3 has 
three possible options for the engineer: the left path of Figure 6.3 labeled (3.2.a) and 
(3.2.b) for RBAC; the center path of Figure 6.3 labeled (3.3.a) and (3.3.b) for LBAC; 
and, the right path of Figure 6.3 labeled (3.4.a) and (3.4.b) for DAC and authorization. 
While all three paths as optional, the engineer must include one path as part of the SIEP 
associated with Step (3) in order to proceed through the step and terminate in step (3.5) 
for the UD definition in Figure 6.3, with the potential to loop back to Step (3.1) as the 
design is developed in iterations over time.  
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Figure 6.3: A Secure Information Engineering Process for RBAC, LBAC and DAC. 
 
In the case of the left path in Figure 6.3 labeled (3.2.a) and (3.2.b) for RBAC 
capabilities, the engineer is able to begin to define roles and permissions as realized with 
the DRSD (see diagram D of Figure 6.2). The left path has feedback loops that allow the 
engineer to revisit the requirements and definitions of RBAC properties in order to 
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provide a robust security policy. In the case of the middle path in Figure 6.3 labeled 
(3.3.a) and (3.3.b), the LBAC requirements are realized by the engineer by first defining 
the sensitivity levels, which will act as the classification levels for elements and clearance 
levels for users (3.3.a) and by second creating the LSID (see diagram E of Figure 6.2) for 
the application‘s tree structured schema (3.3.b). The engineer can also use the LBAC 
feedback loops to polish these security requirements iteratively. . In the case of the right 
path in Figure 6.3 labeled (3.4.a) and (3.4.b), DAC and authorizations are defined by the 
engineer, first by creating the DD (see diagram F of Figure 6.2) and second by specifying 
the AD (see diagram G of Figure 6.2). Again, for this step, the engineer can loop back for 
revisions and subsequent iterations.  Step (3.5) of Figure 6.3 allows the engineer to refine 
UD (see diagram B of Figure 6.2), where the users are tied to their RBAC roles and 
LBAC clearance levels. From Step (3.5), the engineer can either proceed to Step (4) or 
loop back to (3.1) in order to continue to iterate and create the design.  
Once this step is complete, the engineer can then generate enforcement security 
policies (Step 4) by the mapping process presented in Chapter 5.  After the process of 
defining roles, permissions, classification (sensitivity) levels for elements, authorizations 
and delegations is complete; an opportunity to further refine the security design follows 
looping back from (3.5) to (3.1) in Figure 6.3. Once the security design is properly 
refined, a direct mapping of the UML diagrams to enforcement policies in XACML is 
done in the major Step (5) in Figure 6.3, following the process presented in Chapter 5 
with the mapping statements for RBAC, LBAC and DAC delegations and authorizations. 
This fifth step marks the final part of the secure information engineering process, yielding 
an information secure system via the product of enforcement policies. 
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6.3 Prototype Mobile PHA Application with Enforcement 
Over the past few years, we have been developing two Personal Health Assistant 
(PHA) (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013) mobile application (for Android (Burnette, 
2009) and iOS (Goadrich & Rogers, 2011)) for medication management and 
reconciliation that allows: a PHA-Patient app that allows patients to view and update 
their personal health record stored in their Microsoft HealthVault (MSHV) (Microsoft 
HealthVault.2014) account and authorize medical providers to access certain portion of 
PHI; and, a PHA-Provider app where providers are able obtain the permitted information 
from their respective patients that they have been authorized to view.  PHA-Patient 
(upper screenshots of Figure 6.4) allows users to perform a set of actions regarding their 
health information. A user can view and edit their medication list, allergies, observations 
of daily living (ODLs/Wellness Diary) and set security policies for read/write permissions 
on their tied providers by role. Security settings can be set at a fine granular level, and 
each provider gets view/update authorizations to the different information components 
available in PHA. Using this information, The PHA-Provider (lower screenshots of 
Figure 6.4) allows the users (health professionals or medical providers) to view and edit 
the medical information of their patients as long as there are permitted to do so as 
dictated by the security settings created by the user (patient). By logging in with their 
personalized account, a list of patient tied to the provider is displayed. Upon selecting a 
patient, the information associated with that patient can be viewed and updated. 
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Figure 6.4: Main Screens of PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider Versions. 
 
In order to demonstrate the security framework presented in this dissertation in an 
actual working healthcare application, we leverage both PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider 
to supply an example that transitions the new UML diagrams as given in Chapter 4 and 
utilized in SIEP in a working prototype to demonstrate the process.  We focus on PHA-
Provider which is capable of enforcing general security via the software‘s design as well 
as enforcing XACML policies generated via the process of Chapter 5 and Step (5) of 
Figure 6.3. The provider version of PHA is the analog of the application commissioned 
by the Get Better Clinic of the scenario in Section 2.6.  
The remainder of this section is organized into six subsections that explain the way 
that the PHA architecture enforces security that leverages RBAC, LBAC and DAC in the 
form of an enforcement XACML policy. In Section 6.3.1, we discuss the general PHA 
architecture, describing the communication between the information system and mobile 
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application components. In Section 6.3.2, we describe how the general security, 
consisting of log in authentication and authorization, is handled between PHA-Provider 
and the RESTful services. In Section 6.3.3, we discuss the set of steps followed to 
enforce RBAC capabilities defined in the security policy that results from the SIEP of as 
presented in Section 6.3. In Section 6.3.4, we review the steps that are followed to 
properly enforce LBAC features, including read and write capabilities with different 
classifications and clearance levels. Lastly, in Section 6.3.5, we explore role delegation 
and the steps followed from the perspective of the HVMLS.  
6.3.1 The PHA Architecture 
The personal health record Microsoft HealthVault (MSHV) acts as the data source for 
PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider, and stores information in a proprietary format which to 
be exported via a .NET API which can then be used to generate a CCR compliant.  
MSHV, acts as the PHA‘s data source (top of Figure 6.5) where a user can save 
demographic and health information, including medications, allergies, procedures, 
conditions, etc. MSHV stores this information in a proprietary format that can be 
exported via as XML structures that can be turned into a Continuity of Care Record 
(CCR) (Kibbe et al., 2004) schema compliant XML instance. To recreate the typical 
XACML enforcing architecture, our MSHV Middle-Layer Server (center of Figure 6.4) 
acts as the contained solution of policy access, information, decision, and enforcement 
points. The extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) policies created and 
stored in the MSHV account of each respective user (acting as the policy retrieval point) 
limits access to MSHV to through the MSHV Middle-Layer Server, which handles the 
requests (where data is sent as JavaScript Object Notation, or JSON (Crockford, 2006)) 
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of PHA for both the patient and provider versions (middle and bottom of Figure 6.5). To 
store the relations (mappings) between the authorized list of providers and their 
respective patients (used in both PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider), our Middle-Layer 
Server uses MySQL (Kofler, 2001) with a RESTful (Masse, 2011) API done in PHP 
(Schlossnagle, 2004) with the Slim Framework (Lockhart, 2012). With this 
implementation, the server acts as a generic, common point of access for different 
applications by utilizing web services mapped to MSHV‘s API. 
JSON is utilized for the communication of PHA and the Middle-Layer Server (middle 
and bottom of Figure 6.5), allowing us to insure a uniform communication with any 
application (not only PHA) that can be created for users. The communication between the 
patient version and the HealthVault Middle-Layer Server (HVMLS) (middle and lower 
left of Figure 6.5) is done with unmodified JSON objects, while the communication 
between the provider version and the Middle-Layer Server (middle and lower right of 
Figure 6.5) is combination of unmodified (for the initial request of patients) and filtered 
(for the resulting data allowed by the policies enforced) JSON. Requests done by the 
PHA-Patient are translated to and from MSHV objects (upper left of Figure 6.5), since 
the patient is the owner of the data. Requests done by the PHA-Provider determine the 
format of the data to be utilized (upper right of Figure 6.5). If a provider is requesting 
information in the patient‘s CCR document, then data from MSHV is exported as a CCR 
schema compliant XML document with policy enforcement performed, whereas any 
input from the provider to MSHV is first received as a JSON payload, converted to an 
XML document based on the CCR schema, enforced with policies, and once authorized, 
translated to MSHV objects for write back. 
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Figure 6.5: Microsoft HealthVault – Middle-Layer – PHA General Architecture. 
 
6.3.2 General Security 
The general security of PHA-Provider consists of managing the users and their log in 
credentials. As a first layer of security, in order to utilize the capabilities of the 
application, users must log in with their credentials stored behind the HVMLS service 
(via the use of a MySQL database). In order to verify validity of a user‘s credentials, 
PHA-Provider sends a request to the HVMLS service (Figure 6.6) endpoint 
auth/provider/login. In this POST request, the payload sent to the server consists of the 
username and password. If login is successful, a message in JSON syntax 
[{“authentication”: ”SUCCESS”}] is sent to the user. If the login is invalid, a message in 
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JSON syntax [{“authentication”: ”FAILED”}] is sent and no access is granted. As an extra 
layer of general access to the application, a user can set a PIN code that consists of 4 
digits in order to expedite future login attempts once the credentials have been typed. 
This PIN code is stored in a salted hash (Salted password hashing - doing it right.2014) 
form in the device‘s internal storage via the implementation of application default 
properties, and is not stored in the back-end server. 
 
Figure 6.6: Sample of HVMLS RESTful Service Endpoints. 
 
Once a successful login in PHA-Provider has occurred, the user (a provider) is 
greeted by their information screen (upper right of Figure 6.7) with the option to see their 
authorized patients (lower right of Figure 6.7). In these screens, the user can change their 
details with respect to contact information and primary role, or see the list of patients they 
have with respect to a specific role. For example, the user Elisa could have 3 different 
patients under her role of Physician, but under a different role she could have none. 
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Figure 6.7: Main Screens of PHA-Provider. 
 
When the successful login has been completed, the user‘s default role is broadcasted 
by the server to the application. In this process, all of the relevant XACML (Godik et al., 
2002) policies generated via the process in Chapter 5, stored in the server, are fetched 
into memory to be utilized for enforcement per each request of PHA-Provider. In the 
example shown in Figure 6.8, with user Elisa under the role of Physician following the 
healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, the server fetches all the XACML policies that have a 
higher level target with a <Subject> subtree that consist of a <user> element with Elisa‘s 
details (user identifier and name). As an example, we revisit Figure 5.16 of Section 5.4 
and reintroduce it as Figure 6.8 below. In this generated policy, for user Elisa (line 5, 40 
and55 of Figure 6.8) and role Physician (line 13 and 44 of Figure 6.8) contains the RBAC 
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capabilities (lines 10-36 of Figure 6.8), LBAC features (lines 10-36 of Figure 6.8) and 
DAC delegations and authorizations (lines 37-66 of Figure 6.8). 
6.3.3 RBAC Security Capabilities 
In this section, we describe the way that the RBAC component of the XACML policy 
is enforced when handling reading and writing requests on XML instances whose schema 
has been secured. From Section 6.2, we assume that a patient has used PHA-Patient to 
authorize a provider with view and update capabilities on their data stored in MSHV. This 
authorization in PHA-Patient essentially supplies some of the user/role/permissions that 
are to be enforced against a particular provider as authorized by a patient.  Assuming that 
this has occurred, the focus is on the usage of PHA-Provider in order to detail the process 
and steps that are taken when a user of the PHA-Provider attempts to access data on an 
authorized patient, and to serve as an explanation of the way that the CCR XML is 
securely controlled in its access by a medical provider. The enforcement of security in 
reading and writing requests is handled by the HVMLS (center portion of Figure 6.5).  
The process of securing the CCR instance for operations that have an access mode of 
‗read‘ (read and aggregate, see Defn. 34 of Section 3.4) is shown as a set of 
interconnecting steps in the flowchart of Figure 6.9, and begins with a request from the 
PHA-Provider. When an initial request is made, the server retrieves the list of patients 
tied to the provider pertaining information. When a patient is selected, the server retrieves 
two XML documents: the complete CCR instance and the XACML policy that targets the 
schema with respect to that user and their current role. When these two XML documents 
are retrieved, the server enforces security on the CCR instance by filtering and removing 
elements from the instance as directed by the XACML policy generated from the user  
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Figure 6.8: XACML Enforcement Policy for User Elisa and Role Physician. 
65. <Policy PolicyId="ada-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">  
66. <Description>Omitted due to length.</Description> 
67. <Target> 
68. <Subjects> 
69. <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
70. </Subjects> 
71. <Resources><AnyResource/></Resources>  
72. <Actions><AnyAction/></Actions> 
73. </Target> 
74. <Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
75. <Target> 
76. <Subjects> 
77. <role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>  
78. </Subjects> 
79. <Resources><element> 
80. <elementID>el-3</elementID> 
81. <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName> 
82. </element></Resources>  
83. <Actions><operation> 
84. <operationName>insert</operationName> 
85. <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode> 
86. </operation></Actions> 
87. </Target> 
88. <Condition> 
89. <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal"> 
90. <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only"> 
91. <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
92. Secret 
93. </AttributeValue> 
94. </Apply> 
95. <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
96. Secret 
97. </AttributeValue> 
98. </Apply> 
99. </Condition>  
100. </Rule> 
101. <Rule RuleId="simple-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
102. <Target> 
103. <Subjects> 
104. <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
105. </Subjects> 
106. <Resources> 
107. <Roles><role> 
108. <roleID>2</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName> 
109. </role></Roles> 
110. </Resources>  
111. <DelegationTargets> 
112. <user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user> 
113. </DelegationTargets> 
114. </Target>  
115. </Rule> 
116. <Rule RuleId="simple-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
117. <Target> 
118. <Subjects> 
119. <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
120. </Subjects> 
121. <Resources><Schemas><schema> 
122. <schemaID>4</schemaID> 
123. <schemaName>Schema 4</schemaName> 
124. </schema></Schemas> 
125. <Instances><instance> 
126. <instanceID>4,2</instaneID> 
127. <instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName> 
128. </instance></Instances></Resources>  
129. </Target>  
130. </Rule> 
131. </Policy> 
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preferences. In terms of the XACML given in Figure 6.8, this would correspond to the 
read operation inside the <Rule> element. Since the PHA-Provider handles information 
in JSON format at the front-end, the last step of securing the CCR instance is converting 
the filtered XML into an equivalent JSON object (as shown in the JSON calls in the right 
side of Figure 6.9). This equivalent JSON object is then utilized by PHA-Provider to 
present the patient data to the provider who is able to view and update as necessary. 
The process of securing the CCR XML for operations that have a write access mode 
(insert, update and delete, see Defn. 34 of Section 3.4) is shown as a set of 
interconnecting steps in the flowchart of Figure 6.10, and begins with a request from 
PHA-Provider. When a provider wants to update a patient‘s record (e.g., medication), the 
request is sent to the HVMLS tied to the update data as a JSON object (see right side of 
Figure 6.10) that verifies the target on which the rules of the requester‘s XACML Policy 
act upon, and evaluates the requester‘s role against the policy in order to determine if the 
write is allowed. This was shown in Figure 6.8 with the insert <operation> in lines 19-22.  
If the user requesting an update operation has a role with a permission that allows it to 
occur, the CCR instance is updated with the sent data, and validated with the CCR 
schema before the write-back to MSHV. If validation against the schema is successful, 
then the write-back occurs, and the update performed by the provider is saved in the 
patient‘s MSHV record. If the requester has a role that is not allowed to perform writing 
operations on the desired element, HVMLS drops the request. While XPath and XQuery 
do not allow the process to update an XML instance, our approach as given in Figure 
6.10 provides a means for updating XML documents (e.g. CCR instances) that is 
controlled via an XACML security policy with the assistance of HVMLS. 
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Figure 6.9: Enforcing Reading Permissions. 
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Figure 6.10: Enforcing Writing Permissions. 
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6.3.4 LBAC Security Features 
In this section, we explain the way that the LBAC component of the XACML policy 
is enforced when handling reading and writing requests such as those in Section 6.2.2. 
Following the same assumptions of Section 6.2, we assume that the engineer has set 
classification levels to the different segments of the health record and a clearance level to 
the user. In the case of Elisa, her clearance level is Secret as defined by the segment in 
lines 34-25 of Figure 6.8. The process of securing the CCR instance with LBAC features 
for operations across the two access modes (read and write, see Defn. 34 of Section 3.4) 
is shown as a set of connecting steps in Figure 6.11. When the initial request is made on 
behalf of PHA-Provider, the server responds by evaluating the target, policy rules, and 
LBAC features used by the security architecture by using the requested element‘s 
classification and the user‘s clearance. If the user‘s clearance equals or exceeds what is 
required (e.g., simple-security, simple-integrity, etc. as discussed in Section 3.4), the 
server continues to read the XML instance‘s segment and generate output (responding the 
request with a success as shown in the right-most path of Figure 6.11) or validates the 
updated CCR with the schema in a similar fashion as the RBAC write from Section 6.3.3. 
If the validation is successful, in the case of operations with a write access mode, then the 
data is saved in HealthVault and a response of success is provided to the application. If 
the validation is not successful, then the attempt was not legal and the request is dropped 
without any changes done to the saved data in HealthVault. 
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Figure 6.11: Enforcing LBAC Features for Operations with Read/Write Access Modes. 
6.3.5 DAC Delegations 
Enforcing security for delegation follows the steps in Figure 6.12. When the request 
to delegate a role is performed, the server verifies the user initiating the request (which 
can be an original user or a delegable user) and the receiving user against the user objects 
and their properties in the MySQL database. If the initiating user is an original user (see 
Defn. 36 of Section 3.5) and the receiving user is a delegable user (see Defn. 37 of 
Section 3.5), the update is recorded in the database and the role is deactivated for the 
original user. If the initiating user is a delegable user, then the server verifies whether 
there is a pass-on delegation authority for that role (see Defn. 38 of Section 3.5). If there 
is no pass-on delegation, the request is dropped and a response of invalid is sent to the 
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application. If there is pass-on delegation, then the process follows the same order as if 
the initiating user is an original user. 
Initial Request: 
Information Update
Evaluate the Initiating User and the 
Receiving User
Is the Initiating User 
an Original user?
Is the receiving user a 
delegable user allowed to 
perform the sent role?
Drop Request:
Invalid
Delegate Role and
Respond Request:
Success
NO
YES
NO
Is the Initiating User a 
Delegable User
Is there Pass-On 
Delegation?
NO
NO
YES
 
Figure 6.12: Enforcing Security in Role Delegation. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
The work presented in this dissertation is summarized as a security framework for 
tree-structured documents that leverages RBAC (Ferraiolo et al., 2001), LBAC (Sandhu, 
1993) and DAC (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). The main objectives have been four-fold: 
create an underlying security model that abstracts away from specific document formats 
(e.g. XML (Bray et al., 1998), JSON (Crockford, 2006), etc.) and considers their most 
basic form as tree-structured containers while supporting RBAC, LBAC and DAC 
capabilities as an integrated solution; representing the underlying security model with 
extensions to the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Fowler, 2004) model and 
metamodel layers by leveraging previous work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and 
(Berhe et al., 2010) that focused on functional and collaborative security, resulting in 
seven new diagrams that graphically represent the document‘s schema, the role slices, 
users, delegation and authorization properties; the introduction of an enforcement policy 
generation process that leverages those new seven UML extensions to create instances of 
policies ready to be deployed, exploiting XACML (Godik et al., 2002) as the language of 
choice; and, a secure information engineering process that utilizes all the previously 
discussed objectives to introduce a development cycle that focuses on information 
security, a process that could be integrated into those presented by (Pavlich-Mariscal et 
al., 2010) and (Berhe et al., 2010). The driving motivation for these four objectives has 
been illustrated with the healthcare domain by presenting a realistic scenario where a 
need for granular information security is necessary when multiple users, roles, clearances 
and information are present.  
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The remainder of this conclusion is organized as follows. Section 7.1 summarizes the 
dissertation, discussing the four main objectives mentioned above in further detail. Using 
this as a basis, Section 7.2 discusses the research contributions of this dissertation, 
primarily in the areas of information security and access control models, UML extensions 
for information security, policy generation processes, and secure information engineering. 
Then, on Section 7.3, we detail the ongoing and future research directions that include, 
but are not limited to, support for non-orthogonal RBAC and LBAC security 
requirements, other access control models (e.g. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
(Yuan & Tong, 2005)), and compartments for a greater level of security by isolating 
information with respect to roles and users. 
7.1 Summary of the Dissertation 
The work presented in this dissertation tackles the areas of motivation and need for 
information security for those applications that require granular security assurance in 
personal and/or protected information; security and access control models such as RBAC, 
LBAC and DAC that are required to not only provide a basic level of security, but also 
interact with each other as an integrated solution to provide a more robust security 
mechanism; enforcement policy generation that is automatic and formal; and, a secure 
information engineering process that combines all the previous aspects into a formal 
development cycle process for security administrators and software developers to utilize. 
In support of these research areas, the discussion was organized throughout six chapters. 
Information modeling is focused on representing, using, and exchanging information 
in large-scale applications that include healthcare collaborative and non-collaborative 
scenarios that use the Health Level 7‘s clinical document architecture (Alschuler et al., 
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2002) or the continuity of care record (Kibbe et al., 2004). Chapter 1 presented the 
motivation and need for information security from a broad domain perspective. In 
Chapter 1 we discussed how these information systems may support a wide range of data 
formats such as XML, JSON, RDF and OWL. These information applications data often 
have a tree structure of index and entity nodes that allows for information to be modeled 
via schemas (that define structure) which can be used as blueprints for the creation of 
new documents (instances) and their validation (enforcement). In such settings, where 
sensitive data is utilized by users for time-critical applications, security that is achieved 
via access control is a paramount concern. These applications all present unique 
challenges to the objective of providing a high-degree of protection to information. The 
overarching need is the ability to provide granular access control in support of 
information modeling for structured documents is based on security policies defined in an 
local manner (e.g., institutions) and guidance defined and enforced at a more global scope 
(e.g., legal entities and active pieces of legislation), has proven to be difficult to achieve. 
Chapter 2 reviewed background concepts utilized throughout this dissertation in a 
wide range of areas to support the detailed material in the remaining chapters. First, 
Section 2.1 briefly reviews XML and its usage in the two dominant healthcare standards: 
HL7 CDA and CCR. Next, Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present the various access control 
models that are utilized in support of the work in this dissertation, respectively: RBAC to 
support roles, LBAC to support classification and clearance levels, and DAC to allow 
both authority and privileges to be passed from one user to another. Then, Section 2.5 
presented a set of assumptions for the healthcare domain, more specifically, detailing the 
way that health information technology (HIT) systems leverage private and protected 
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information in interacting with patients for care and treatment. Section 2.6 presented a 
scenario of information usage in the healthcare domain using the two dominant standards 
(HL7 CDA and CCR) with an emphasis on the way to secure the information across 
differing degrees of granularity and requirements. Using this as a basis, Section 2.7 
introduced the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Fowler, 2004) and its metamodeling 
capabilities that are going to be utilized throughout this dissertation to define the new 
UML diagrams to support the modeling of XML and LBAC/RBAC/DAC. Lastly, Section 
2.8 introduced XACML, a language utilized to create formal and enforceable security 
policies for XML documents. 
The objective of Chapter 3 was to propose a security model for tree-structured 
documents that includes the ability to define RBAC, LBAC and DAC for information 
systems. The model presented in Chapter 3 defines the underlying concepts and 
capabilities that served as a foundation for the definition of new UML diagrams to model 
RBAC, LBAC, and DAC for tree-structured documents, with the intent to achieve fine-
grained information security via access control as part of the overall software engineering 
process for information systems. The inclusion of security as part of an information 
system‘s design facilitates the modeling of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC at a schema-level 
that is then realizable against its instances. The key intent of our approach is for a 
schema-level security solution that defines and enforces fine-grained control of an 
information system‘s instances for: non-destructive (document-level) operations that 
utilize instances as a source of information (e.g., read and aggregate); destructive 
(document-level) operations that modify instance(s) to reflect a change (e.g., insert, 
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update, delete); and, other types of operations (policy-level) that act in the instance as a 
whole and not in the intrinsic data found within. 
Building from the model of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presented the second major 
component of our security framework for tree-structured documents involves the 
realization of the security model as a series of new UML diagrams that capture the 
characteristics of the security model and allow us to augment the software engineering 
process of UML with an information engineering process for tree-structure documents. 
Recall from Section 2.7 that UML provides a large variety of diagrams for the 
visualization of different software requirements: class, component, deployment, activity, 
use-case, state-machine, communication, sequence, etc. UML provide the benefit of 
reducing misinterpretation and promoting simple communication of domain requirements 
with its visual notation (Lange & Chaudron, 2005). However, while UML can be utilized 
to define security requirements, what is lacking in UML is actual diagrams that are 
dedicated to, in our interest, access control models (RBAC, LBAC, and DAC) that allow 
the definition of security requirements using new security UML diagrams that seamlessly 
integrate with the UML model and unified design process. This is particularly true for 
domains such as healthcare where the information to be utilized is private and often 
governed by legal constructs that assure its proper use and dissemination, as we have 
described in Section 2.6 and illustrated with a detailed example for our security model of 
Chapter 3. 
With the introduction of the UML extensions of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presented the 
third component of our framework that supports the automatic generation of a security 
enforcement policy when given a security design for a set of schemas as captured in our 
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new UML diagrams. UML has a long history for the automatic generation of code 
(REFS) in varied languages; our usage of our new UML diagrams to generate a security 
policy is consistent with this usage. In this chapter, we present a process for the 
generation of enforcement policies that transitions a UML design containing a Document 
Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), a Secure Information Diagram (SID), a Document Role 
Slice Diagram (DRSD), lattice-based access control SID (LSID), a User Diagram (UD), a 
Delegation Diagram (DD), and an Authorization Diagram (AD); see respectively 
Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.7. To support the automatic generation of a security enforcement 
policy, we define a set of mapping statements (MSs) that are utilized to define the 
conditions under which the combination of the various diagrams (DSCD, SID, DRSD, 
LSID, UD, DD, and AD) can be utilized to support the creation of respective policies for 
RBAC, LBAC, DAC, and authorization. A mapping rule (MR) is defined to take the 
security model concepts and capabilities to Chapter 3 that both underlie correspond to 
different portions of the new the UML diagrams of Chapter 4 and use this combination to 
yield a portion of the security policy. 
Then, in Chapter 6, we discussed the software engineering process that leverages the 
security model presented in Chapter 3, the UML diagram and metamodel extensions 
presented in Chapter 4, and the policy mapping process presented in Chapter 5. Over the 
past five years, major focus has been on extending UML with new diagrams that supports 
secure software engineering for RBAC, MAC, and DAC (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2014). 
First, from a functional perspective that focuses on object-oriented design, a framework 
of composable security features was defined (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) that preserves 
separation of security concerns from models to code through the extension of UML with 
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new diagrams for RBAC, DAC, and MAC with the automatic generation of enforcement 
code that allowed the security definitions to be separated (untangled) from the code. 
Second, from a collaboration perspective, a framework for secure, obligated, coordinated, 
and dynamic collaboration was developed (Berhe et al., 2010) that extended the NIST 
RBAC to allow for the definition and enforcement of security with new UML diagrams 
for collaborative RBAC applicable to situations such as medical care where physicians 
from different specialties need to collaborate with one another to treat a patient in an 
effective and timely manner. The last perspective is the work presented in this 
dissertation, which has focused on the definition of a modeling and design framework 
with enforcement process for information-based applications. To place the work of this 
dissertation into an appropriate context with our prior wok, this chapter has two 
objectives. First, this chapter reviews the overall integrated secure software engineering 
process that spans functional, collaboration, and information concerns. Second, using this 
as a basis, we then concentrate on the secure information engineering process that targets 
the information security concerns for an application that are the basis of our work in this 
dissertation as presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
7.2 Research Contributions 
As outlined previously, our research contributions are primarily in the areas of 
security and access control models that support RBAC, LBAC and DAC; UML security 
extensions in the model and metamodel layers for information access control with 
RBAC, LBAC and DAC; the generation of enforcement policies from UML diagrams; 
and, the secure information engineering process. While the research contributions 
presented in this dissertation are unique and extend the research that is being conducted 
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in the major areas we tackle as discussed in the beginning of Section 7.1, we further 
describe each into detail to differentiate from the relevant research of other efforts in the 
same areas. 
E. Security Model and Access Control Integration: The contribution of this aspect 
of our work provides an underlying security model that leverages RBAC, LBAC 
and DAC with the purpose of securing tree-structure documents that could be 
XML, JSON, RDF, OWL, etc. The initial aspects of our work towards this 
objective tackled the integration from the UML model perspective (De la Rosa 
Algarín, A. & Demurjian, 2013). We note that a more formal alternative was to 
build a properly defined model in which integration was a key component. 
Towards that purpose, in Chapter 3 we presented the formal model that supports a 
wide array of capabilities (e.g. roles, clearances, classifications, authorizations, 
delegations, etc.) via the introduction of specialized operations such as the 
projection and decoration operations that act on a tree-structure and result in an 
altered version. As a special consideration of this model, we assert that RBAC and 
LBAC are orthogonal. That is, their capabilities do not affect each other. This 
allows for a security solution to support either or both at the same time. 
F. Seven UML Extensions for Tree-structured Document Security: The 
contribution of this aspect of our work is to represent a tree-structured schema as 
an UML-like diagram which is augmented with security features that capture the 
core aspects of the three main access control models: RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to this research contribution, describing the seven new 
UML diagrams for information security that are built from extensions to the UML 
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metamodel: the Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), which is used to 
represent the tree-structured schemas a  UML diagram; the Document Role Slice 
Diagram (DRSD), which is used to support RBAC capabilities; the Secure 
Information Diagram (SID), which is used to support a projection over elements; 
the LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID), which is used to support LBAC 
features; the User Diagram (UD), which is used to describe the users and their 
attributes in an information system; the Delegation Diagram (DD), which is used 
to describe the delegation capabilities from users; and, the Authorization Diagram 
(AD), which is used to describe the authorizations to a user/role combination. The 
introduction of these UML diagrams provides the benefit to generate enforcement 
code that is formalized by the underlying security model. 
G. Security Policy Generation: The contribution in this aspect of our work 
leverages the UML diagrams presented in Chapter 4, which were built from the 
underlying security model of Chapter 3, and provides a process for automatic 
generation of enforcement policies leveraging the XACML specification. This is 
achieved via mapping statements from the new UML security diagrams for 
RBAC, LBAC and DAC, and the XACML Policy structure, which can be used as 
part of an enforcement mechanism to assure security. Towards this contribution, 
we have also introduced an automatic mapping algorithm that considers RBAC, 
LBAC and DAC security components and integrates them into a single 
enforcement policy for a required application. 
H. Secure Information Engineering: This contribution provides a secure 
information engineering process to systems information by focusing on the 
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perspective of the information to be secured. This secure information engineering 
process involves the global security model and policy integration by modeling the 
tree-structured schemas to be secured with the respective access control security 
models (Contribution A), the use of UML diagrams for information security 
(Contribution B), and the generation of enforcement policies (Contribution C), all 
utilized as part of a development cycle for information security that can be 
integrated with the work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and (Berhe et al., 
2010) to provide an overall process for functional, collaborative an information 
concerns (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2014). The end result of this contribution is a 
formal engineering process that a software designer or developer can follow in 
order to ensure security and information assurance in their respective application. 
We note that, as part of our research, a strong attempt to consider real world scenarios 
throughout the dissertation was made. More specifically, we introduced a healthcare 
driven scenario in Section 2.6, components of which were utilized to explain concepts of 
the major contributions (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). The enforcement prototype of Section 
6.2 has been the result of years of development that tie directly to the healthcare domain 
example, and the enforcement cases presented tie with the scenario of Section 2.6. This 
important final step demonstrates the practical application of our research. 
7.3 Ongoing and Future Research 
While we note that the research contributions of our work presented herein are 
unique, we realize that there are interesting research areas that serve as our ongoing work 
and future research directions. These future research directions consider alternations to 
some of our assumptions of the security model (non-orthogonal RBAC and LBAC); 
212 
 
support for other access control models (e.g. ABAC); support for concepts such as 
compartments; and others. We have identified the following research direction as of 
potential interest.  
Non-Orthogonal RBAC and LBAC: The security model of Chapter 3 (contribution 
A) supports RBAC, LBAC and DAC capabilities in certain unison. The model asserts 
that RBAC and LBAC capabilities are orthogonal. What this means is that clearance 
levels from LBAC are assigned to the user and not the role (which is also assigned to the 
user). This avoid certain complexities when enforcing security as LBAC is considered to 
be the most constrained of the access control models. An interesting area of future work 
is to understand how the security model would change if RBAC and LBAC were non-
orthogonal. That is, the clearance level for a user could also be assigned to the role. In 
those cases we ask ourselves, which clearance would take precedence? Would the 
decision depend on the context of the requests which are secured? Taking a page from the 
healthcare domain book: how would the delegation of roles in an emergent care situation 
result when the delegable user might not have enough permission? These questions paint 
an interesting picture in terms of complexity, something worthy of pursuing. Because of 
this, we consider this to be an important future area of research. 
Support for other access control models: The security model of Chapter 3 
(contribution A) and the UML extensions of Chapter 4 (contribution B) support RBAC, 
LBAC and DAC. These access control models are considered to be the major security 
models, being extensively utilized in cross-domain applications. That said, there are other 
models that become more and more useful as the shape of information changes. One 
example is the attribute-based access control (ABAC) model. Support of models such as 
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these will undoubtedly affect the way RBAC and LBAC are enforced (recall that DAC 
lives at the policy level, not the document level), and the overall integration might result 
in something different to what we have presented here. We ask ourselves: which access 
control model would take the primary spot of enforcement? How different would it be to 
support ABAC if RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal? How about when they are non-
orthogonal? We hypothesize that ABAC will affect LBAC more than RBAC, but that is a 
hypothesis that requires research to be proved. Therefore, we conclude that this is another 
important area of research. 
Support of information compartments: As a small future area of research, we wish 
to support the definition of compartments for information. Compartmentalization is 
extensively used in the defense community as a means to protect data by the method of 
isolation (no one knows the complete secret). Towards this purpose, should compartments 
be defined and assigned to roles or users? Should they be assigned to the user/role 
combination? How would clearance levels and classification of elements in the 
compartment interplay? 
Collaboration workflows in information security: The work presented in this 
dissertation finds as inspiration the work presented by (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and 
(Berhe et al., 2010). One area of research we seek to pursue is the collaboration 
workflows and obligations presented by (Berhe et al., 2010) when applied to information 
security. Unlike software security, which focuses on methods, information security can be 
very granular or very coarse. The potential of collaboration across a document opens the 
idea of granular and coarse collaboration, as well as those other topics tackled by (Berhe 
et al., 2010) in his research. 
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Automatic creation of DSCD: Chapter 4 presented the UML diagrams for 
information security. One of those diagrams, the Document Schema Class Diagram 
(DSCD), was built as part of a UML profile that created a relation between tree-structures 
and UML components. We want to explore if that process can be automated to the point 
where there are no errors. At the same time, we want to explore if a metamodel 
extensions to convert tree-structures into UML is more scalable. Potential schemas can 
have thousands of nodes, and automatic conversion to UML might not scale when using a 
simple profile approach. 
Generating enforcement policies in different languages: Another area of interest 
relates to the generation of enforcement policies. Chapter 5 presented an approach to 
create an XACML instance policy from the UML diagrams, but we seek to explore the 
possibilities to generate SQL code, aspect oriented code (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) 
for information security from the diagrams presented in Chapter 5. As technology 
advances and standards are dropped in favor of others, we cannot assume that XACML 
will be the one option for the future. Another aspect with regards to generating 
enforcement policies is the performance and efficiency of the algorithm. We assert that 
there must exist other methodologies to generate a policy, other algorithms that are more 
efficient. Our ongoing work includes the development of these more efficient algorithms. 
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Appendix A 
 
- Carol Smith’s Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture (HL7 CDA) Instance 
1. <?xml version="1.0"?> 
2. <!-- To use the impl_cdar2.xls stylesheet, remove the comment delimiters from the 
stylesheet call below. --> 
3. <!-- ?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="IMPL_CDAR2.xsl"? --> 
4. <ClinicalDocument xmlns="urn:hl7-org:v3" xmlns:mif="urn:hl7-org:v3/mif"  
5. xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
6. xsi:schemaLocation="urn:hl7-org:v3 CDA.xsd"> 
7. <typeId root="2.16.840.1.113883.1.3" extension="POCD_HD000040"/> 
8. <id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.4" extension="c266"/>  
9. <code code="11488-4" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.1" codeSystemName="LOINC" 
displayName="Consultation note"/> 
10. <effectiveTime value="20051014224411-0500"/> 
11. <confidentialityCode code="N" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.25"/> 
12. <recordTarget> 
13. <patientRole> 
14. <id extension="12345" root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/> 
15. <patient> 
16. <name> 
17. <given>Carol</given> 
18. <family>Smith</family> 
19. <suffix></suffix> 
20. </name> 
21. <administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/> 
22. <birthTime value="19320924"/> 
23. </patient> 
24. <providerOrganization> 
25. <id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/> 
26. </providerOrganization> 
27. </patientRole> 
28. </recordTarget> 
29. <author> 
30. <time value="2000040714"/> 
31. <assignedAuthor> 
32. <id extension="KP00017" root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/> 
33. <assignedPerson> 
34. <name> 
35. <given>Brock</given> 
36. <family>Ketchum</family> 
37. <suffix>MD</suffix> 
38. </name> 
39. </assignedPerson> 
40. <representedOrganization> 
41. <id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/> 
42. </representedOrganization> 
43. </assignedAuthor> 
44. </author> 
45. <custodian> 
46. <assignedCustodian> 
47. <representedCustodianOrganization> 
48. <id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/> 
49. </representedCustodianOrganization> 
50. </assignedCustodian> 
51. </custodian> 
52. <documentationOf> 
53. <serviceEvent classCode="PCPR"> 
54. <code code="xxx" codeSystem="xxx" codeSystemName="xxx" displayName="xxx"/> 
55. <effectiveTime> 
56. <low value="19600127"/> 
57. <high value="20050329"/> 
58. </effectiveTime> 
59. <performer typeCode="PRF"> 
60. <functionCode code="PCP" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.88"/> 
61. <time>         
62. <low value="1998"/> 
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63. <high value="2005"/> 
64. </time> 
65. <assignedEntity> 
66. <id extension="1" root="1.3.6.4.1.4.1.2835.1"/> 
67. <code code="59058001" 
68. codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.96" 
69. codeSystemName="SNOMED CT" 
70. displayName="General Physician"/> 
71. <addr> 
72. <streetAddressLine>1 Fake Road</streetAddressLine> 
73. <city>Fake City</city> 
74. <state>KK</state> 
75. <postalCode>123456</postalCode> 
76. <country>USA</country> 
77. </addr> 
78. <telecom value="tel:(999)555-1212" use="WP"/> 
79. <assignedPerson> 
80. <name> 
81. <prefix>Dr.</prefix> 
82. <given>Elisa</given> 
83. <family>Mathison</family> 
84. <suffix></suffix> 
85. </name> 
86. </assignedPerson> 
87. </assignedEntity> 
88. </performer> 
89. </serviceEvent> 
90. </documentationOf> 
91. <component> 
92. <structuredBody> 
93. <component> 
94. <section> 
95. <code code="10164-2" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.1" 
96. codeSystemName="LOINC"/> 
97. <title>History of Present Illness</title> 
98. <text> 
99. <content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content> 
100. is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management. 
101. Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content> 
102. <content revised="insert">teens</content>. 
103. She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year. 
104. She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several 
105. months.  
106. </text> 
107. </section> 
108. </component> 
109. </structuredBody> 
110. </component> 
111. </ClinicalDocument> 
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- Carol Smith’s Continuity of Care Record (CCR) Instance 
1. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2. <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="stylesheet/ccr.xsl"?> 
3. <ContinuityOfCareRecord xmlns="urn:astm-org:CCR"> 
4. <CCRDocumentObjectID>Ab13c1971-221a-9724-5d09-9981709c4204</CCRDocumentObjectID> 
5. <Language> 
6. <Text>English</Text> 
7. </Language> 
8. <Version>V1.0</Version> 
9. <DateTime> 
10. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
11. </DateTime> 
12. <Patient> 
13. <ActorID>A1234</ActorID> 
14. </Patient> 
15. <From> 
16. <ActorLink> 
17. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
18. <ActorRole> 
19. <Text>author</Text> 
20. </ActorRole> 
21. </ActorLink> 
22. </From> 
23. <To> 
24. <ActorLink> 
25. <ActorID>A1234</ActorID> 
26. <ActorRole> 
27. <Text>patient</Text> 
28. </ActorRole> 
29. </ActorLink> 
30. </To> 
31. <Purpose> 
32. <Description> 
33. <Text>Summary of patient information</Text> 
34. </Description> 
35. </Purpose> 
36. <Body> 
37. <Problems> 
38. <Problem> 
39. <CCRDataObjectID>PROB1</CCRDataObjectID> 
40. <DateTime> 
41. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
42. </DateTime> 
43. <IDs> 
44. <ID></ID> 
45. <Source> 
46. <Actor> 
47. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
48. </Actor> 
49. </Source> 
50. </IDs> 
51. <Type> 
52. <Text>Problem</Text> 
53. </Type> 
54. <Description> 
55. <Text></Text> 
56. <Code> 
57. <Value></Value> 
58. <CodingSystem>ICD9-CM</CodingSystem> 
59. </Code> 
60. </Description> 
61. <Status> 
62. <Text>Active</Text> 
63. </Status> 
64. <Source> 
65. <Actor> 
66. <ActorID></ActorID> 
67. </Actor> 
68. </Source> 
69. <CommentID></CommentID> 
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70. <Episodes> 
71. <Number/> 
72. <Episode> 
73. <CCRDataObjectID>EP1</CCRDataObjectID> 
74. <Source> 
75. <Actor> 
76. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
77. </Actor> 
78. </Source> 
79. </Episode> 
80. <Source> 
81. <Actor> 
82. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
83. </Actor> 
84. </Source> 
85. </Episodes> 
86. <HealthStatus> 
87. <DateTime> 
88. <ExactDateTime/> 
89. </DateTime> 
90. <Description> 
91. <Text></Text> 
92. </Description> 
93. <Source> 
94. <Actor> 
95. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
96. </Actor> 
97. </Source> 
98. </HealthStatus> 
99. </Problem> 
100. </Problems> 
101. <Alerts> 
102. <Alert> 
103. <CCRDataObjectID>A789bbc2b-e7ee-51d4-f153-05734e7bd44a</CCRDataObjectID> 
104. <DateTime> 
105. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
106. </DateTime> 
107. <IDs> 
108. <ID></ID> 
109. <Source> 
110. <Actor> 
111. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
112. </Actor> 
113. </Source> 
114. </IDs> 
115. <Type> 
116. <Text>-</Text> 
117. </Type> 
118. <Description> 
119. <Text></Text> 
120. <Code> 
121. <Value></Value> 
122. </Code> 
123. </Description> 
124. <Source> 
125. <Actor> 
126. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
127. </Actor> 
128. </Source> 
129. <Agent> 
130. <EnvironmentalAgents> 
131. <EnvironmentalAgent> 
132. <CCRDataObjectID>Afed996aa-e012-02f4-8dee-d24177756afa</CCRDataObjectID> 
133. <DateTime> 
134. <ExactDateTime></ExactDateTime> 
135. </DateTime> 
136. <Description> 
137. <Text></Text> 
138. <Code> 
139. <Value/> 
140. </Code> 
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141. </Description> 
142. <Status> 
143. <Text></Text> 
144. </Status> 
145. <Source> 
146. <Actor> 
147. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
148. </Actor> 
149. </Source> 
150. </EnvironmentalAgent> 
151. </EnvironmentalAgents> 
152. </Agent> 
153. <Reaction> 
154. <Description> 
155. <Text></Text> 
156. </Description> 
157. <Status> 
158. <Text>None</Text> 
159. </Status> 
160. </Reaction> 
161. </Alert> 
162. </Alerts> 
163. <Medications> 
164. <Medication> 
165. <CCRDataObjectID>Af9ec1fa4-73ea-3c94-e96a-96c76398222d</CCRDataObjectID> 
166. <DateTime> 
167. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
168. </DateTime> 
169. <Type> 
170. <Text>Medication</Text> 
171. </Type> 
172. <Status> 
173. <Text></Text> 
174. </Status> 
175. <Source> 
176. <Actor> 
177. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
178. </Actor> 
179. </Source> 
180. <Product> 
181. <ProductName> 
182. <Text></Text> 
183. <Code> 
184. <Value></Value> 
185. <CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem> 
186. </Code> 
187. </ProductName> 
188. <Strength> 
189. <Value></Value> 
190. <Units> 
191. <Unit></Unit> 
192. </Units> 
193. </Strength> 
194. <Form> 
195. <Text></Text> 
196. </Form> 
197. </Product> 
198. <Quantity> 
199. <Value></Value> 
200. <Units> 
201. <Unit></Unit> 
202. </Units> 
203. </Quantity> 
204. <Directions> 
205. <Direction> 
206. <Description> 
207. <Text></Text> 
208. </Description> 
209. <Route> 
210. <Text>Tablet</Text> 
211. </Route> 
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212. <Site> 
213. <Text>Oral</Text> 
214. </Site> 
215. </Direction> 
216. </Directions> 
217. <PatientInstructions> 
218. <Instruction> 
219. <Text></Text> 
220. </Instruction> 
221. </PatientInstructions> 
222. <Refills> 
223. <Refill> 
224. <Number></Number> 
225. </Refill> 
226. </Refills> 
227. </Medication> 
228. </Medications> 
229. <Immunizations> 
230. <Immunization> 
231. <CCRDataObjectID>Afde47991-11b3-f054-35e4-b0d0ffbeb5a3</CCRDataObjectID> 
232. <DateTime> 
233. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
234. </DateTime> 
235. <Type> 
236. <Text>Immunization</Text> 
237. </Type> 
238. <Status> 
239. <Text>ACTIVE</Text> 
240. </Status> 
241. <Source> 
242. <Actor> 
243. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID> 
244. </Actor> 
245. </Source> 
246. <Product> 
247. <ProductName> 
248. <Text></Text> 
249. </ProductName> 
250. </Product> 
251. <Directions> 
252. <Direction> 
253. <Description> 
254. <Text></Text> 
255. <Code> 
256. <Value>None</Value> 
257. </Code> 
258. </Description> 
259. </Direction> 
260. </Directions> 
261. </Immunization> 
262. </Immunizations> 
263. <Results> 
264. <Result> 
265. <CCRDataObjectID>A75d67a94-9ffa-86c4-1979-b57ce822803b</CCRDataObjectID> 
266. <DateTime> 
267. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
268. </DateTime> 
269. <IDs> 
270. <ID/> 
271. <Source> 
272. <Actor> 
273. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
274. </Actor> 
275. </Source> 
276. </IDs> 
277. <Source> 
278. <Actor> 
279. <ActorID></ActorID> 
280. </Actor> 
281. </Source> 
282. <Test> 
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283. <CCRDataObjectID>A135053dc-a2a1-7124-f510-0a4b6e5ef90a</CCRDataObjectID> 
284. <DateTime> 
285. <ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime> 
286. </DateTime> 
287. <Type> 
288. <Text>Observation</Text> 
289. </Type> 
290. <Description> 
291. <Text></Text> 
292. <Code> 
293. <Value>Value</Value> 
294. </Code> 
295. </Description> 
296. <Source> 
297. <Actor> 
298. <ActorID></ActorID> 
299. </Actor> 
300. </Source> 
301. <TestResult> 
302. <Value></Value> 
303. <Code> 
304. <Value>Value</Value> 
305. </Code> 
306. <Description> 
307. <Text></Text> 
308. </Description> 
309. </TestResult> 
310. <NormalResult> 
311. <Normal> 
312. <Value></Value> 
313. <Units> 
314. <Unit>Test Unit</Unit> 
315. </Units> 
316. <Source> 
317. <Actor> 
318. <ActorID></ActorID> 
319. </Actor> 
320. </Source> 
321. </Normal> 
322. </NormalResult> 
323. <Flag> 
324. <Text></Text> 
325. </Flag> 
326. </Test> 
327. </Result> 
328. </Results> 
329. </Body> 
330. <Actors> 
331. <Actor> 
332. <ActorObjectID>A1234</ActorObjectID> 
333. <Person> 
334. <Name> 
335. <CurrentName> 
336. <Given>CAROL</Given> 
337. <Family>SMITH</Family> 
338. <Suffix/> 
339. </CurrentName> 
340. </Name> 
341. <DateOfBirth> 
342. <ExactDateTime>1983-04-13T00:00:00Z</ExactDateTime> 
343. </DateOfBirth> 
344. <Gender> 
345. <Text>Female</Text> 
346. <Code> 
347. <Value/> 
348. </Code> 
349. </Gender> 
350. </Person> 
351. <IDs> 
352. <Type> 
353. <Text>Patient ID</Text> 
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354. </Type> 
355. <ID>16</ID> 
356. <Source> 
357. <Actor> 
358. <ActorID>A6e0d85e5-b441-22d4-4971-7a05aeb2df8b</ActorID> 
359. </Actor> 
360. </Source> 
361. </IDs> 
362. <Address> 
363. <Type> 
364. <Text>H</Text> 
365. </Type> 
366. <Line1>3814 FirstAve.</Line1> 
367. <City>Madison</City> 
368. <State>ND</State> 
369. <PostalCode>39816</PostalCode> 
370. </Address> 
371. <Telephone> 
372. <Value>(77) 382-5756</Value> 
373. </Telephone> 
374. <Source> 
375. <Actor> 
376. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
377. </Actor> 
378. </Source> 
379. </Actor> 
380. <Actor> 
381. <ActorObjectID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorObjectID> 
382. <InformationSystem> 
383. <Name>Clinic A</Name> 
384. <Type>Facility</Type> 
385. </InformationSystem> 
386. <IDs> 
387. <Type> 
388. <Text></Text> 
389. </Type> 
390. <ID></ID> 
391. <Source> 
392. <Actor> 
393. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
394. </Actor> 
395. </Source> 
396. </IDs> 
397. <Address> 
398. <Type> 
399. <Text>WP</Text> 
400. </Type> 
401. <Line1></Line1> 
402. <City>Farmington</City> 
403. <State>CT </State> 
404. <PostalCode>06030</PostalCode> 
405. </Address> 
406. <Telephone> 
407. <Value>860-679-2000</Value> 
408. </Telephone> 
409. <Source> 
410. <Actor> 
411. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
412. </Actor> 
413. </Source> 
414. </Actor> 
415. <Actor> 
416. <ActorObjectID>Aa04b1505-4651-d224-a1a2-d4d8ea6b4b23</ActorObjectID> 
417. <InformationSystem> 
418. <Name>OEMR</Name> 
419. <Type>OpenEMR</Type> 
420. <Version>4.x</Version> 
421. </InformationSystem> 
422. <IDs> 
423. <Type> 
424. <Text>Certification #</Text> 
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425. </Type> 
426. <ID>EHRX-OEMRXXXXXX-2011</ID> 
427. <Source> 
428. <Actor> 
429. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
430. </Actor> 
431. </Source> 
432. </IDs> 
433. <Address> 
434. <Type> 
435. <Text>WP</Text> 
436. </Type> 
437. <Line1>2365 Springs Rd. NE</Line1> 
438. <City>Hickory</City> 
439. <State>NC </State> 
440. <PostalCode>28601</PostalCode> 
441. </Address> 
442. <Telephone> 
443. <Value>000-000-0000</Value> 
444. </Telephone> 
445. <Source> 
446. <Actor> 
447. <ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID> 
448. </Actor> 
449. </Source> 
450. </Actor> 
451. </Actors> 
452. </ContinuityOfCareRecord> 
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Appendix B 
 
XACML Policy and Rule Combination Algorithms in Pseudo-code  
- Permit-Overrides: 
1. Decision permitOverridesCombiningAlgorithm(Decision[] decisions) 
2. { 
3.   Boolean atLeastOneErrorD  = false; 
4.   Boolean atLeastOneErrorP  = false; 
5.   Boolean atLeastOneErrorDP  = false; 
6.   Boolean atLeastOneDeny = false; 
7.  
8.   for( i=0 ; i < lengthOf(decisions) ; i++ ) 
9.   { 
10.     Decision decision = decisions[i]; 
11.     if (decision == Deny 
12.     { 
13.       atLeastOneDeny = true; 
14.       continue; 
15.     } 
16.     if (decision == Permit) 
17.     { 
18.       return Permit; 
19.     } 
20.     if (decision == NotApplicable) 
21.     { 
22.       continue; 
23.     } 
24.     if (decision == Indeterminate{D}) 
25.     { 
26.       atLeastOneErrorD = true; 
27.       continue; 
28.     } 
29.     if (decision == Indeterminate{P}) 
30.     { 
31.       atLeastOneErrorP = true; 
32.       continue; 
33.     } 
34.     if (decision == Indeterminate{DP}) 
35.     { 
36.       atLeastOneErrorDP = true; 
37.       continue; 
38.     } 
39.     if (atLeastOneErrorDP) 
40.     { 
41.       return Indeterminate{DP}; 
42.     } 
43.     if (atLeastOneErrorP && (atLeastOneErrorD || atLeastOneDeny)) 
44.     { 
45.       return Indeterminate{DP}; 
46.     } 
47.     if (atLeastOneErrorP) 
48.     { 
49.       return Indeterminate{P}; 
50.     } 
51.     if (atLeastOneDeny) 
52.     { 
53.       return Deny; 
54.     } 
55.     if (atLeastOneErrorD) 
56.     { 
57.       return Indeterminate{D}; 
58.     } 
59.   } 
60.   return NotApplicable; 
61. } 
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- Deny-Overrides: 
1. Decision denyOverridesCombiningAlgorithm(Decision[] decisions) 
2. { 
3.   Boolean atLeastOneErrorD  = false; 
4.   Boolean atLeastOneErrorP  = false; 
5.   Boolean atLeastOneErrorDP  = false; 
6.   Boolean atLeastOnePermit = false; 
7.    
8.   for( i=0 ; i < lengthOf(decisions) ; i++ ) 
9.   { 
10.     Decision decision = decisions[i]; 
11.     if (decision == Deny) 
12.     { 
13.       return Deny; 
14.     } 
15.     if (decision == Permit) 
16.     { 
17.       atLeastOnePermit = true; 
18.       continue; 
19.     } 
20.     if (decision == NotApplicable) 
21.     { 
22.       continue; 
23.     } 
24.     if (decision == Indeterminate{D}) 
25.     { 
26.       atLeastOneErrorD = true; 
27.       continue; 
28.     } 
29.     if (decision == Indeterminate{P}) 
30.     { 
31.       atLeastOneErrorP = true; 
32.       continue; 
33.     } 
34.     if (decision == Indeterminate{DP}) 
35.     { 
36.       atLeastOneErrorDP = true; 
37.       continue; 
38.     } 
39.     if (atLeastOneErrorDP) 
40.     { 
41.       return Indeterminate{DP}; 
42.     } 
43.     if (atLeastOneErrorD && (atLeastOneErrorP || atLeastOnePermit)) 
44.     { 
45.       return Indeterminate{DP}; 
46.     } 
47.     if (atLeastOneErrorD) 
48.     { 
49.       return Indeterminate{D}; 
50.     } 
51.     if (atLeastOnePermit) 
52.     { 
53.       return Permit; 
54.     } 
55.     if (atLeastOneErrorP) 
56.     { 
57.       return Indeterminate{P}; 
58.     } 
59.   } 
60.   return NotApplicable; 
61. } 
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- First-applicable: 
1. Decision firstApplicableEffectCombiningAlgorithm(RuleOrPolicies[] rulesOrPolicies) 
2. { 
3.   for( i = 0 ; i < lengthOf(rulesOrPolicies) ; i++ ) 
4.   { 
5.     Decision decision = evaluate(rulesOrPolicies[i]); 
6.     if (decision == Deny) 
7.     { 
8.       return Deny; 
9.     } 
10.     if (decision == Permit) 
11.     { 
12.       return Permit; 
13.     } 
14.     if (decision == NotApplicable) 
15.     { 
16.       continue; 
17.     } 
18.     if (decision == Indeterminate) 
19.     { 
20.       return Indeterminate; 
21.     } 
22.   } 
23.   return NotApplicable; 
24. } 
- Only-one-applicable: 
1. Decision onlyOneApplicableCombiningAlogrithm(RuleOrPolicies[] rulesOrPolicies) 
2. { 
3.   Boolen atLeastOne = false; 
4.   RuleOrPolicy selectedRuleOrPolicy = null; 
5.   ApplicableResult appResult; 
6.   for ( i = 0; i < lengthOf(rulesOrPolicies) ; i++ ) 
7.   { 
8.     appResult = isApplicable(rulesOrPolicies[I]); 
9.     if ( appResult == Indeterminate ) 
10.     { 
11.       return Indeterminate; 
12.     } 
13.     if( appResult == Applicable ) 
14.     { 
15.       if ( atLeastOne ) 
16.       { 
17.         return Indeterminate; 
18.       } 
19.       else 
20.       { 
21.         atLeastOne = true; 
22.         selectedRuleOrPolicy = rulesOrPolicies[i]; 
23.       } 
24.     } 
25.     if ( appResult == NotApplicable ) 
26.     { 
27.       continue; 
28.     } 
29.   } 
30.   if ( atLeastOne ) 
31.   { 
32.     return evaluate(selectedRuleOrPolicy); 
33.   } 
34.   } 
35.   else 
36.   { 
37.     return NotApplicable; 
38.   } 
39. } 
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Appendix C 
 
- User Elisa with Role Physician’s XACML Policy Instance for the Healthcare 
Scenario 
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">   
2. <Description>Omitted due to length.</Description> 
3. <Target> 
4.  <Subjects> 
5.   <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
6.  </Subjects> 
7.  <Resources><AnyResource/></Resources>     
8.  <Actions><AnyAction/></Actions> 
9. </Target> 
10. <Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
11.  <Target> 
12.   <Subjects> 
13.    <role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>  
14.   </Subjects> 
15.   <Resources><element> 
16.     <elementID>el-3</elementID> 
17.     <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName> 
18.   </element></Resources>    
19.   <Actions><operation> 
20.     <operationName>insert</operationName> 
21.     <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode> 
22.   </operation></Actions> 
23.  </Target> 
24.  <Condition> 
25.   <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal"> 
26.    <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only"> 
27.     <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
28.      Secret 
29.     </AttributeValue> 
30.    </Apply> 
31.    <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer"> 
32.     Secret 
33.    </AttributeValue> 
34.   </Apply> 
35.  </Condition>   
36. </Rule> 
37. <Rule RuleId="simple-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
38.  <Target> 
39.   <Subjects> 
40.    <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
41.   </Subjects> 
42.   <Resources> 
43.    <Roles><role> 
44.      <roleID>2</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName> 
45.    </role></Roles> 
46.   </Resources>     
47.   <DelegationTargets> 
48.    <user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user> 
49.   </DelegationTargets> 
50.  </Target>        
51. </Rule> 
52. <Rule RuleId="simple-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit"> 
53.  <Target> 
54.   <Subjects> 
55.    <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user> 
56.   </Subjects> 
57.   <Resources><Schemas><schema> 
58.    <schemaID>4</schemaID> 
59.    <schemaName>Schema 4</schemaName> 
60.    </schema></Schemas> 
61.    <Instances><instance> 
62.     <instanceID>4,2</instaneID> 
63.     <instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName> 
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64.    </instance></Instances></Resources>     
65.  </Target>        
66. </Rule> 
67. </Policy> 
 
